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Abstract
In the first chapter, I investigate how women’s participation in entrepreneur-
ship responds to a shock to maternity risk. Exploiting the liberalization of
a contraceptive in Italy, I find that lower maternity risk leads to an increase
in the number of young women who become entrepreneurs and in the equity
stakes of new female entrepreneurs. The effects are larger for women joining
innovative firms, who become more likely to be executives and the main owners
of their firms. This suggests that easier management of maternity risk reduces
the gender gap in entrepreneurship and that maternity risk is more important
for women selecting in innovative entrepreneurship.
The aim of the second chapter is to assess whether and how banks’ rent-
extraction affects entrepreneurial innovation, defined as the birth of innovative
firms. I show that the effect of banks’ rent-extraction is theoretically ambigu-
ous, and I show that a lower degree of banking competition leads to a weaker
effect of the policy empirically, exploiting a policy intervention to foster en-
trepreneurial innovation. I propose a new way to measure banks’ rents and
I use a difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) design and Instrumental
Variables approach for identification. Following the policy intervention, the
birth rate of innovative firms is lower where banking competition is weaker.
In the third chapter, I study how the existence of benefits from relation-
ship lending could be detrimental to the scope and success of Venture Capital.
I construct a model in which entrepreneurial choices are tilted towards less
innovative projects to reap the benefits of relationship banking. Relationship
banking benefits cause the entrepreneur to opt for more traditional projects,
forgoing more profitable innovative projects and VC financing. The mechanism
is exacerbated by higher costs to obtain venture capital and lower VC exper-
tise. The model shows how banks and venture capitalists are linked through
entrepreneurial choices.
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1. Maternity Risk and the Gender Gap
in Entrepreneurship
FABRIZIO CORE1
In developed countries women’s participation rates in entrepreneurship are
40 to 50% those of men (Halabisky (2018), Bosma and Kelley (2019)). This
gender gap is particularly severe for entrepreneurial projects that are more
capital intensive and innovative, with women accounting for less than 10% of
the total of entrepreneurs (Coleman and A. Robb (2009), P. A. Gompers and
Wang (2017b)). Despite the importance of innovative start-ups for job creation
and economic growth (Decker et al. (2014), Puri and Zarutskie (2012)), little is
known about the cause of the wide gender gap in innovative entrepreneurship
and its implications for the efficient allocation of talent in this pre-eminent
sector of the economy.
Entrepreneurship, in growth-oriented and innovative firms in particular,
requires significant commitment of time and resources. Levine and Rubin-
stein (2017) find that incorporated entrepreneurs work 27% more hours and
earn 41% more per hour than salaried employees. The literature in labor
economics shows that women select out of high-powered jobs that penalize
them more for career breaks and flexible hours, because of maternity risk and
motherhood (Bertrand et al. (2010), Goldin (2014)). This suggests that ma-
ternity risk is likely to be an important factor in the decision of women to
become entrepreneurs, a career with highly skewed payoffs and lack of protec-
tion for prospective mothers. Yet the link between maternity risk and female
entrepreneurship remains understudied.
1I thank Ulf Axelson, Daniel Paravisini, Dirk Jenter and Daniel Ferreira for their invalu-
able comments and supervision. I furthermore thank Moqi Groen-Xu, Vicente Cuñat, Denis
Gromb and Chiara Serra, as well as all participants at the LSE PhD Seminar, the HEC PhD
Conference and the QMUL PhD Workshop in Economics and Finance for their comments.
Some of the data used in the paper comes from Rilevazione sulle forze di lavoro, by the Ital-
ian Statistical Institute (ISTAT). The data have been accessed at the ADELE laboratory in
Rome to safeguard the privacy of the individuals and statistical confidentiality. The results
and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the official position of ISTAT, and should not be considered official statistics.
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In this paper, I study the response of female entrepreneurship to a shock
to maternity risk, defined as the possibility of a woman having an unexpected
pregnancy. I focus in particular on founders of innovative start-ups, defined
as young businesses whose aim it is to bring innovative products and services
to the market (Hellmann and Puri (2000)), for which the gender gap is wider
(P. A. Gompers and Wang (2017b)). As the shock to maternity risk, I exploit
the liberalization of an Emergency Contraceptive Pill (ECP) that took place in
Italy in May 2015. The liberalization constitutes a positive exogenous shock to
the ability of women to avoid unwanted pregnancies and manage their fertility
choices. To measure entrepreneurship, I use administrative data to reconstruct
the population of new incorporated and unincorporated business owners in
Italy and their initial equity stakes.
To causally identify the effect of the shock, I exploit variation in women’s
prior access to abortion services, which depends on the municipality where they
reside. I use a difference-in-differences design (DID henceforth), comparing
entrepreneurial outcomes of women in municipalities that differ in the barriers
women faced in accessing abortion services prior to the liberalization of ECPs.
The idea is that the liberalization reduces maternity risk more for women who
previously faced greater barriers to access abortion services.
I find a moderate effect on women’s participation in regular entrepreneur-
ship and a large effect on the selection of women into innovative entrepreneur-
ship. For regular entrepreneurship, in municipalities where barriers to abortion
are one standard deviation higher than the cross-sectional mean, the number
of women aged 35 or younger who become entrepreneurs increases by 3% com-
pared to pre-liberalization levels. As a result, the gender gap in participation
rates closes by 6%. I also document a new dimension of the gender gap, per-
taining to equity holdings. Controlling for age and firm characteristics, women
founders hold on average between 0.4 and 2 percentage points less equity than
men. Therefore, the gender gap in entrepreneurship also has an intensive mar-
gin: not only do fewer women join entrepreneurship, but those who join also
own less of the firm. Following the liberalization, higher barriers to abortion
are associated with an increase in equity holdings of women aged 35 or younger
of 0.14%, closing 14% of the gender gap. When considering limited-liability
companies only, the increase is 0.61%, or 16% of the gender gap. At the firm
level, the average new limited-liability company has 1.19% more of its equity
held by women and new companies are also more likely to be majority-owned
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by one or more women. The proportion of women within similar founding
teams grows by 1.03%.
All effects are larger when I focus on innovative start-ups. Once ECPs are
more easily available, the number of women aged 35 or younger who start an
innovative firm increases by 39.6% where barriers to abortion are one standard
deviation higher than the cross-sectional mean, closing 27% of the gender gap.
Also, higher barriers to abortion correspond to the average female founder
of younger age holding 17.35% more equity in her innovative start-up, and
being 16.46% and 43.42% more likely to be the main owner or an executive,
respectively, where main owners hold the largest equity stake among founders.
Consequently, the gender gap in equity holdings closes by 64%, while the gap
in the probability of being an executive reduces by 23%.
Lastly, I use microdata from a survey of the labor force to investigate if
the liberalization had an effect on women’s the probability of being employed
and on the number of hours worked. The liberalization had no significant
effect on these variables, suggesting maternity risk is of greater importance
for prospective entrepreneurs. I also use the survey to further investigate
entrepreneurship. I find that, following the liberalization, women below 35
years of age in a stable relationship living in areas with higher barriers to
abortion are 17.78% more likely to be entrepreneurs and, conditionally on being
entrepreneurs, work 5.42% more hours. This is consistent with Bastianelli,
Rosato, et al. (2016) and Loghi and Crialesi (2017), who show that emergency
contraception and abortions are mostly required by women below age 35 who
are in a stable relationship.
Italy represents an ideal setting to study the importance of maternity risk
for entrepreneurial choices of women. In Italy women’s access to abortions
varies cross-sectionally due to the ability of gynecologists in public hospitals
to refuse abortion services on the basis of their ethical and religious beliefs.
To measure women’s barriers to accessing abortion services at the munici-
pality level, I use a novel dataset on the number of gynecologists who are
conscientious objectors (COs) in each Italian public hospital, combined with
travel times between each hospital and each municipality. I measure access
to abortion in a given municipality as the weighted mean of the share of CO
gynecologists in each public hospital, using travel times between that hospital
and the municipality as weights.
The DID design combines differential prior access to abortion across mu-
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nicipalities with the exogenous liberalization of ECPs. The European Com-
mission imposed the liberalization of ECPs on all countries of the European
Union following a complaint by an ECP manufacturer. The liberalization al-
lowed women to buy ECPs in pharmacies without needing a prescription from
a doctor, increasing women’s access to the drug. I demonstrate the relevance of
my measure of abortion access by showing its predictive ability for the effect of
the ECP liberalization on fertility of women. A one standard deviation higher
weighted mean share of CO gynecologists is associated with a 1% decrease in
the number of births per fertile woman. This is evidence that the liberalization
altered the fertility choices and outcomes of women.
Italy represents the ideal laboratory where to study the importance of ma-
ternity risk also because the usage of modern contraceptives is unusually low
(e.g. 51.8% of women in a relationship use modern contraceptives, compared
to 70% in the US), suggesting that women are more exposed to the risk of un-
wanted pregnancies and face higher social costs in avoiding them.2 Also, prior
to the liberalization obtaining emergency contraception in Italy was harder
than in other developed countries, as Italy was the only country in the world
that required women to take a pregnancy test in order to have ECPs prescribed
by a physician, imposing an additional burden and social stigma on consump-
tion of ECPs. Furthermore, Italy has the lowest proportion of women who
own and manage a new business in the European Union (Halabisky (2018)).
The use of the DID allows me to control both for time-varying macroe-
conomic shocks and for time-invariant economic and cultural differences at
the local level. One potential concern is that the participation of women in
entrepreneurship may have been affected by local time-varying shocks, other
than the liberalization. To investigate this concern, I restrict the sample to
women who would not be (or less) affected by the liberalization but presum-
ably still by other shocks. I fail to find an effect of the liberalization on
women aged between 36 and 49 and women above 50 years of age, both in
terms of participation and in equity holdings. Also, I fail to find an effect on
men’s participation in regular and innovative entrepreneurship, irrespectively
of the age group considered. Finally, the liberalization had no effect on female
founders of unlimited-liability partnerships and sole proprietorships. These
results are consistent with maternity risk being more important for selection
2Modern contraceptives are defined as “a product or medical procedure that interferes
with reproduction from acts of sexual intercourse” (Hubacher and Trussell (2015)).
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into entrepreneurial projects that are more complex and growth-oriented. In
fact, prior studies show that the choice of limited liability strongly predicts
growth-orientation of the firm, while partnerships and proprietorships are le-
gal forms suitable for entrepreneurial projects which are less time and capital
intensive (Guzman and Stern (2016) and Levine and Rubinstein (2017)).
To rationalize my findings, I build on the model of Goldin (2014), who pre-
dicts that women select out of occupations that disproportionally reward time
spent at work. I augment and reinterpret this model to include the choice
between paid employment and entrepreneurial careers under maternity risk.
In accordance with the empirical results, the model predicts that if mater-
nity risk is sufficiently high, a woman would choose paid employment over
entrepreneurship.
My results have important policy implications. Policymakers of both de-
veloped and developing countries have devoted attention and resources in de-
signing interventions to foster female entrepreneurship (Halabisky (2018)). My
findings suggest the importance of interventions to promote work-life balance
of mothers and access to social protection by female entrepreneurs. While
these are factors frequently considered in policies for female employees (Gate-
wood et al. (2014)), interventions towards female entrepreneurship often act
through development of role models, mentoring activities and extended finan-
cial support. Therefore, efforts of policymakers may be ineffective without also
tackling the importance of maternity risk for female entrepreneurs and, more
importantly, for women’s demand for entrepreneurship.
My paper contributes to the recent literature explaining the gender gap
in entrepreneurship and why women start different entrepreneurial projects
compared to men, as documented by Guzman and Kacperczyk (2019) and
P. A. Gompers and Wang (2017b). The literature proposes two main explana-
tions for the gender gap. On the one hand, female entrepreneurship could be
discouraged by psychological factors, such as attitude towards risk and com-
petition or self-perception of own abilities (Del Carpio and Guadalupe (2018),
Jetter and Walker (2018), Guiso and Rustichini (2018)). On the other hand,
it could also be hindered by external factors, mainly discrimination by cap-
ital providers. Assenova and Mollick (2018), Hebert (2018), P. A. Gompers
and Wang (2017a), and Gornall and Strebulaev (2018) focus on venture cap-
italists, Ewens and Townsend (2018) on angel investors and Greenberg and
Mollick (2015) on crowd-funding. I contribute to this literature by proposing
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women’s maternity risk as one driver of the gender gap.
Relatively few papers have addressed the relationship between mother-
hood and entrepreneurship. Gottlieb et al. (2016) show that women are more
likely to become entrepreneurs during longer maternity leave that protect them
against experimentation risk, but they do not directly examine the effect of
maternity leave on entrepreneurs. My work most closely relates to the con-
temporaneous working paper of Bulka and Zandberg (2019), who assess the
importance of access to abortion for women selecting into entrepreneurship
in the US. Similarly to my results, they find that the number of female en-
trepreneurs increases when unwanted pregnancies are easier to avoid. Beyond
their analysis, I also document a positive effect on equity holdings and on the
probability of having executive roles, and I uncover the much greater impor-
tance of maternity risk for innovative entrepreneurship.
By studying the importance of maternity risk for the selection of women
into entrepreneurship, I also contribute to the literature on what drives in-
dividuals to become entrepreneurs (Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Levine and
Rubinstein (2017), and Levine and Rubinstein (2018)). In studying the effect
of liberalizing contraception, I contribute to the literature on policy drivers
of entrepreneurship (Mullainathan and Schnabl (2010), Bruhn (2011), and
Branstetter et al. (2013)). Finally, I contribute to the economic literature that
studies the effects of contraceptives on economic outcomes of women, start-
ing from the seminal work of Goldin and Katz (2002) and Bailey (2006), and
more recently Bailey, Hershbein, et al. (2012) and Bailey and Lindo (2017).
I expand this literature documenting the importance of fertility control for
entrepreneurship.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Sections 1.1 and 1.2 outline
the institutional background and describe the data. Section 1.3 states the
identification and estimation strategy, while Section 1.4 provides summary
statistics. Section 1.5 presents the main results of the paper and robustness
checks, and Section 1.6 concludes.
1.1 Institutional Background
The liberalization of emergency contraception pills (ECPs), by making these
drugs more easily available, reduces likelihood of women having unwanted
pregnancies. It also reduces the cost of averting unwanted pregnancies by
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giving women an alternative to abortion procedures, especially for those women
who face a more difficult or more stigmatized access to abortion. To identify
the effect of this shock, I exploit the exogeneity of the liberalization’s timing,
combined with the cross-sectional variation in access to abortion caused by
gynecologists’ conscientious objection.
Abortion has been legal in Italy since 1978, although there is still a lot of
resistance from institutions and politics (e.g. the Catholic Church, which plays
an important role in providing healthcare services in Italy, still deems abortion
to be homicide). At the same time, Italy had a Modern Contraceptive Preva-
lence Rate (MCPR), which measures the fraction of women in a relationship
that uses modern contraceptive methods, of 51.8% in 2013 (Loghi and Crialesi
(2017)). This ranks below all European and most North African countries. As
a reference, the US had a MCPR above 70% in 2013. This makes Italy a use-
ful setting to study whether the risk of unwanted pregnancies shapes women’s
entrepreneurial choices.
Italy, like some other European countries, also has a data advantage over
many other countries, such as the US: in Italy, all firms, public and private,
are required to disclose yearly information about their ownership structure
and financials. This allows me to study the intensive margin of selection into
entrepreneurship by observing the roles of individual women inside firms, in
terms of equity held and executive positions taken.
1.1.1 Emergency Contraception, Abortion and Consci-
entious Objection in Italy
There are two types of emergency contraception pills (ECPs) available for
purchase in Italy (like in most other countries): the ulipristal acetate pill
(UPA ECPs), also known as 5-days-after pill, and the levonorgestrel pill (LNG
ECPs), the older and more famous morning-after pill. EllaOne (UPA) was
approved for sale in November 2011, whereas Norlevo (LNG) arrived in Italy
in 2000.3
The difference between the two ECPs is the active substances of the two
drugs. They guarantee different periods of efficacy, up to 120 hours and up to
72 hours for UPA and LNG, respectively (Glasier et al. (2010)). In Italy both,
3In the US, the most famous levonorgestrel pill is Plan B, whereas EllaOne is sold under
the name Ella.
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drugs are sold in one-dose packs, at a price of e 26.90 for UPA ECPs and e
17.22 for LNG ECPs.4 The change of the prescription regime did not alter the
price or the doses sold per pack.
In Italy both drugs were available only with a prescription from a general
practitioner (GP). Moreover, Italy imposed an additional burden on women.
To purchase EllaOne, women had to also take a mandatory pregnancy test to
demonstrate they were not already pregnant. The reason being that, given the
drug’s time-span of efficacy, the Italian Drugs Safety Agency (AIFA) expressed
worries about it being potentially abortive.5
In November 2014, following a request by an UPA ECPs manufacturer, the
European Medicine Agency (EMA) adopted a recommendation to abolish the
prescription regime for UPA ECPs in all EU countries. In January 2015, the
European Commission issued an implementing decision for all EU countries
to switch to the non-prescription regime. Every country, except Hungary and
Malta, complied with the decision in 2015, abolishing prescription requirements
for both UPA and/or LNG ECPs. The Italian Drugs Safety Agency (AIFA)
lifted the prescription and pregnancy test requirements for UPA ECPs on
the 8th of May 2015 and for LNG ECPs on the 3rd of March 2016. The
liberalization increased the chances of women being able to take the drug in
time to be effective, since women no longer needed to obtain the prescription
beforehand. Furthermore, removing the need to consult a General Practitioner,
the liberalization also lowered the social cost and the likelihood of incurring in
the social stigma associated with averting pregnancies.
The decision was not motivated by lobbying on behalf of women’s rights
associations, but rather imposed by the EMA, speaking in favor of randomness
in timing and lack of anticipation of the event. If anything, domestic politics
pushed in the opposite direction. Before the liberalization, a parliamentary
question was raised in 2012 by 85 MPs to ban the sale of EllaOne. Also, the
AIFA president at the time of the liberalization was appointed in 2009 by a
conservative center-right government, traditionally pro-life rather than pro-
choice. Therefore, without the EU Commission’s decision, it would have been
unlikely for AIFA to liberalize ECPs of its own initiative.
On the other hand, abortion in Italy was legalized by Law 194 in 1978
(194/78). It required abortions to be made available in public hospitals through-
4Source: Federfarma, Italian Federation of Pharmacies (https://www.federfarma.it).
5Levy et al. (2014) prove this conjecture to be scientifically wrong.
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out the country. Along with the law on divorce of 1970, it constitutes one of
the main achievements for women’s rights in Italy. At the same time, the
law also allows gynecologists and nurses working in public hospitals to opt-out
of providing abortion services, to guarantee their constitutional rights to reli-
gious, moral and ethical freedom. In fact, many religions, like Catholicism and
Islam, prohibit their followers from both obtaining and performing abortion.
This Conscientious Objection (CO) is granted to every doctor who requires it,
with the only exception that the doctor could be coerced in case of an imme-
diate threat to a patient’s life. Appendix A.3 provides a more comprehensive
review of Law 194 and abortion procedures in Italy.
1.1.2 Start-Up Italy Act
One of the challenges when analyzing innovative entrepreneurship is defining
which firms are truly innovative. To identify a sample of Italian innovative
entrepreneurship, I exploit the Start-Up Italy Act (SIA henceforth), which
passed in December 2012. It is aimed at fostering innovative entrepreneurship
throughout Italy and was renewed in 2016. The act gives a series of benefits
to recently incorporated firms qualifying as innovative.
To qualify, a firm needs to fulfill size, sector and age requirements and
conditions on patenting and research and development expenses, while the
founding team needs to meet education conditions. The benefits comprise eas-
ier access to bank credit, tax breaks for equity investors and several exemptions
from bureaucratic duties and red tape. Table A22 in Appendix A.2.1 gives an
overview of the requirements and incentives of SIA. By the end of 2017, 9,039
firms had taken up the program, with only 3.28% of them incorporated before
the launch of the program in December 2012.
The firms participating in the program represent a sample of young and
innovative Italian start-ups. According to De Angelis et al. (2017), start-ups
incorporated under SIA account for 54% and 36% of the number and total value
of VC deals involving Italian firms between 2012 and 2015, respectively. Also,
according to Calenda (2017) SIA incorporated start-ups accounted for 26.2% of
all Italian firms operating in scientific research and development (NACE code
M-72) and for 8.6% of those operating in the production of software (NACE
code J-62) in 2017. The sample of start-ups considered here represents a
sizeable proportion of the population of young and innovative Italian firms.
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1.2 Data
I collect data from a variety of sources: data on abortions and gynecologists
comes from the Italian Ministry of Health. Data about start-ups comes from
the Italian Ministry of Economic Development, while for entrepreneurs and
firms I use the ORBIS database. Lastly, data about labor market outcomes
are from ISTAT’s Quarterly Cross-sectional Labor Force Survey (Original title:
Rilevazione sulle forze di lavoro).
1.2.1 Abortion and Conscientious Objectors
From the Italian Ministry of Health, I obtain detailed data at the hospital level
for the years 2014 and 2015. For each of the 440 Italian public hospitals with
a gynecology residency, I have the total number of gynecologists, the number
of COs and the total number of abortions performed in that hospital in each
year. I calculate the percentage of conscientious objectors for each hospital
in 2014 and 2015 and then average this percentages across time, to have a
measure of conscientious objection around the liberalization of UPA ECPs in
mid-2015.
I construct a measure of barriers to abortion at the municipality level, com-
bining travel times to hospitals with the share of objectors in the hospitals.
For each of the 8,092 Italian municipalities existing in January 2013, I approx-
imate the travel time to every hospital in Italy using the travel time between
the municipality and the hospital’s municipality. While recent the literature
in health economics has proposed an approach to measure access to abortion
at the local level using travel times to abortion clinics (Fletcher and Venator
(2019), Lindo et al. (2019), Myers et al. (2019)), I use the inverse travel times
as a weight to calculate a weighted average of the percentage of gynecologists
who are conscientious objectors in all hospitals of the country. In this way,
I do not restrict the choice set of women to the closest hospital. For each
municipality, I obtain a weighted share of COs that measures the access to
abortion services for women residing in that municipality. Data about travel-
times by car between municipalities comes from the Italian Statistical Institute
(ISTAT). The distances are calculated using a proprietary map book at the
end of 2013.
A woman living in a given municipality will face higher barriers to access-
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ing abortions if that municipality is far from hospitals and if there are few
non-CO gynecologists in the nearer hospitals. In this way, I account for the
possibility that a woman can potentially travel to each Italian hospital, even
if at a higher cost (as proxied by distance). Such cost is not only the actual
cost of travelling and the opportunity cost of time, but also takes into consid-
eration the social cost and stigma associated with more complicated abortion
procedures. Having to travel long distances to get an abortion entails a higher
social and psychological cost for the woman, also due to the fact that it will
be harder for her to have the procedure discreetly.
Since there may be more than one hospital in a municipality, I aggregate the
conscientious objector data at the municipality level. To do so, I calculate the
average percentage of COs in the hospitals located within each municipality,
weighted by the total number of gynecologists in each hospital. The abortion
access index is calculated as follows:
Wm =
1∑
j wmj
∑
j
wmjCOj , wmj =
1
tmj
(1.1)
Subscript m indexes the municipality of interest and j indexes all the munic-
ipalities with at least one hospital. COj is the share of CO gynecologists in
the hospitals of municipality j. The weights, wmj, are calculated as 1tmj , where
tmj is the travel time by car between municipalities m and j. The functional
form 1
tmj
takes into account that the disutility of travel is non-linear in travel
time (Koppelman (1981)) and that the marginal disutility of travel decreases
in travel time (Cranenburgh et al. (2014)). The higher the value of Wm, the
higher the barriers to abortion services are in municipality m.
1.2.2 Regular and Innovative Entrepreneurship
I collect information on the universe of firms started in Italy between the
beginning of 2013 and the end of 2017. I use data from the ORBIS database
by Bureau Van Dijk, which collects all administrative information disclosed by
firms (see Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2015) for a complete description). I identify
all newly founded firms between 2013 and 2017 in Italy and, for each firm, I
collect the date of incorporation, the legal form, the NACE 4-digits industry
code and a unique identifier. I censor the data collection from the fourth
quarter of 2017, due to the incompleteness of more recent data in the ORBIS
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database.
I obtain information about the owners and founders of the firms from the
ORBIS historical offline database. This database contains all filings of Ital-
ian firms regarding owners of equity and the date of the filing. Using the
unique firm identifier, I collect information on founding teams of limited li-
ability companies, both private and public, partnerships (unlimited liability
companies) and sole-proprietorships. Members of founding teams are identi-
fied as all equity owners listed on the first available filing, provided that the
filing was recorded within 20 months from the date of incorporation. I choose
the 20 months cut-off because, according to Italian business law, each firm
is required to disclose information about its owners when presenting the first
balance-sheet. The first balance-sheet can be filed within 20 months from the
registration of the firm in the local business registry (i.e. the date of incor-
poration). ORBIS provides information about the place where each founder
resides and their percentage of equity in the firm.
Founders are identified by a unique identifier, their Italian fiscal code. An
Italian fiscal code is constructed using biographical information of the person
of interest and by reverse-engineering the algorithm it is possible to recover
information about the gender and place and date of birth of the invidividual
(see Stazi et al. (2002) for a in-depth description of the algorithm). The fiscal
code does not carry information on the marital status of the individual or
whether she has children.
Lastly, from ORBIS I also obtain information about the first executives of
the firms, namely those executives who are appointed within 20 months of in-
corporation. The two main roles for executive directors in Italy are Chief Exec-
utive Officer (Amministratore Delegato) for companies and General/Managing
Partner (Socio Accomandatario) for partnerships.
To identify the start-ups incorporated under the SIA program, I obtain
from the Italian Ministry of Economic Development (MISE) the list of firms
that took up the program between January 2013 and December 2017. The list
contains a unique firm identifier and information about the requirements of the
program that each firm satisfied at the moment of take-up. Using the unique
firm identifier, I extract information about the start-ups from the ORBIS online
database and following the procedure previously outlined I reconstruct their
founding teams and obtain information about the founders from the ORBIS
ownership database.
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1.2.3 Labor Market Outcomes
To measure the impact of access to emergency contraception on women’s la-
bor market outcomes, I use the Quarterly Cross-sectional Labor Force Survey,
run by ISTAT. The survey is conducted on a rotating representative sample of
individuals at the province-quarter level. ISTAT samples individuals from all
municipalities above a certain population threshold in every wave of the sur-
vey, whereas individuals from smaller municipalities are surveyed only in some
waves. According to ISTAT, the population threshold varies across provinces
to ensure representativeness of the sample within each province. Since access
to abortion is defined at the municipality level, I keep only individuals who
reside in municipalities that are included in every wave of the survey.
I use data from the first quarter of 2013 to the fourth quarter of 2018, the
most recent available data. The survey provides information at the individual
level on gender, age, marital and family status, employment and number of
hours worked. Combining information on individual’s marital and family sta-
tus, I can identify the sub-samples of women who are in a stable relationship
and of women who are mother of one or more children, which I cannot do for
the sample of founders due to data limitations. I then use this information
in the analysis to explore differences in responses to the shock by women in
different relationship statuses.
1.3 Identification and Estimation Strategy
To identify the causal effect of the decrease in maternity risk on entrepreneur-
ship, I combine the exogenous liberalization of ECPs in Italy with cross-
sectional differences in access to abortion services among Italian municipal-
ities. I use a Difference-in-Differences (DID henceforth) approach to compare
the evolution of women’s participation in entrepreneurship and the labor mar-
ket, around the liberalization of ECPs (May 2015) across municipalities with
different access to abortion services, due to conscientious objector gynecolo-
gists in public hospitals.
The idea is that abortion and ECPs are (imperfect) substitutes. While tak-
ing an ECP may not be equivalent to having an abortion, when ECPs are easier
to obtain, abortion services become less important for avoiding an unwanted
pregnancy. This implies that easier access to ECPs will be more important for
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women that face significant barriers to accessing abortion services. Therefore,
the decrease in maternity risk, caused by ECP liberalization, will be greater
for women who live where access to abortion is lower.
I run my analysis at two different levels of aggregation. The first one is
at the municipality level and it studies the evolution of the number of women
who select into regular and innovative entrepreneurship. The second one is
at the individual level, and it investigates the outcomes of individual founders
(e.g. percentage of equity owned or probability of having an executive role)
and firms (e.g. total woman-held equity or probability of being woman-led).
For both analyses, I divide the population of women into three age groups:
women aged between 18 and 35, women between 36 and 49, and women above
age 50. The motivation behind these breakpoints is that women of age 35
or younger are those more exposed to maternity risk and more likely to take
emergency contraception or to resort to abortion services, while 49 years of
age is the standard cut-off used by WHO when estimating the fertile popu-
lation. According to the medical literature (Bastianelli, Farris, et al. (2005),
Bastianelli, Rosato, et al. (2016)) the average Italian woman requesting ECPs
is 26 years of age, with fewer than 9% older than 30. Moreover, around 70%
of women who get an abortion are below 35, with the highest abortion rates
among women in between 25 and 29 years of age.6 In terms of fertility choices,
the average age of having a first child in Italy was 30.7 in 2014, the highest
in the European Union, and the Italian National Healthcare System uses 35
as the threshold to define advanced maternal age. Lastly, the 35 years thresh-
old also has a biological justification, as Scheffer et al. (1999) estimate that
between 35 and 37, women experience a structural shift in the decline rate of
antral follicles; low levels of antral follicles are strong predictors of infertility.
For municipality-level outcomes, I estimate the following regression equa-
tion:
ymt = α + βmt(POSTt × Wm) + γm + τt + POSTt × ρr + εmt (1.2)
The time dimension of the DID is a POST dummy, which is 1 starting from
the second quarter of 2015 and 0 before, as the liberalization of UPA ECPs
took place in May 2015. The cross-sectional variation, Wm, is a continuous
variable that measures access to abortion services in every municipality and
6Abortions and abortion rates are measured in 2014 using ISTAT data.
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varies between 0 and 1. As discussed in the previous section, the higher Wm,
the harder it is to access abortion services in municipality m. The regression
coefficient on the interaction between POST and Wm is the effect of interest.
To mitigate potential omitted variable bias, I fully saturate the regression
with municipality and quarter fixed effects (γm and τt). I also add region
fixed effects (ρr) interacted with the POST dummy to account for differential
effects of the liberalization across different regions. The main outcome is the
number of female entrepreneurs per 1,000 women living in the municipality,
by age category. I distinguish between regular entrepreneur and founders of
innovative start-ups.
Next, I study outcomes at the individual level to understand whether
the characteristics of new entrepreneurs change after the liberalization. For
each founder, I retrieve her initial equity stake and investigate whether female
founders hold more equity after the liberalization. The regression I estimate
is as follows:
yijmt = α+βmt(POSTt×Wm)+γm+τt+σs+POSTt×ρr+POSTt×FEsj+ijmt
(1.3)
where i indexes the founder and j the firm, m the municipality where she
resides and t the quarter of incorporation of the firm. The regression includes
quarter and municipality fixed effects and interactions between the POST
dummy and fixed effects for the region of the founder’s municipality. I also
include industry fixed effects (σs, defined using the 4 digits NACE sector codes)
and fixed effects for the number of founders and legal form of the firm (FEsj).
I also modify the second specification to investigate outcomes at the firm
level. Firm-level outcomes allow me to better understand overall changes in the
equity held by founders. For example, the founder’s average equity stake after
the policy could go up both because women tend to start more projects alone
(in which case they own 100%) or because women hold more equity within
similar-sized founding teams. While this concern can be partially addressed
by the inclusion of a fixed effect for the number of founders, firm-level outcomes
also allow me to investigate possible changes within the founding teams. I run
the following regression:
yjmt = α+βmt(POSTt×Wm)+γm+τt+σs+POSTt×ρr+POSTt×FEsj+jmt
(1.4)
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While I use the same fixed effects structure of Equation 1.3, m now indexes the
municipality of firm j rather than of founder i in firm j. Notably, the two could
be different. While this makes the estimation noisier, it allows me to assign
Wm to the firm. An alternative method would be to take the average access
to abortion across the founders’ municipalities, but, since people in certain
municipalities will be more likely to be entrepreneurs because of the policy,
a firm’s access to abortion might be endogenous to the outcome of interest,
making inference invalid.
Finally, since the literature in labor economics has established the relevance
of abortion and contraception for women’s labor market outcomes (Goldin
and Katz (2002), Bailey (2006), Myers (2017)), I investigate if the increase
in emergency contraception’s availability had a similar effect. Using the data
from the Quarterly Cross-sectional Labor Force Survey, I run the following
individual-level regression:
yimt = α+βmt(POSTt × Wm) +γm + τt +POSTt×ρr +POSTt×FEsi + imt
(1.5)
The fixed effects structure is the same as in Equation 1.3. The regression in-
cludes fixed effects for age classes (5yrs bins), education levels, marital and
family statuses, citizenship, and whether an individual is foreign-born, all in-
teracted with the POST dummy. Table A23 in Appendix A.2.1 summarizes
the values these variables can take. The dependent variable yimt represents dif-
ferent labor market outcomes: probability of being employed, number of hours
worked, probability of being an entrepreneur and number of hours worked
by entrepreneurs. Following the previous analysis, I estimate Equation 1.5
on different sub-samples of women, defined by age (18-35, 36-49, 50+), and
relationship status (in a stable relationship or not).
Standard errors in all regressions are clustered at the level of the munic-
ipality, as women living in the same municipality might share several com-
mon factors besides access to abortion. Also, clustering at the municipality
level accounts for serial correlation in the policy variable and time-varying
shocks. Lastly, the DID identifying assumption is that women’s participa-
tion to entrepreneurship would have evolved according to parallel trends in
municipalities with greater and smaller barriers to abortion services. While
this assumption is not directly testable, in Section 1.5 I check that different
municipalities were on parallel trends prior to the liberalization of ECPs.
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1.4 Summary Statistics
1.4.1 Barriers to Abortion
Figure A1 shows that municipalities where accessing abortion services is more
difficult (higher Wm) tend to be clustered in the south (above the 75th per-
centile) and in the north-east (above the median). In north-western and north-
central regions (e.g. Piemonte, Toscana and Emilia-Romagna), municipalities
exhibit easier access to abortions (lower Wm).
Since barriers to abortion are not randomly assigned to municipalities, I
investigate how they correlate with other municipality characteristics. I col-
lect various economic and social statistics at the municipality level in 2014,
prior to liberalization in mid-2015. Statistics at the municipality-level are ob-
tained from a variety of ISTAT databases. Table A1 collects the results from
regressing Wm on several indicators of the local economy, entrepreneurial cli-
mate, fertility and women’s inclusion. Since Wm has a strong North-South
clustering, I also run the regression including region fixed effects.
Some municipality-level characteristics correlate with Wm. For example,
once I include region fixed effects, Wm positively correlates with income per-
capita but negatively with the employment rate and it correlates positively
with the percentage of graduates but negatively with the percentage of high-
school graduates. Furthermore, women’s involvement and fertility outcomes
all predictably co-move with Wm. Municipalities in which there are higher
barriers to abortion are also those in which there are more births, resulting
in a smaller share of childless couples. In terms of women’s involvement in
decision roles, whereWm is higher the share of women in town boards is lower.
Consistent with conscientious objection stemming from religious and moral
beliefs, a higher Wm also corresponds to a higher share of votes in favor of
centre-right and far-right parties, traditionally pro-life and against abortions.
Lastly, access to abortion does not significantly correlate with entrepreneur-
ship, measured as the number of firms per 100 residents and the number of
workers in high-tech professions per 100 workers. Furthermore, Wm does not
correlate with the number of female entrepreneurs per 1000 women, neither for
all women nor for women of younger age (≤35 years old). Because of the signif-
icant differences between municipalities with high and low Wm, all subsequent
analyses include municipality fixed effects to absorb time-invariant differences
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between municipalities.
1.4.2 Regular and Innovative Entrepreneurship
The final population of new entrepreneurs consists of 2,131,220 founders in
1,531,660 new firms, founded between the first quarter of 2013 and the fourth
quarter of 2017. I identify at least one executive at founding for 1,335,874 of
the start ups (a coverage of 82.2%), for a total of 1,411,407 executives, 426,411
of them women.
I have a sample of 9,039 innovative start-ups, resulting from the list ob-
tained from the Ministry of Economic Development. From the ORBIS database,
I collect information for 28,294 founders of 8,837 start-ups (98% of the list).
Out of 8,837 start-ups with a founding team, information on executives at
founding is available for 5,273 start-ups (around 60%), for a total of 6,183
executives. Innovative entrepreneurial project accounts for 1.4% of new en-
trepreneurs, and 0.6% of new firms.
Table A2 presents summary statistics for the population of new founders
and of new firms. The first row of Panel A of Table A2 shows evidence of the
gender participation gap in entrepreneurship, as only 30% of all new founders
are women. In accordance with the literature on the gender gap, the problem
is more severe in innovative firms, where the share of women falls to 20%.
Compared to regular entrepreneurship, founders of an innovative start-up are
less likely to be foreign-born individuals, tend to be 1 year older on average and
to hold smaller stakes of equity in their companies. The evidence on foreign-
born individuals is consistent with P. A. Gompers and Wang (2017b), who
document that the innovation sector also suffers from a diversity gap. Figure
A2 shows the gender gap in entrepreneurial participation as a function of age
of the founders. For unlimited liability partnerships, the share of women is
constant throughout the age structure, at around 30%. On the other hand,
for limited liability companies the gender gap widens throughout fertile age
(especially up to 30 years of age), to then stabilize at around 28%. This
suggests a relationship between the fertile age of women and the existence of
the gender gap in entrepreneurship.
Comparing the average new firm with the average new innovative start-
up (Table A2, Panel B), the former tends to have more women within the
founding team, and the team is smaller and younger on average. Both the
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average new firm and innovative start-up have one executive, who is more likely
to be a woman in the average new firm. Regarding sector and geographical
distribution, Table A3 collects the NACE sectors and macro-regions (NUTS1)
of new firms and new innovative start-ups. The latter tend to be clustered in
ICT and R&D sectors (NACE sectors J and M), which combined account for
almost 70% of the total. The same sectors accounts for less than 10% of all
new firms. The most represented sectors in the population of new firms are
wholesale and retail and the accommodation and food industry.
Geographically, almost a third of the start-ups are located in the Northwest,
with Milan being the main Italian innovation hub. Nonetheless, the rest of the
sample is rather more equally distributed across north-eastern, central and
southern (including isles) Italy. Comparing the geographical distribution of
innovative start-ups and of all new firms, the former are more concentrated in
the North, suggesting that the South is a harder environment for innovative
entrepreneurship. On the other hand, the South accounts for a bigger share of
the total of new firms. I address such geographical clustering including region
fixed effects interacted with the POST dummy in my specifications, in this
way I compare firms and founders within coherent economic environments.
There are 20 regions in Italy, which are larger administrative divisions than
municipalities but smaller than macro-regions.
1.4.3 Labor Market Survey
After applying the aforementioned filters to the Quarterly Cross-sectional La-
bor Force Survey, I have 3,042,088 individual observations in 900 municipalities
over 24 quarters, 1,601,883 of which are women (53%). Table A24 collects sum-
mary statistics for the sample: 32.7% of individuals are parents of one or more
children, while 49.4% are singles. Women tend to be slightly older than men
on average (48 versus 45 years).
In this sample , 4.4% of individuals are entrepreneurs. Also, this sample
shows the participation gap in entrepreneurship between men and women: only
3.4% of women are entrepreneurs compared to 5.5% of men, more than 25,000
fewer individuals. The overall employment rate is around 81% for men and
almost 8 percentage points lower for women. In terms of the average monthly
wage, women earn on average 300 Euros less then men, which accounts for
almost a third of their pay. This evidence is consistent with the literature in
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labor economics that document the wage and employment gap in the US (Blau
and Kahn (2006), Blau and Kahn (2013)).
Since I am excluding all individuals living in municipalities that are not
included in the survey in all quarters, I use individuals living in 900 munici-
palities, out of 8,092, in the analysis. The 900 municipalities are representative
of access to abortion of all municipalities. While the average Wm in Italy is
69.9% with a standard deviation of 0.045, the municipalities considered have
an average Wm of 70.9% with a standard deviation of 0.069.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Contraception and Fertility
I first show that the abolition of the prescription regime had a large effect on
the sales of EllaOne, the 5-days-after ECP available in Italy, in Figure A3.
In the second quarter of 2015 sales grew by 341% compared to the previous
quarter.7 Part of the effect could be driven by substitution between types
of ECPs, as between May 2015 and March 2016 it was easier to get EllaOne
than Norlevo, which was only liberalized in March 2016. In fact, the market
share of EllaOne went from 5.5% at the start of 2015 to 60% at the start of
2016, but the total market for emergency contraception grew by 24% over the
same period.8 Hence, the abolition of the prescription regime appears to have
enlarged the market for emergency contraception.
In order for the liberalization of ECPs to constitute a reduction of ma-
ternity risk I need to rule out the possibility of women substituting regular
contraception with ECPs, especially in areas where barriers to abortion were
higher. Unfortunately, data on sales or consumption of regular contraceptive
methods at the municipality level are not available. From the Italian Min-
istry of Health and the Italian Drug Safety Agency (AIFA), I obtain data on
consumption (defined daily dose, DDD, per 1000 inhabitants) of regular oral
contraceptives at the region level for 2014 to 2018. The main types of oral con-
traceptives sold are progestins and estro-progestins, most frequently referred
to as “the Pill”.
If women substituted regular contraception with emergency one in regions
7Source: AIFA and Italian Ministry of Health.
8Source: data about market shares and size comes from IQVIA.
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where accessing abortion services was more difficult, I would expect consump-
tion of regular contraception to fall more after the liberalization in these re-
gions. To test this, I aggregate access to abortion at the region level (Wr),
using as weight the share of women aged 18-49 living in each municipality of
each region:
Wr =
1
FFr
∑
m
FFmWm , ∀m ∈ r (1.6)
FFr and FFm are the number of women aged 18 to 49 living in the region
and municipality in 2014, respectively. I estimate regressions relating con-
sumption of regular contraception to access to abortion, an indicator for the
post-liberalization period, and their interaction. Table A4 collects the esti-
mates. The liberalization of ECPs did not have a significant effect on women’s
consumption of oral contraceptives, as the coefficient on the post-liberalization
is negative but not significant, whereas access to abortion correlates negatively
and significantly with the consumption of regular contraception. The interac-
tion term is not significant and positive, suggestive of a lack of differential
substitution between contraceptive methods in regions with different access to
abortion. However the small number of observations and unavailability of data
prior to 2014 warrant caution in interpreting this finding.
To further rule out the possibility of women substituting regular contra-
ception with emergency one, I investigate if the liberalization of ECPs affected
regular contraception’s popularity in Google searches. Figure A4 plots Google
interest for searches of the most popular contraceptive pills sold in Italy (Yaz,
Yasminelle and Yasmin), as well as of the word “condom”. The liberalizations
did not meaningfully decrease the popularity of these search terms. Further-
more, even though medical literature deems EC drugs as safe (Trussell et al.
(2014)), EllaOne’s label recommends not taking more than one dose during
the same menstrual cycle. Also, survey evidence shows that more than 50% of
women think that ECPs are either very dangerous or rather dangerous SWG
(2017), which speaks in favor of women using ECPs as a last resort rather than
as regular contraception.
I also test if liberalizing ECPs affected fertility, since maternity risk is not
directly observable. I examine the number of children born per 1000 women of
fertile age (conventionally 49 years or younger). If ECPs are an efficient way
to avert unwanted pregnancies, following their liberalization women’s fertility
should decrease. If unwanted pregnancies are more frequent where barriers to
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abortion access are higher, fertility should decrease more in these municipali-
ties. To test this, I use the number of births per 1000 women in fertile age at
the municipality level as an outcome variable of the DID. Data on fertility at
the municipality level comes from ISTAT and is available at a yearly frequency.
Results of the estimation for 2012 to 2017 are collected in Table A5, and
illustrated in Figure A5, that also shows that fertility in different municipal-
ities followed parallel trends before the liberalization. The coefficient of the
interaction between Wm and POST is negative and significant. Therefore,
following the liberalization of ECPs, fertility declined more in municipalities
where having an abortion was harder. I find that a standard deviation increase
in barriers to abortion is associated with a decrease in fertility of almost 1%
of the pre-liberalization average, from 2015 to 2017, equivalent to a decrese in
fertility of 0.5% per year. The effect is bigger than what documented in the
literature on the liberalization of ECPs in the US: Mulligan (2016) finds that it
led to a decrease of around 0.2% per year in women’s fertility, while Gross et al.
(2014) and Durrance (2013) find no effect. The discrepancy of my results with
the previous literature might be explained by differences in the institutional
settings. As noted in the introduction, Italy has a lower modern contraceptive
prevalence rate than the US, which makes women more likely to be exposed to
maternity risk. This result constitutes the first attempt to estimate the effect
of emergency contraception’s availability on women’s fertility rates in Italy.
1.5.2 The ECP Liberalization and Female Entrepreneur-
ship
I document a new dimension of the gender gap in entrepreneurship: conditional
on being entrepreneurs, women hold less equity. Table A6 shows the result from
a regression of the share of equity of each founder on an indicator variable of her
being a woman. I include a set of fixed effects for the number of founders, the
quarter of incorporation, municipality, NACE code and legal form. I estimate
the regressions using data only from the pre period (e.g. before the second
quarter of 2015). I repeat the analysis for different legal forms of the firm
and different age brackets of the founder. I find that this gender equity gap is
bigger for limited liability companies than for unlimited liability partnerships,
and it grows to more than 2% of equity in innovative start-ups. Women tend to
matter less for more structured and innovative entrepreneurial projects, even
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if conditional on being entrepreneurs the equity gap with men is less dramatic
than in terms of participation.
Therefore, women experience a gender gap both in participation and in
equity holdings. I define the participation gap as the extensive margin of the
gender gap, whereas the equity holding gap constitutes the intensive margin.
I start by studying the effect of the ECP liberalization on the participation
of women in regular entrepreneurship. To study the extensive margin, I calcu-
late the number of women in each age group (18-35, 36-49, 50+) who become
owners of newly founded firms in each municipality and quarter. I standardize
the number of new female entrepreneurs by the number of women in the respec-
tive age group living in the municipality. I use this measure as the dependent
variable in estimating Equation 1.2. I include municipality and quarter fixed
effects and region fixed effects interacted with the POST dummy to control
for nation-wide or region specific time-variant shocks and for time-invariant
differences between municipalities.
Table A7 collects the estimates. The coefficient on the interaction be-
tween barriers to abortion and POST is positive and significant for female
entrepreneurs below age 35, and insignificant for all other age groups. The
number of female entrepreneurs aged 35 or younger, standardized by the cor-
responding number of women living in the municipality, increases by 3% for
one standard deviation increase in Wm, compared to the pre-liberalization
mean. These results are consistent with women below 35 being most affected
by the liberalization, since this is the age group most at risk of taking ECPs,
as mentioned in Section 1.3.
The evidence in Table A7 suggests that giving women ways to manage
their fertility risk helps shrink the gender participation gap in entrepreneur-
ship. This can happen through at least two different channels. On the one
hand, women might be more prone to become entrepreneurs after ECPs are
made more easily available because they are less exposed to the risk of un-
wanted pregnancies. A similar channel has been documented by Bandiera
et al. (2017), who show that awareness of contraceptives increases women’s
empowerment, improving their economic and entrepreneurial prospects. On
the other hand, the number of female entrepreneurs could increase because
fewer women experience unwanted pregnancies that cause them to forgo their
entrepreneurial projects. This channel is in line with the labour economics
literature on contraception, which shows that once contraceptive methods are
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available fewer women forgo employment due to pregnancies (Goldin and Katz
(2002), Bailey (2006)).
In column 5 of Table A7, I use a different definition of who is an en-
trepreneur. Following Gartner and Shane (1995), I consider as entrepreneurs
only those individuals who have executive roles, rather than those who are
equity holders. Using this alternative measure of entrepreneurship, the results
do not change. The share of women younger than 35 who are entrepreneurs
increases following the liberalization of ECPs, with a magnitude of 4%, com-
parable to the previous result.
To investigate how the intensive margin of the gender gap responds to
the liberalization of ECPs, I study it’s effect on the share of equity held by
women in new firms founded around the event. Table A8 shows that for
women 35 or younger the shock had a positive and significant effect on their
share of equity. Their equity holding increases by 0.14%, with respect to
pre-liberalization mean, for one standard deviation higher Wm. While the
economics magnitude of the effect is small, it accounts for 14% of the gender
gap in equity holdings. Women above 36 years are not significantly affected,
consistently with maternity risk being more relevant for younger women.
According to Guzman and Stern (2016), business registration and limited
liability are strong predictors of a firm’s growth-orientation. These firms re-
quire bigger investments of time and resources from founders. Therefore, I
expect maternity risk to be more relevant for women who start limited liabil-
ity companies. To investigate this hypothesis, I run the analysis separately
for founders of limited liability companies and unlimited liability partnerships
and proprietorships. Columns 5 and 6 of Table A8 show that women who
found a limited liability company are the only affected group. A one standard
deviation higher Wm is associated with an increase by 0.6% of the equity hold-
ings of women 35 or younger, which accounts for more than 17% of the gap in
equity holdings with men. Young founders of partnerships and proprietorships
are not significantly affected by the shock to maternity risk. As it was the
case for the participation gap, giving young women ways to effectively deal
with maternity risk allows a more equitable participation of both genders in
entrepreneurship.
To assess the robustness of the result on equity holdings, I use a difference-
in-difference-in-differences analysis (DDD), that adds interactions with a fe-
male dummy (F ) to the previous specification and uses the population of male
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founders as control group. The results are shown in Table A9 and confirm the
robustness of the main analysis. When considering newly incorporated limited
liability companies, the liberalization increases equity holding of young women
(35 years or less) relative to young men and also makes them more likely to
be main owners, defined as those founders who hold the largest equity stake in
the firm. On the other hand, there is no differential change between male and
female founders when considering founders between 36 and 49 years of age or
founders of unlimited liability partnerships or proprietorships.
1.5.3 Firm-Level Evidence
Lastly, I investigate the effect of the liberalization on women’s involvement
at the firm level. For each firm, I calculate the amount of equity owned by
women, whether control, defined as an equity stake of 50% or more, is assigned
to one or more women, the maximum share of equity held by a woman, and
the percentage of women in the founding team. As discussed in Section 1.3,
I assign to each firm the access to abortion of the municipality where it is
located, which may not be the same where the founders live.
Table A10 presents the estimates of Equation 1.4. I restrict the analysis
to limited-liability companies. I find a positive and significant effect on the
total amount of equity held by women, the likelihood of one or more women
being in control of the firm and on the percentage of women in the founding
team. This evidence is consistent with the results at the founder level. Since
the coefficient on the maximum share of equity is not significant, there is no
evidence that following the liberalization women are more likely to start firms
on their own. This suggests that after the liberalization women are more likely
to be part of bigger founding teams, within which they matter more.
1.5.4 The ECP Liberalization and Female Innovative En-
trepreneurship
Using the sample of innovative start-ups incorporated under the Start-up Italy
Act, I next study the effect of the ECP liberalization on the gender gap in
innovative entrepreneurship, both in the extensive and intensive margin. As it
is the case for limited liability companies, innovative entrepreneurial projects
require significant investments in time and resources, especially in their early
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stages. Moreover, innovative entrepreneurial ideas depreciate faster than non-
innovative ones, making the ability to start the project at the right time par-
ticularly important. For these reasons, maternity risk might be an important
factor for women selecting in innovative entrepreneurship.
Column 1 of Table A11 shows that the shock to maternity risk had a
positive and significant effect on the number of women who join innovative en-
trepreneurship. For one standard deviation higher Wm, the number of women
who join innovative entrepreneurship increases by 32%. When dividing women
by age (18-35, 36-49, 50+), the only significantly affected group is that of
younger women, as shown in column 3 of Table A11.
The effect of the liberalization is more than ten times larger for innova-
tive entrepreneurship than for regular entrepreneurship. While one standard
deviation higher Wm corresponds to a 3% increase in the number of young
female entrepreneurs, it corresponds to an almost 40% increase in the num-
ber of female entrepreneurs in innovative firms. This suggests that the risk
of unwanted pregnancies and inefficient planning of motherhood matter more
for selection into innovative entrepreneurship than for selection into regular
entrepreneurship.
I next study whether the liberalization causes women who found an in-
novative start-up after the liberalization to hold more equity with respect to
those who founded it before when facing higher barriers to abortion. Table
A12 shows that the average equity stake of female founders living in areas
with worse access to abortion goes up more after the liberalization of ECPs,
as the coefficient on the interaction of POST and Wm is positive and signif-
icant. It corresponds to an increase in younger women’s average equity stake
of almost 18% for one standard deviation higher Wm. Similarly to what I see
in the extensive margin, the intensive margin effect is larger in terms of eco-
nomic magnitude for innovative entrepreneurs than for the whole population
of founders. The coefficient is significant for all women, but when considering
different age brackets only women younger than 35 are significantly affected.
Again, the results are consistent with young women being most affected.
A possible consequence of women holding more equity is that they could
also take on more important roles. To test whether this is the case, I study the
probability of a woman having two main roles, one is being the main owner
and the other being an executive. Executives are defined as those managers
who have executive powers (e.g. a CEO is an executive, but a board member is
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not). Table A13 collects estimates of the effect on the probability of the average
woman founder being the main owner. When considering all women the effect
is positive but not significant, but when restricting the sample to women aged
35 or younger, women who found their start-up after the liberalization of ECPs
are almost 17% more likely to be main owners, for one standard deviation
increase in Wm. Young female founders in areas with worse access to abortion
also become more likely to be executives at founding, which is not the case for
female founders in other age categories (Table A14).
Another consequence of holding more equity is that women would make
bigger investments in their start-ups. To study if this is the case, I estimate
the Euro-value of each founder’s equity stake. To do so, I multiply the per-
centage of equity owned by each founder by the capital stock resulting form
the first balance sheet filed by the company. Importantly, this measure is only
a proxy of the value of the investment made by the founder, unless all equity
contributions have been made in cash. I find that female founders aged 35 or
younger invest around 24% more in their start-ups, for one standard deviation
higher Wm, compared to the pre-policy mean (Table A15). This corresponds
to investments bigger by almost 1000 Euros, excluding start-ups with only one
founder.
I then study whether women who join innovative entrepreneurship following
the liberalization of ECPs are different, compared to those who join prior to
it. Since the data are from administrative sources, I have limited information
about the founders. I investigate the average age, within each of the age
brackets I considered in previous analysis. If the liberalization of ECPs allowed
the selection into entrepreneurship of women in maternal age, I expect to find
an increase in the average woman founder below 35, as maternal age in Italy
tends to corresponds with the 30s. Table A16 shows that this is indeed the
case, while women in other age brackets do not seem to be of different age
around the policy.
Lastly, I investigate women’s participation in innovative entrepreneurship
at the start-up level. I study the amount of equity held by women, whether
control is assigned to one or more women, the maximum share of equity in
the hands of a single woman, and the percentage of women in the founding
team. Following the same analysis of regular entrepreneurship, I define access
to abortion using the municipality of incorporation of the start-up. The evi-
dence is mostly consistent with the previous founding. From Table A17, the
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percentage of women in the founding team increases, while other coefficients
are insignificant. The coefficient on the total equity held by women is positive
and close to being significant. In interpreting these results, it is important to
take into account the noise introduced in the estimation and the limited size
of the sample, compared to the one of all firms, which makes the estimates
imprecise. Conversely, the coefficients on the maximum share held by a single
woman and the likelihood of a single woman holding more than 50% are both
negative and insignificant. The conclusion I draw from these results is that
women do not necessarily start projects on their own but rather join bigger
founding teams.
1.5.5 The Quarterly Cross-sectional Labor Force Survey
I use the Quarterly Cross-sectional Labor Force Survey to assess the robustness
of the results on female entrepreneurship, and since the impact of emergency
contraception on women’s labor market outcomes has not been studied, I also
study the impact of ECP liberalization in Italy on women’s probability of
employment and hours worked.
Firstly, I document the gender gap for different economic outcomes (Table
A19). I use all individuals in the survey to regress different labor market
outcomes on a dummy equal to one if the individual is a woman, and I include
fixed effects for age, education, relationship status, citizenship and profession
to match women to similar men. Being a woman below 35 years entails a 17.6%
lower probability of being employed and a 26.5% lower probability of being an
entrepreneur with respect to men in the same age group. Furthermore, women
tend to work 16.8% fewer hours than men, for a 3% lower hourly wage. The
gap is wider when considering only individuals who are in a stable relationship.
Considering only individuals in a relationship, being a woman entails a 40%
lower chance to either work or to be an entrepreneur, and female entrepreneurs
work on average 27% fewer hours than men.
To focus on entrepreneurship, I identify the entrepreneurs in the survey and
investigate how the probability of being an entrepreneur, conditionally on being
able and willing to work, changes for women. In this dataset, entrepreneurs
are defined differently from the self-employed. Self-employed are workers who
provide a service or a good using mainly their own labor (e.g. doctors and
lawyers), while entrepreneurs use both their own labor and capital. I focus
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on entrepreneurs rather than self-employed to be consistent with the previous
analysis. Also, in Italy self-employed are entitled to paid maternity leave
depending on their profession, whilst entrepreneurs do not have any maternity
benefit and therefore experience a higher cost associated with motherhood. I
leverage the richness of the dataset to analyze the effect on women in different
relationship statuses.
Firstly, I find that the effect of ECP liberalization on the probability of
being an entrepreneur is stronger for women aged 35 or younger in a stable
relationship (Table A20, columns (1) to (3)). In this group, the probability
of being an entrepreneur increases by 16%, for one standard deviation higher
Wm. The evidence is consistent with Bastianelli, Rosato, et al. (2016) who find
that women in a relationship are more likely to require emergency contracep-
tion. Interestingly, the probability of being self-employed, for women in the
same age category and in a stable relationship, is not affected. This result is
consistent with entrepreneurship being a more demanding career, compared to
self-employment, and therefore more incompatible with higher maternity risk.
To study the intensive margin of entrepreneurial participation, I use the
number of weekly hours worked by women who are entrepreneurs. As for
the probability of being an entrepreneur, the only significantly affected group
are women aged 35 or less in a stable relationship (Table A20, columns (4)
to (6)). These women increase their hours worked by 5% with respect to
the pre-liberalization mean for one standard deviation higher Wm. Notably,
the increase is not significant for women in self-employment, suggesting that
entrepreneurs are more affected by the liberalization than the self-employed.
The results in this section provide evidence of entrepreneurship being an harder
career than paid and self-employment to undertake when maternity risk is
higher.
Lastly, I study how labor market outcomes of younger women responded to
the liberalization. The literature in labor economics has reached the conclu-
sion that regular contraceptives and access to abortions have been important
drivers of women selecting into employment during the 20th century. The sem-
inal works of Goldin and Katz (2002) and Bailey (2006) demonstrated the
importance of the Pill for women’s labor market outcomes, and Myers (2017)
shows the positive impact of abortion legalization. The setting I study differs
from the aforementioned literature in labor economics. First, I investigate the
impact of emergency contraception among women to whom regular contracep-
CHAPTER 1. MATERNITY AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 39
tion is easily available. Second, I study Italy in the 21st century, where women
in paid employment are entitled to paid maternity leave of 5 months at 80%
of their pre-maternity paycheck. The effect of contraception has mostly been
studied in 20th century US, where women did not have such benefits (according
to Bartel et al. (2018) only 14% of workers had access to paid maternity leave
by 2016 in the US).
I start by studying the probability of being employed, conditional on being
able and willing to work. Table A21, columns (1) and (2), reports the esti-
mates of Equation 1.5. The effect of the liberalization of ECPs is insignificant.
Furthermore, I study women’s labor supply conditional on working, measured
as the number of contractual working hours per week. As for the employment
probability, Table A21 ( columns (3) and (4)) does not show any significant
effect of the shock to maternity risk. Results are consistent with maternity
risk being more salient for women who want to select into entrepreneurship,
compared to women who select into general employment.
1.5.6 Discussion and Robustness
I use a difference-in-differences framework with multiple periods (i.e. quar-
ters), therefore the identifying assumption is parallel trends in the outcomes of
interest, namely that female entrepreneurship in municipalities with different
levels of access to abortions would have behaved similarly without the liber-
alization. Since the cross-sectional variation in access to abortion is measured
by a continuous variable, I cannot divide the observations into treated and
control groups and plot the dependent variables of the two groups over time.
To circumvent this problem, I estimate the following regression equation:
yijmt = α+
2017h2∑
k=2013h1
βmk(τk × Wm) +γm + τt +σs +POSTt×ρr +FEsjt + ijmt
(1.7)
For ease of visualization and to decrease the noise and seasonality of the esti-
mates, I estimate this regression at the six-months frequency. Therefore, τt is
a full set of half-yearly dummies interacted with Wm. Given the presence of
fixed effects, I have to drop one interaction. Following the literature, I drop
the first semester of 2015, which is the last non-treated period. If the parallel
trends assumption is likely to be satisfied, all the βmt coefficients should be
insignificant before the first semester of 2015 (the liberalization took place in
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May 2015) and significant thereafter, showing no evidence of pre-trends in the
outcomes between municipalities with different barriers to abortion. I plot the
βmt coefficients, with 90% confidence bounds. Figures A5 to A9 plot the esti-
mates of βmt for most results in Section 1.5. In general, there are no significant
effects of the treatment before the liberalization of ECPs.
I also use the sample of men, especially those of younger age, to run a
placebo test of my identification strategy. I re-estimate the main analysis on
the population of male founders only, both for regular entrepreneurship and
innovative one only. Appendix A.2.1 collects the tables of the estimation.
I fail to find a significant effect on men’s participation in entrepreneurship
in all estimations. The effects are generally positive but much smaller than
those I find for the population of women. The placebo test also allowss me to
conclude that a reduction maternity risk, by increasing women’s involvement
but not men’s one, helps closing the gender gap, both in participation and
equity holdings.
When studying innovative entrepreneurship in Section 1.5.4, I do not in-
clude a set of fixed effects for the number of founders. Since the sample of
innovative founders is smaller this is to avoid to identify the coefficients of in-
terest on a narrow set of observations. Consequently, the results for women’s
participation in innovative entrepreneurship (Tables A12 and A13) could be
driven by women starting more one-founder firms following the the liberaliza-
tion. As a result, the average percentage of equity would go up mechanically
as women would always have 100% of the equity of a one-founder firm. Investi-
gating such dynamics helps understanding how maternity risk affects women’s
participation. In Column 5 of Tables A12 and A13, I re-estimate Equation 1.3
excluding one-founder start-ups. The coefficients are similar, implying that
the effect on both variables is not driven by an increase in the number of
one-founder start-ups.
I furthermore assess the robustness of the main results to the threshold
of 35 years of age. Figure A10 collects estimates, for various outcomes, of
separate regressions where the threshold is moved, from including only women
aged 28 or younger, up to ones aged 42 or lower. As the threshold is lowered,
estimates become generally bigger in magnitudes but more noisy, since the
number of observations is reduced. When moving the threshold to the left,
regression coefficients become smaller in magnitude. This is consistent with
women being mostly affected by ECPs’ liberalization when they are younger
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than 35, whereas as the sample considered is enlarged, the coefficients wane as
non-treated women are added.
Lastly, I check whether results are robust to specifying access to abortion
in alternative ways. In constructing Wm in the main analysis, I use travel
times and non-linear weighting to allow women to travel to every hospital. As
a robustness check, I use linear weighting to measure access to abortion asWL:
WL =
1∑
j wmj
∑
j
wmjCOj , wmj =
tmax − tmj
tmax
(1.8)
Where tmax is the maximum travel time between municipality m and any
hospital j. Furthermore, I measure access to abortion as Wm and WL, but ex-
cluding any hospital located farther than 4 hours from municipality m. Lastly,
I measure access to abortion as the share of CO gynecologists in the closest
hospital to a woman’s municipality. This last approach is consistent with the
literature in health economics. Tables A25 to A28 in Appendix A.2.1 collect
the estimates of the main regressions for women in innovative entrepreneur-
ship, repeated with different measures of access to abortion. The results are
comparable, both qualitatively and quantitatively, to the one of the main anal-
ysis, that are therefore robust to measuring access to abortion in alternative
ways.
1.6 Conclusions
In this paper, I study the effect of a decline in maternity risk on women’s
participation in entrepreneurship, with a particular focus on innovative en-
trepreneurship.
I find that, in response to the reduction in cost and likelihood to avoid
unwanted or unplanned pregnancies, women tend to participate more in en-
trepreneurial projects, and the effect is stronger for women participating in
more innovative firms. I use the abolition of the prescription requirement for
one type of ECP in Italy in 2015 as a reduction to maternity risk. To iden-
tify the effect, I exploit the differential access to abortion services in different
municipalities caused by the decision of gynecologists in public hospital to con-
scientiously object to performing abortion services. The higher the barriers to
accessing abortion services the larger the decline in maternity risk.
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I study women’s participation in entrepreneurship both in the extensive
and in the intensive margin. The extensive margin of women’s participation
is given by the number of women who select into entrepreneurship and the
intensive margin is how much a woman matters within the firm, conditional
on joining entrepreneurship. In the extensive margin, the number of women
aged 35 or younger who join entrepreneurship goes up, more so for those who
join more innovative firms. For the intensive margin, I study the amount
of equity held by female founders, their probability of being main owners or
executives, and whether firms tend to be more likely to be controlled by women.
I find that younger women facing higher barriers to accessing abortion hold
significantly more equity in limited liability companies and innovative start-
ups, following the liberalization. Furthermore, female founders of innovative
start-ups aged 35 or younger who face lower access to abortion are also more
likely to be the main owners and the executives. On the other hand, I fail to
find an effect for women participating in unlimited liability partnerships and
sole-proprietorships, entrepreneurial projects which are less oriented to growth
and risk.
When analyzing entrepreneurship using the Quarterly Cross-sectional La-
bor Force Survey, I find that younger women, living in areas where access to
abortion is impaired, are more likely to be entrepreneurs, but only if they are
in a stable relationship. The evidence is consistent with the group of younger
women in a relationship being the most exposed to maternity risk. These same
women also tend to work more hours as entrepreneurs after the liberalization.
Regarding labor market outcomes, women do not seem to be more likely to be
employed or to consistently work more intensively. This constitutes the first
attempt at estimating the effect of emergency contraception’s availability on
women’s labor market outcomes.
The paper concludes that maternity risk helps explaining the participation
gap in entrepreneurship. I also establish that maternity risk is more impor-
tant for women who want to join more innovative entrepreneurial projects.
Therefore, giving to women cheaper and easier ways to manage maternity risk
significantly improves their participation in entrepreneurship, innovative one
in particular, both in terms of the number of women and their involvement
within the firm.
2. Lend Me a Hand - Banks Rent
Extraction and Policies for Start-Ups
FABRIZIO CORE1
In developed countries, innovative start-ups and high growth firms account
for about 50% of firm-level gross job creation and contribute significantly to
economic growth (Decker et al. (2014), Mollica and Zingales (2007) and Puri
and Zarutskie (2012)). However, there are significant differences between coun-
tries in the contribution and importance of high-growth innovative young firms.
Countries like Israel have a bursting innovative start-up economy (Senor and
Singer (2011)). In Europe, while others countries Italy or Spain are lagging be-
hind, some others, like the UK or Germany, achieved good results (Henrekson
and Sanandaji (2017)).
There is no conclusive evidence on why this is the case, in particular Axel-
son and Martinovic (2013) show that Europe does not seem to suffer from a par-
ticularly strong stigma of failure, a factor often used to explain the lower level
of innovation in Europe. European governments spend a significant amount
of effort and resources to design and promote policies aimed at helping start-
ups gettin founded from VCs (P. Gompers and Lerner (2001)), angels (Lerner
(1998)) and crowdfunding (Mollick (2014)). Lerner et al. (2018) comment on
the fact that these policies represent fertile future research avenues and it is of
paramount importance to asses what factors contribute to the success or failure
of such policies, both in terms of policy design and economic environment.
Most policies are aimed at helping firms in R&D and patenting activities
on one hand, and easing financing conditions for equity providers on the other.
Another common way to ease financial constraints for young firms are pub-
lic guarantees on bank debt and there is a vast literature documenting the
importance of banks financing for the success of private firms, like Petersen
and Rajan (1994), and in particular for innovative firms, see A. M. Robb and
Robinson (2014).
1I thank Ulf Axelson, Daniel Paravisini, Denis Gromb, Vicente Cuñat and Dirk Jenter
for their very helpful comments. I also benefited from the comments of participants in the
PhD Seminar at the LSE and the HEC PhD Conference.
43
CHAPTER 2. LEND ME A HAND 44
In this paper, I study the salience of banking competition for transmission
of incentives to entrepreneurial innovation. I exploit a policy intervention
of the Italian Government in late 2012, that introduced the possibility for
newly incorporated innovative start-ups to get public guarantees on their bank
loans, the Start-Up Italy Act. Developing a new and parsimonious way to
measure banking competition and cost of debt, I find that in provinces in
which credit is more expensive the effect of the policy in fostering the birth of
firms in innovative industries is weaker. On average, the policy intervention
increased the number of innovative firms by 25%, while in provinces with lower
competition of the banking sector the increase has been of only 10%. Therefore
the policy is less than half effective where banking competition is lower.
In the literature, the seminal papers by Rajan (1992) and Sharpe (1990)
conclude, as a corollary, that the ability of banks to build relationships with
the entrepreneurs they finance, a behaviour associated with uncompetitiveness
by Boot and Thakor (2000), results in more risky ventures being financed.
However I show that the effect of banking competition on the success of a
similar policy is theoretically ambiguous. I develop a simplified theoretical
framework in which banks extract rents and depending on the mechanism
considered, access to credit of more innovative firms can be hindered or eased
by higher rents. Furthermore, the introduction of a public guarantee on the
debt can push bank toward financing more or less innovative firms, depending
on the model considered. This theoretically ambiguity requires the question
to be investigated empirically.
In order to identify the effect of banks’ rent extraction on the effect of
the policy, I use a triple difference design, in which I compare birth rate of
firms in innovative and non-innovative industries industries between low and
high-competition provinces. The use of a DDD framework allows me to use
fixed-effects in the estimation, to address the concern of confounders related
to the business cycle and province and sector specific factors. The idea behind
this approach is that the policy affects certain industries, where innovative
start-ups are concentrated, more than others. Comparing firms creation in the
two groups of industries around the policy allows me to estimate the effect of
the policy intervention. The third difference, between competitive and non-
competitive local banking markets (provinces), gives me the effect of banking
competition on the effect of the policy.
Since the degree of competition of the local banking market is not ran-
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domly assigned and provinces with different degrees of banking competition
tend to be different, I also use an instrumental variable approach. I implement
and improve the instrument developed by Guiso, Sapienza, et al. (2004) for
the Italian banking market. This instrument uses the structure of the banking
sector build by the Fascist regime in 1936, following a banking reform. Results
of the IV and DDD estimations are consistent, and the negative effect of bank-
ing competition on the success of the policy is robust to different identification
strategies.
My results are in line with Ughetto et al. (2017) and Cowling et al. (2018),
who document that in presence of a public guarantee on debt, high-technology
firms experience an higher penalty in the cost of debt. In light of my results,
rent extraction and competition in the banking sector is one of the factors
explaining the lag of certain European countries in developing bursting start-up
sectors, which are fundamental to support and foster growth and employment.
My paper contributes to the literature about banks’ market power and
private firms investment and innovation (Petersen and Rajan (1994), Petersen
and Rajan (1995), Boot and Thakor (2000), Fields et al. (2006), DeYoung
et al. (2008), Benfratello et al. (2008), Dass and Massa (2011), A. M. Robb
and Robinson (2014) and Kerr and Nanda (2009)). From a theoretical stand
point, I contribute to the literature pioneered by Rajan (1992), Sharpe (1990),
Landier (2003), Ueda (2004), Milhaupt (1996) and Diamond (1991), about
banking competition and firms’ outcomes.
In considering banks rent extraction and its link to innovative firms my
work contributes the literature of banking competition and innovation, like
Chava et al. (2013) and Cornaggia et al. (2015), who link competitive banks
behaviour to more innovation. Furthermore, it builds on the literature estimat-
ing banking sector parameters using Italian data, similarly to Guiso, Sapienza,
et al. (2004), Benfratello et al. (2008) and Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia
(2004). I consider the policy intervention studied by Finaldi Russo et al.
(2016), but focus on banks’ rents and competition, like Coccorese (2008) and
Presbitero and Zazzaro (2011).
In developing a new measure to estimate banks rent-extraction my paper
contributes to the literature on concentration and competition indexes (Dick-
son (1979) and Feinberg (1980)), the H-Statistic (Panzar and Rosse (1987)),
and structural-estimation measures, among others Claessens and Laeven (2003)
and Boone (2008). My paper also contributed to the literature about the im-
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portance of public guarantees on debt for SMEs, see Ughetto et al. (2017) and
Cowling et al. (2018).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2.1 outlines the
theoretical ambiguity in a simple framework of banks’ rent-extraction. Sections
2.2 and 2.3 give an overview of the policy stimulus (SIA) and explain how I
construct my new measure of banking competition and rents. Section 2.4
illustrates my estimation and identification strategies, while Section 2.5 review
the data sources and offers summary statistics. Lastly, Section 2.6 explains and
discusses the main results of the paper and their robustness, while Section 2.7
concludes.
2.1 Theoretical Framework
I develop a simple theoretical framework to show how higher rent extraction
can cause banks to finance more innovative ventures as well as fewer. Further-
more, a policy that gives public guarantees on firms’ debt can result in banks
financing more innovative firms when rents are higher, but the result can be
the opposite depending on the model considered.
In the model banks can extract a rent from the entrepreneurs they finance,
making a positive profit on the credit relationship. Depending on the the
design of the rent extraction process, the prediction for the finance of inno-
vation differs. The model highlights two opposite effects: on the one hand
more expensive terms of credit limit the borrowing capacity of innovative en-
trepreneurs if they cannot pledge future chasflows; on the other hand banks’
ability to extract rents allows intermediaries to take more risks by subsidiz-
ing present cashflows with future rents, financing more risky and profitable
entrepreneurs.
2.1.1 The General Structure
The model has three periods, time 0, 1 and 2. At time 0 an entrepreneur looks
for finance. If funded, the entrepreneur produces an interim risky cashflow at
time 1 (X) with a certain probability ( 1
γ
), that depends on her type, and zero
otherwise. If successful, requires an additional injection of funds (I) at time 1
to continue the project. Conditionally on the second round of financing being
secured, the entrepreneur produces a final safe cashflow at time 2 (γ2X), that
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again depends on her type.
There is a continuum of entrepreneurs, each with an own type γ that de-
termines how innovative is her project and it is perfectly observable. They are
uniformly distributed across types γ on the interval [1; γmax]. Innovation (i.e.
higher γ) makes the the first cashflow of the project riskier and the second
cashflow bigger. The funding required, both at time 0 and 1, does not depend
on γ. Figure B1 pictures the structure of the project and its relevant cashflows.
All projects, for all values of γ, are assumed to be positive NPV.
Funding, both at time 0 and 1, is provided by banks that can only use short-
term (one-period) debt claims. Each bank provides I to a specific entrepreneur
at time 0 in exchange of a repayment R1, due at time 1. At time 0 banks and
entrepreneurs are matched and if the entrepreneur does not secure financing
for her project she gets a payoff of zero. At time 1, the realized cashflow is
perfectly observable, so the entrepreneur cannot default strategically on her
debt. If the venture is successful, the entrepreneur can refinances it with the
same bank or she can switch to another one. If the entrepreneur defaults at
time 1, the venture is liquidated for a payoff of 0 and the entrepreneur exits
the game. Banks exogenously extract rents (∆) from the entrepreneurs they
finance.
The discount rate in the economy is 0 and all agents in the game (en-
trepreneurs and financiers) are risk neutral. Furthermore, I make the following
assumptions:
Assumption 1. γ ∈ [1; γmax], where γ = 1 is the least innovative type, the
safest but least profitable one.
Assumption 2. I > 1
2
X, which ensures that the venture cannot be fully refi-
nanced with the cashflow at time 1.
Assumption 3. X > I+∆ > I, which makes projects positive NPV for every
γ and rents sufficiently small to always allow the lowest-type entrepreneur to
be financed.
Assumption 4. Each bank in the economy is endowed with funds to finance
only one entrepreneur at a time. Also, each entrepreneur can by financed by
only one bank at a time.
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The NPV of each entrepreneur’s project is a function of her type γ:
NPV (γ) = −I + 1
γ
(X − I + γ2X) = −I + γX + X − I
γ
> 0 ∀γ ∈ [1; γmax]
Taking derivative of the expression above and using Assumption 1, it is easy
to show that NPV (γ) is a strictly increasing function of γ:
∂NPV (γ)
∂γ
= X − X − I
γ2
=
X(γ2 − 1) + I
γ2
> 0
In this simple framework, innovators are “better” the higher their type γ. To
illustrate the theoretical ambiguity about the effects of banks’ rent on the
financing of innovative ventures, I model the rent extraction process in two
different ways.
2.1.2 Ex Post Rent Extraction
The first rent-extraction mechanism I study follows Rajan (1992), where banks
can extract an ex-post rent by holding up the entrepreneur they previously
financed. The intuition behind this mechanism is that a lack of competition
comes from the existence of a monitoring cost that the bank has to pay at time
0 or of a switching cost at time 1 to be paid by the entrepreneur in order to
seek financing from another institution. In my simplified illustration, I call this
rent ∆ and it can be extracted by banks at time 2 (ex-post rent extraction),
after they refinance the entrepreneur.
In the second lending relationship, in which the entrepreneur is always
successful with probability 1, repayment is as follows:
R2 = I + ∆ (2.1)
Assuming ex-ante competition in the banking sector, it must be the case that
banks do not make profits in expectation:
1
γ
(R1 +R2) = I +
1
γ
I (2.2)
By substituting 2.1 into 2.2, I obtain the first repayment banks requires from
an entrepreneur:
R1 = γI −∆ (2.3)
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Comparing 2.3 and 2.1 makes clear how banks are extracting rent ex-post to
subsidize competitive relationships ex-ante (the hold up problem generated by
either relationship lending or a switching cost). For the repayment schedule
to be feasible it must hold:
R1 = γI −∆ < X ⇒ γ < X + ∆
I
(2.4)
R2 = I + ∆ < γ
2X ⇒ γ >
√
I + ∆
X
(2.5)
In the space of parameters delimited by Assumptions 1 and 3, an higher ex-post
rent ∆ corresponds to more entrepreneurs of more innovative types (i.e. higher
γ) that can be funded. The results comes from the higher cashflow at time 2
that more innovative entrepreneurs produce, which allows them to subsidize
for the lower repayment at time 1. In other words, when ∆ is higher the set of
entrepreneurs that can get founding expands to the right, as the condition in
2.4 is less binding. On the other hand, the inequality in 2.5 is never binding as
the RHS is smaller than one as per Assumption 3. Therfore, according to this
mechanism an higher degree of competitiveness in the banking sector should
be associated with a smaller number of innovative ventures getting funded, as
illustrated by Rajan (1992).
2.1.3 Ex-Ante Rent Extraction
The second rent-extraction mechanism I study is the opposite of Section 2.1.2.
Here banks are exogenously non-competitive and that they can extract a rent
on every single credit relationship, both at time 1 and 2. Now banks do not
subsidize the first credit relationship with a rent extracted in the second one.
The repayment schedule for a bank that finances two now potentially dif-
ferent entrepreneurs in the first and second rounds are:
R1 = γ(I + ∆) (2.6)
R2 = I + ∆ (2.7)
In this framework each repayment is independent and there is no inter-temporal
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profit condition analogous to Equation 2.2. Feasibility now requires:
R1 = γ(I + ∆) < X ⇒ γ < X
I + ∆
(2.8)
R2 = I + ∆ < γ
2X ⇒ γ >
√
I + ∆
X
(2.9)
An higher ∆ is now associated with more high-type entrepreneurs (i.e. more
innovative ones) excluded from funding. As in the previous case, 2.9 is never
binding, as the right-hand-side is always smaller than one by Assumption 3.
The takeaway of this mechanism is that an higher degree of banking compe-
tition results in more innovative entrepreneurs getting funded. When instead
competition is weaker, the terms of credit are more expensive and, without be-
ing able to pledge future cashflows, more innovative firms do not have enough
funds to compensate the bank for their riskiness and also pay the additional
rent, γ∆.
2.1.4 Guarantees’ Effect
After establishing the theoretical ambiguity between rent extraction and the
financing of innovation, I study the impact of a policy that gives a public
guarantee on entrepreneurs’ debt in the presence of banks’ rent-extraction.
To model the guarantee, I assume that in case of failure of the project the
bank can recover an amount kI, where k ∈ (0, 1). The guarantee is relevant
only in the financing of the first period, as in the second period all surviving
projects are certain to be successful.
Guarantees’ Effect - Ex-Post Rent Extraction
Implementing the policy in the ex-post rent-extraction mechanism yields the
analogous of equations 2.1 and 2.2:
R2 = I + ∆ (2.10)
1
γ
(R1 +R2) + (1− 1
γ
)kI = I +
1
γ
I (2.11)
By substituting 2.10 into 2.11, I obtain the first repayment banks ask to a
generic entrepreneur:
R1 = γ(1− k)I + kI −∆ (2.12)
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Feasibility of the repayment schedule requires:
R1 = γ(1− k)I + kI −∆ < X ⇒ γ < X + ∆− kI
I − kI = γ¯ (2.13)
R2 = I + ∆ < γ
2X ⇒ γ >
√
I + ∆
X
(2.14)
Banks are now able to finance entrepreneurs up to the type γ¯. Differentiating
the quantity with respect to k returns the effect of the policy on the marginal
type:
∂γ¯
∂k
=
X + ∆− I
(1− k)2I > 0 (2.15)
Where the last inequality comes from Assumption 3. Under ex-post rent ex-
traction mechanism the policy is beneficial to extend credit to more innovative
firms as the terms of credit are less expensive. To assess how rent extraction
affects the policy’s effect I differentiate 2.15 with respect to ∆:
∂2γ¯
∂k∂∆
=
1
(1− k)2I > 0 (2.16)
Equation 2.16 shows that the effect of the policy should be greater when rent
extraction by banks is higher and terms of credit more expensive.
Guarantees’ Effect - Ex-Ante Rent Extraction
To obtain the effect of the policy under an ex-ante mechanism of rent-extraction,
I rewrite Equations 2.6 and 2.7 introducing the guarantee:
R1 = γ(I + ∆)− k(γ − 1)I (2.17)
R2 = I + ∆ (2.18)
Following the previous steps feasibility requires:
R1 = γ(I + ∆)− k(γ − 1)I < X ⇒ γ < X − kI
I + ∆− kI = γˆ (2.19)
R2 = I + ∆ < γ
2X ⇒ γ >
√
I + ∆
X
(2.20)
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Where γˆ is the marginal type that banks are willing to finance. To find the
effect of the policy on the marginal type, I differentiate γˆ with respect to k:
∂γˆ
∂k
=
I(X −∆− I)
(I + ∆− kI)2 > 0 (2.21)
The last inequality in 2.21 comes from Assumption 3 and states that the in-
troduction of a partial guarantee on bank debt expands the set of innovative
types funded in equilibrium.
Again, I want to find how rent extraction impacts on this beneficial effect.
Further differentiating 2.21 by ∆ yields:
∂2γˆ
∂k∂∆
= −I(X −∆− I +X − kI)
(I + ∆− kI)3 < 0 (2.22)
Where Assumption 3 again implies the last inequality. 2.22 shows that if banks
extract rents ex-ante, higher rents make the terms of credit more expensive
causing the guarantee to expand the set of innovative types less.
This simple theoretical exercise shows that banks’ rent-extraction (i.e.
lower banking competition) can be both beneficial and detrimental for financ-
ing more innovative entrepreneurs, depending on the mechanism considered.
Furthermore, the effect of a policy introducing a public guarantee on debt can
be amplified as well as hindered by an higher degree of rent extraction. The
following empirical investigation serves the purpose of solving such theoretical
ambiguity.
Stemming from this brief analysis, it is important to understand what effect
banks’ rents have on the financing of innovation. It is potentially an important
driver for the success of policies like the one considered in this paper. To offer
ground to my investigation, in the next session I study how incorporations in
innovative sectors, following the introduction of a policy in the last quarter of
2012, vary in local economies with different degrees of banks’ rent extraction.
2.2 The Policy Intervention
To foster the birth of innovative ventures in Italy, the government launched
in December 2012 a series of incentives for newborn and young firms which
qualify as innovative, according to a set of criteria, the so called Start-Up Italy
act (SIA).
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To take-up the policy program, a firm must satisfy all the following condi-
tions at the time of take-up:
1. Being incorporated in Italy as a limited-liability company and be less
than 5 years old;
2. Having technological innovation as main business objective;
3. Having value of production smaller than 5 million Euros as per the last
available balance sheet;
4. Not having distributed any dividend in the past;
5. Being a private independent company, not a university/corporate spillover.
In addition, at least one of the following conditions must be met:
1. R&D expenses accounting for at least 15% of the biggest between value
and cost of production;
2. A patent granted or a registered trademark for a piece of software;
3. Having at least one third of all employees and collaborators holding a
PhD or having been researchers in accredited institutions, or at least two
thirds of them holding a master degree.
Once a firm takes up the program, it can have access to the following benefits:
• Access to government’s guarantees on its bank debt (Fondo di Garanzia
per le PMI );
• A favorable employment law to incentivize the use of stock options and
work for equity as means of compensation;
• Tax breaks for private and public investors in the start-up’s equity;
• An easier and faster procedure for failing and filing for bankruptcy;
• Exemption to several bureaucratic duties and red tape (e.g. subscribing
to the registry is usually expensive but it is free for a start-up taking up
the program).
CHAPTER 2. LEND ME A HAND 54
In particular the access to the public guarantee, which to start-ups under the
program is given preferentially and always for 80% of bank debt, is the policy
intervention I exploit in my analysis.
The public guarantee must be obtained at the moment in which the bank
gives credit to the start-up. Importantly, the guarantee must be requested by
the bank, not the firm, and if it is approved the bank cannot require further
guarantees from the firm. The Italian Guarantee Fund for SMEs, financed by
the Italian Ministry of Economic Development, pays the bank in case of de-
fault of the borrower up to a percentage, depending on the type of operation
and counter-party (as aforementioned, for innovative start-ups the percent-
age is always 80%). Both short-term and long-term loans are eligible for the
guarantee.
2.3 Measuring Banks Rent Extraction
I develop a new measure of bank’s rent extraction, which I call Return Dis-
tance (RD). Banks extract rents when terms of credit are too expensive, that
mean that rate at which a loan is given does not reflect the probability of the
entrepreneur repaying it. On the other hand, a risk-neutral competitive bank
should price loans to make zero profits in equilibrium:
∑
i
[pi(1 + r)− 1] = 0 ⇒ r? = 1− p¯
p¯
(2.23)
Where p¯ is the true probability of success and r? is the average (net) rate of
return that a competitive lender sets to lend one unit of funds for one period
of time. If the observed average rate of return on loans (r¯) is bigger than
r? banks are extracting in equilibrium and making a profit. The bigger the
difference between the observed and the competitive average rate, the higher
the rent. I define the Return Distance (RD) as:
Definition 1. RD = r¯ − r?
The RD measures rents for loans that are homogeneous in maturity, not
collateralized and given by risk-neutral intermediaries. In fact, according to
Nishiyama (2007) finds that banks appear to be close to risk neutrality. Fur-
thermore, my synthetic measure does not take into account the existence of
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banks’ fixed costs. For my empirical analysis this is not an invalidating con-
cern, as long as such costs do not vary by province.
The Return Distance must be estimated in the relevant geographical market
for banks’ loans, where banks should on average make zero profits. I, therefore,
choose the province as a unit of observation over the region as there is a vast
literature which indicates that in Italy the province is the appropriate size
of local banking market (see Herrera and Minetti (2007), Alessandrini et al.
(2009), and Presbitero and Zazzaro (2011))2.
To estimate RD, I focus on short term loans, defined by the Bank of Italy
as Finanziamenti per Cassa. These are loans with maturities shorter then than
12-months and non-collateralized and are the products for which the return
distance is more likely to be a good indicator of rent extraction.
To calculate the average probability of repayment I use the rate of delin-
quencies. The Bank of Italy defines delinquencies, called Sofferenze Rettificate,
as loans for which the borrower experiences a judicial or substantial state of
default and the lender cannot expect the loan to be repaid, either partially or
in full. They are recorded by the type of the counter-party: limited and non-
limited liability companies (the latter also called Productive Families). Loans
to limited liability companies account on average for 92.6% of the total Euro-
value. For every province I calculate a weighted average of the delinquency
rates, using as weights the total Euro amounts (Li) of short term loans given
to these two types of counter-parties:
d¯ =
dpfLpf + dnfcLnfc
Lpf + Lnfc
(2.24)
Given the average rate of delinquency, d¯, I furthermore obtain r?, the compet-
itive average rate of return, as d¯
1−d¯ analogous of Equation (2.23).
To calculate RD I subtract r? from the average rate of return of short-
term loans, r¯. The Bank of Italy collects data on rates offered by banks on
short-term loans by category of the loan. There are three main categories of
short-term loans:
1. Revocable Loans: loans that can be unilaterally terminated by banks
(e.g. credit lines);
2. Fixed-term Loans: unsecured loans that cannot be terminated by either
2Italy, in 2016, was divided in 20 regions and 104 provinces
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parties before maturity (e.g. unsecured leasing);
3. Self-Liquidating Loans: loans given against some form of account receiv-
ables (e.g. factoring).
For each of these types of short-term loans, BOI collects the average return
rate and the total amount given, in each province in each quarter. Fixed-term
loans are the most represented category, accounting on average for 70% of
the total Euro-value of loans in a province. Starting from the average rate of
each category, I compute a weighted average using the total Euro value of the
respective category (Lj):
r¯ =
rRLR + rFLF + rSLS
LR + LF + LS
(2.25)
Subtracting r? from r¯, as per Definition 1, gives the Return Distance measured
in each province.
I measure the Return Distance for each Italian province from the first
quarter of 2010 to the fourth quarter of 2012 (the passing of Start-Up Italy).
For each province, I calculate the average RD over the period 2010-2012, which
I refer to as the pre-policy period.
Lastly, I rank the provinces according to the median RD. Provinces above
median are those in which rent extraction is higher, and provinces below me-
dian are those in which it is lower. The resulting dummy variable Rent con-
stitutes one of the treatment assignments of the empirical analysis.
2.4 Estimation and Identification
The goal of this empirical exercise is to estimate the causal effect of banks’ rent-
extraction on the effectiveness of the policy stimulus. To study the effectiveness
of the policy, I study the evolution of incorporations in industries which are
over represented among start-ups that took up the program around the passing
the policy, in provinces with higher and lower banking competition. I do not
use directly the number of incorporations under the program because taking
up the program is an endogenous decision of the firm.
Firstly, I use a difference-in-differences (DID) design to causally estimate
the effect of the policy. I compare the difference in incorporations before and
after the policy between R&D oriented industries and non-R&D oriented ones.
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Industries are defined as two-digits NACE codes and R&D oriented industries
are those that are over-represented among firms that took up the program
between its launch and the end of 2016. The list of R&D oriented industries
can be found in Table B1. I estimate the following equation:
ypiq = α + γIndustryi ∗ Policyq +Qq + Ii + Pp + piq (2.26)
Where Industryi is a dummy equal to 1 for R&D oriented industries and 0
otherwise, Policyq is dummy equal to 1 after 2012Q4 and 0 before and Qq, Ii,
Pp are quarter, industry and province fixed effects. Figure B7 gives evidence
of the identifying assumption of parallel trends for the DID.
After estimating the effect of the policy on the incorporations of firms in in-
novative industries, I study whether it differs in provinces where rents extracted
by banks are higher, compared to provinces where rents are lower. Accord-
ing to the theoretical framework, the policy should have an bigger (smaller)
effect in provinces where rents are higher, if banks extract these rents ex-post
(ex-ante).
To causally identify the effect of banks’ rent-extraction on the effect of
the policy stimulus, I add a further difference to my previous specification,
resulting in the following regression equation:
yprisq = α + βIndustryi ∗ Policyq ∗Rentp+
+ PQpq + IQiq + PIpi + PQSpqs(+RIQriq) + piqs (2.27)
Where Industryi and Policyq are the dummies previously defined. Rentp
equals one if the province has a pre-policy rent-extraction above the national
median and zero otherwise. I fully saturate the regression using Province-
Quarter, Industry-Quarter and Province-Industry fixed effects. Also, I add a
Province-Quarter-Sector fixed effect (PQSpqs) to account for differential trends
of various sectors in different provinces. Sectors are defined as collections
of industries, according to the main NACE codes. In some specifications, I
add a Region-Industry-Quarter fixed effect to account for additional policies
launched at the regional level to foster the Start-Up Italy Act (RIQriq) and
that could result in differential industry-specific trends across regions. yprisq
is the dependent variable of interest, corresponding to the number of newly
incorporated firms and the percentage of incorporations to the total of firms
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registered 4 quarters before in that industry in each province. The coefficient
β is the DDD estimator, where the three layers of differences are pre and post
policy, innovative and non-innovative industries and high-rent and low-rent
provinces. The coefficient β captures the causal impact of banks’ rents on the
effect of the policy in the two groups of provinces.
In alternative specifications, I assign the treatment Rentp to provinces
within the same region. In these specifications, Rentp equals one if rent-
extraction in that province is above the median value calculated at the region-
level. Regions are collection of provinces and constitute the main level of local
administration in Italy. Provinces within the same region share the same lo-
cal government and parliament. In addition, only regions are allowed to pass
individual policies.
The identifying assumption of the DDD requires parallel trends in the dif-
ferences in incorporations between high-rent and low-rent provinces for innova-
tive and non-innovative industries, absent the policy. Figure B3 shows absence
of pre-trend in the differences between the two groups of provinces. Figure B4
shows the trends using the dummy Rent defined at the regional level.
My identification strategy relies on the fact that I am able to control for all
those factors, other than the policy, that could affect firm-creation differentially
in innovative and non-innovative industries and, at the same time, differentially
in the two sets of provinces. In fact, the saturated regression specification in
Equation 2.27 accounts for all those factors that additively interact with the
endogenous variable. To take into account potential correlations between my
observations, all standard errors are clustered at the province level, when using
the national sorting, and at the region-sector level when sorting at the regional
level.
2.4.1 Instrumental Variable Approach
Alternatively, to estimate the salience of banks’ rent extraction on the effect of
the policy is to estimate the policy’s effect in every province and then regress
these effects on the provinces’ rent extraction. I can estimate the effect of
the policy at the province-level by estimating β from Equation 2.26 for every
province, and then regress the βs on the return distance in the cross-section of
provinces. The second regression would suffer from endogeneity of banks’ rent
extraction. To circumvent the problem I can instrument bank rent extraction.
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To do that, I rely on the instrument developed by Guiso, Sapienza, et al.
(2004), who exploit the Italian reform of the banking sector in 1936, carried
out by the Fascist regime. In particular, they show how the number of bank
branches per capita and the number of savings bank branches per capita can
be used as an instrument for local Italian financial development and degree of
competition of the banking sector. The idea behind the instrument is that the
1936 banking reform allowed savings banks to operate and set up branches in
all the provinces of the region in which they operated, whereas it restricted
to one province the area of operation of all the other types of banks (e.g.
national and cooperative banks). According to Guiso, Sapienza, et al. (2004),
the Fascist regime favoured savings banks because most of these banks directors
were donors of the Fascist Party.
While Guiso, Sapienza, et al. (2004) use the instrument at the region-level,
my analysis is conducted at the level of the province. Therfore, I refine the
instruments (i.e. number of banks branches and of savings bank branches per
capita) by calculating them at the province level (104 provinces). In particular,
I use the same 104-province partition of the main analysis. Since the bound-
aries of provinces changed since 1936, I reconstruct the population of the 104
provinces in 1936 from the population data of municipalities, digitalizing the
1936 Italian Census.
2.5 Data
To conduct the empirical investigation I obtain data from a variety of sources.
I collect data on quantities needed to estimate the return distance from the
Bank of Italy’s (BOI) Surveillance database at the province-quarter level. The
database, collected by BOI to ensure the stability of the Italian banking sector,
contains the delinquency rates of short-term loans that banks give to firms at
the province-quarter frequency. Data is available for 104 Italian provinces, as
BOI does not collect data on Valle d’Aosta, situated in the North-West of the
country and accounting for 0.21% and 0.22% of the Italian population and
GDP, respectively. From the same database, I obtain data on average rate of
returns of short-term loans at the province-quarter frequency.
Data on the number of new firms incorporated and registered in all of the
99 industries (2-digits NACE codes) is from Rapporto Movimprese. Rapporto
Movimprese is redacted by the statistic department of the Italian business
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registry (InfoCamere), which collects and aggregates data from the registries
all over Italy. The analysis runs from 1995 to 2017 and comprises data at
quarterly frequency about the total number of firms in the registry, the num-
ber of firms which are active and the number of new firms incorporated and
dissolved in that quarter, both for limited-liability companies (LLCs) and non-
limited-liability companies (NLLCs).3 Data are aggregated by province and by
industry. In Italy there were 105 provinces in 2016, and they represent the in-
termediate administrative level between town councils and regions. Industries
are defined according to the Italian ATECO classification, which corresponds
to two-digits NACE (European counterpart of NAICS) codes, and there are
99 industries of them (e.g. manufacturing of chemical products or catering
and food services). In the main analysis, I use data from eight quarters before
(2010Q4) the passing of the policy (2012Q4) to eight quarters after (2015Q1).
Data for the construction of the instrumental variables (i.e. number of all
and saving bank branches per capita in 1936) comes from various sources. Data
about bank branches in 1936 are extracted by the BOI INFOSTAT database,
which collects information about the name and type of the bank, and the
location and date of opening and closing of each bank branch in Italy since
1936. Data about population in 1936 comes from ISTAT and from the original
1936 Census, which I transposed from digitalized PDF into usable data.
2.5.1 Summary Statistics
Table B1 lists the industries that are over-represented among firms that took
up the Start-Ip Italy (SIA) program. Since the passing of SIA (fourth quarter
of 2012) 6850 start ups took up the program, by the end of 2016. Table
B2 compares the distribution of the start-up sample and Italian firms from
Movimprese across sectors.4 Almost 70% of the start-ups belongs to ICT and
Professional Services & R&D, but Manufacturing is also over-represented. On
the other hand, more traditional sectors like Agriculture, Construction and
Trade are heavily under-represented.
Start-ups incorporated under the SIA tend to have a strong preference for
bank financing, as shown in Table B3. In fact, the total Euro-value of the
public guarantee used under the program is more than 10 times the value of
3NLLCs in Italy are mostly unlimited partnerships and sole proprietorships.
4Sectors are aggregations of industries, for ease of reporting. According to the Italian
classification (ATECO) there are 21 sectors.
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the outside equity raised in the sample. Furthermore, according to Calenda
(2017), the public guarantee on debt has been voted the most useful tool of the
program by the entrepreneurs who took it up. Therefore the Italian setting
is ideal to study the importance of banks’ rent-extraction for the financing of
innovation.
In terms of geographical dispersion, Figure B5 shows that the policy has
stimulated firms creation throughout the country, with a slight prevalence of
North-Eastern provinces. On average, provinces in which there are bigger
cities (e.g. Rome, Milan and Naples) tend to have generated a higher number
of start-ups. In particular, the province of Milan is a clear outlier, having
generated 794 start-ups alone (more than 10% of the total).
Figure B6 plots the treatment assignment of provinces. High-rent provinces
tend to be clustered in the South, whereas low-rent provinces are concentrated
in the North, particularly in the North-East. To address the problematic
North-South divide, which affects Italy along many dimensions and it can be
a confounding factor, I also rank provinces within each region on the region-
median RD.5 Figure B7 shows that ranking provinces in this way results in
stronger cross-sectional dispersion within each region, without generating a
North-South divide.
I run a series of t-tests for a set of economic indicators at the province
level, to investigate the differences between provinces with high and low rent-
extraction. All indicators are measured at the end of 2012, when the policy
is passed. When sorting using the national median, column 1 of Table B4,
the two groups of provinces (low-rent minus high-rent) are different. High-
rent provinces are poorer, with higher unemployment, produce less patents
and have weaker public services (i.e. higher number of blackouts and stronger
emigration rates for healthcare). Column 1 of Table B5 shows that the two
groups also differ in the structure of their banking sectors. In least competitive
provinces the banking sector is smaller, both in terms of loans and deposits,
with fewer foreign players and branches per capita.
Column 2 of Tables B4 and B5, shows that almost all of these differences
can be explained by the low-rent provinces being mostly located in the south of
the country, which suggests such differences are not driven by rent extraction
but by the North-South divide. On the other hand, sorting provinces using
5Each region in Italy comprises more than one provinces, ranging from 2 provinces up to
12, with an average of 5.5.
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regional medians results in groups that are more homogeneous, as shown by
column 3 of Tables B4 and B5. The differences between the groups for most of
the indicators become insignificant. Regarding the banking sector, high-rent
provinces have slightly less loans per branch, consistent with an higher price for
such loans, a slightly higher growth rate of financial companies, consistent with
intermediaries that can finance growth by extracting rents, and in which the
Loan/Deposit ratio is lower, evidence of a less efficient intermediation sector.
To give evidence that the return distance can be used as a measure of banks’
rent-straction and competition, I estimate banks’ conduct in every province be-
tween 2010 and 2012. To do so I replicate the procedure outlined by Coccorese
(2008). Banks’ conduct measures the distance between marginal costs and rev-
enues of loans in each geographic market and it is estimated structurally non-
linear simultaneous equations. To estimate conduct I collect supplementary
data on GDP and wages in the banking sector at the province-level, as well as
data on government bonds yields. Figure B8 shows that banks’ conduct and
the return distance are highly and positively correlated in the cross-section of
provinces, with an R2 of 52%. If I rank provinces using conduct, the resulting
raking is consistent with the one obtained with the return distance in 78.84%
of provinces at the national level and in 70.19% of provinces at the regional
level. Therefore, the return distance offers a synthetic and parsimonious way
to measure competition in local banking sectors, without the need of structural
methods.
Lastly, I show that the instrumental variables used in the IV identifica-
tion strategy did not meaningfully correlate with economic development in
1936. Table B6 collects the result of a regression of number of banks’ branches
per capita and number of savings banks’ branches per capita on number of
cars per capita (proxy for GDP), share of active population (proxy for em-
ployment) and shares of various sectors of the total workforce (entrepreneurs,
agriculture and manufacturing). Provinces in 1936 which different in the num-
ber of branches of savings banks per capita in 1936 were not different in terms
of local economies, which substantiate the claim that the banking reform was
not driven by provinces’ financial needs.
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2.6 Results
I start by documenting a correlation between R&D orientation of local economies
and banking competition. Following the theoretical framework, if banks ex-
tract rents ex-post an higher degree of rent-extraction should be associated
with more risky (innovative) firms being financed. On the other hand, an
ex-ante rent-extraction mechanism is associated with fewer R&D-oriented fi-
nanced.
Figure B9 plots the share of total firms that are active in r&D-oriented
industries against the return distance in the cross-section of provinces. The
share of R&D firms is obtained as the number of firms registered in industries
in Table B1 at quarterly frequency, average from the first quarter of 2010
to the third quarter of 2012, the pre-policy period. The correlation between
the two variables is negative, both for limited liability companies and non-
limited liability ones. Notably, the slope is steeper for LLCs, consistent with
these firms being riskier. Overall, a lower degree of banking competition (i.e.
higher rents) is associated with economic environments less oriented towards
R&D and innovative. The evidence, albeit not causal, is consistent with an
ex-ante mechanism of rent extraction and a detrimental effect of low banking
competition for innovation.
Next, I investigate the overall effect of the SIA policy stimulus using a
difference-in-differences (DID) framework. Table B7 collects the estimates of
the DID. The DID estimates the effect of SIA both on the number of new
incorporations of innovative LLCs and on the percentage of such incorporations
on the total registered firms in a province-industry combination 4 quarters
before. All estimates are positive and significant which is suggestive evidence
of the fact that, after the passing of the policy, incorporations in innovative
industries grew more than in non-innovative ones. In terms of magnitudes, the
coefficient on the interaction term is 0.249, which corresponds to an increase of
almost 50% compared to the pre policy mean of the dependant variable. SIA
has therefore been a successful policy stimulus for enhancing R&D-oreiented
industries.
The third leg of the analysis estimates the causal impact of banks’ rent-
extraction on the effect of the SIA policy. To estimate such effect, I use a
difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) framework. A negative effect of
bank’s rent on the policy’s effect would be further evidence of an ex-ante rent-
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extraction mechanism. Table B8 reports coefficients of the interaction term
in Equation 2.27 for different measures of new incorporations. The coeffi-
cient is indeed negative (column 1), meaning that lower banking competition
causes the difference between incorporations in innovative and non-innovative
industries to grow less. The magnitude of −0.146 accounts for more than
half of SIA’s effect, which is therefore half-effective in provinces with higher
rent-extraction. A comparable result holds for incorporations expressed in per-
centage terms (column 5). The effect of lower banking competition gets bigger
in magnitude when the region-industry-quarter fixed-effect is included, which
accounts for the passing of additional policies at the regional level (column 3).
To address concerns about the North-South divide, I estimate Equation
2.27 specifying the Rent dummy using regional medians, rather than the na-
tional one. Results are reported in Table B9 and are comparable, both in
magnitude and significance, to the ones of the previous specification. The ef-
fect on the number of incorporations is negative and significant at the 1% level,
bigger in magnitude than in the previous specification, and it remains negative
and significant when incorporations are expressed as percentage of registered
firms four quarters before.
I also study the effect of banks’ market power on the success of the policy
stimulus trough an instrumental variable approach (IV). The need of an IV
stems from the non-random assignment of banks’ market power to different
provinces, which prevents me from simply regressing the effect of the policy
on the Return Distance. As previously mentioned, I firstly estimate the effect
of SIA in the cross-section by estimating Equation 2.26 separately for each
province. I then regress the cross-section of coefficients γiqs on the average
return distances in the pre-policy period, instrumenting it with the number
of banks’ branches and savings banks’ branches per capita, following Guiso,
Sapienza, et al. (2004).
Results of the IV estimation are collected in Table B10 and B11. In Table
B10 the effect of the policy is estimated on the number of incorporations, while
in Table B11 it is estimated on the number of incorporations as a percentage
of registered firms 4 quarters before. Columns 1, 3 and 5 show the first stages
of the IVs: the Return Distance has a significant and negative correlation with
both instruments, and the F-statistics, when the two instruments are used
separately, are always greater than 10. Columns 2, 4 and 6, on the other hand,
show the second stage of the IVs. Weaker banking competition has a negative
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and significant effect on the intensity of the policy. Lastly, column 7 of both
tables reports the standard OLS regression of the SIA effect on the Return
Distance, showing a comparable, but smaller, magnitude.
The results of the IV approach are consistent with those of the DDD. The
evidence brings me to conclude that the pass-trough of a policy stimulus, which
entails a public guarantee on bank debt, crucially requires a good degree of
banking competition, even for those sectors which are supposed to rely less on
bank credit. Therefore, empirical evidence supports an ex-ante mechanism of
banks’ rent extraction.
2.6.1 Robustness
One of the requirements of the SIA policy stimulus is that the firm must be
incorporated as a limited liability company (LLC). I therefore use data about
incorporation of non-limited liability companies (NLLCs) from Movimprese to
run a placebo test. Column 3 of Table B7 shows that the policy have no effect
on incorporations of NLLCs.
Similarly, I fail to find any effect on firm creation of NLLCs in the DDD,
as per columns 2 and 4 of Table B8. Results are not significant even defining
the dummy Rent using within-region medians (see columns 2 and 4 of Table
B9).
To explicitly address the concern on the North-South divide, I construct
a South dummy which equals one if the province is located in the South of
Italy.6 I then substitute the treatment assignment Rent with South in con-
structing the DDD coefficient. I also use this placebo triple interaction as a
control in my main regression. Table B12 shows the estimation of this addi-
tional specification. The coefficient of the placebo interaction with South is
never significant if used as main regressor. On the other hand, when I add the
placebo interaction to the main specification the coefficient on the true inter-
action becomes bigger, more significant and similar in magnitude to the one
obtained defining Rent using regional medians. These results are unchanged
if incorporations are expressed in percentage terms. Lastly, the coefficient on
the placebo interaction, both if used as a control or main regressor, is always
positive.
This is evidence that if anything, the SIA had a stronger effect in the South,
6South here is considered as the collection of the NUTS1 areas South and Isles.
CHAPTER 2. LEND ME A HAND 66
compared to the North. Therefore, the differential effect of the policy in the
two groups of provinces is not mechanically driven by the North-South divide
which affects the Italian economy.
2.7 Conclusions
In this paper I shed light on how banks rent-extraction affects the transmission
of policy stimulus for innovative firms creation. Exploiting a policy interven-
tion of the Italian Government in late 2012, I show that where banks extract
higher rents the effect of the policy on the intensity of innovative entrepreneur-
ship, defined as the number of new innovative ventures, is weaker. Therefore,
more competitive provinces respond better to the policy, which entails a public
guarantee on start-ups’ bank debt. The empirical evidence is consistent with
a theoretical framework in which banks extract rents ex-ante in the credit
relationship.
To causally estimate the effect of banks’ rent-extraction I use two al-
ternative identification strategies. Firstly, I use a difference-in-difference-in-
differences framework, comparing firm creation in R&D-oriented and other
industries, in provinces with higher and lower rent-extraction, before and after
the policy intervention. To measure banks’ rent-extraction I develop a new
parsimonious measure, the return distance. The return distance measures the
difference between the average rate of return of short-term loans and the fic-
tional competitive rate, implied by the average probability of success of these
loans. Secondly, I use an IV-approach, borrowing and improving an instru-
ment for the development of the Italian banking sector originally developed
by Guiso, Sapienza, et al. (2004). The instrument uses the Fascist banking
reform of 1936. Results from the DDD and the IV are similar and show that
the policy is weaker where rents are higher.
Therefore, policy makers should take into account and tackle the issue of
banks rent extraction and banking competition, in order to design effective
policies to spur entrepreneurial innovation. Looking at the bigger picture, I
suggest that this feature of local banking sectors may be one of the factors that
keeps some European regions at a standstill in the development of bursting
start-ups’ economies.
3. Liaisons Dangereuses - Relationship
Banking and Venture Capital
FABRIZIO CORE1
Why has Venture Capital disproportionately grown in particular geograph-
ical regions, like Silicon Valley, and not in others? P. Gompers and Lerner
(2001) identify this as one of the open questions in venture capital research.
Since then, a literature has flourished in trying to establish what caused cer-
tain regions and countries to have a comparative advantage in venture capital
activity, but with mixed success.
Venture capital activity varies significantly across countries and across time.
In 2007, the United States accounted for 78% of all the value of VC deals
around the world and 46% of all VC funds active in the world.2 In 2016, while
the share of American VCs rose to 59% of the total, the share of US-based
deals on the total of VC deals around the world fell to 48%. Jeng and Wells
(2000) find that GDP levels do not explain the cross-sectional difference in the
dimension of the venture capital industry. Figure C1 plots VC investments as
% of GDP in OECD countries against logarithm of GDP in 2016, showing that
no clear association between GDP and size of VC activity has emerged since
then. For example, Italy’s VC industry accounted for 0.5% of the country’s
GDP, compared to almost 10% in Ireland or 15% in Canada, which both had
lower levels of GDP.
The question on what drives differences in venture capital activity and suc-
cess remains an open one. In this paper I propose relationship banking as one
of the factors that impair the success of the venture capital industry. Empir-
ically, Figure C2 shows that countries in which the relevance of relationship
lender is higher, exhibit lower levels of VC activity.3
1I thank Ulf Axelson for his guidance. I also thank Hongda Zhong, Mike Burkart and
Martin Oehmke for their very helpful comments.
2Source: Author computation on OECD Data.
3Relevance of relationship lenders is calculated is proxied by the ratio of loans deposit
made by relationship lenders to the value of loans and deposits made by non-relationship
lenders. Data about lending comes from the IMF Financial Access Survey, whereas data
about VC activity is from the OECD databank.
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Given the high degree of endogeneity of the structure of the banking sector,
I build a model to explain the link between relationship lenders and VCs.
Relationship banking, defined as the ability of banks to refinance the same
firms overtime, adding value to these firms, interact with venture capitalist by
altering entrepreneurs’ choice about what type of projects to start.
In the model, an entrepreneur has two choose between two projects: one
innovative, that is more profitable, and one traditional. Furthermore, the en-
trepreneur has to choose who to approach for obtaining funding. The two
alternative sources of funding in the model are banks, who use debt and can
build relationship refinancing the entrepreneur, and venture capital, that is
costly to obtain for the entrepreneur but it is able to add value to more inno-
vative projects. When refinancing the same entrepreneur over time, a bank can
improve the profitability of a traditional project, similarly to what the VC can
do in the innovative one. The existence of such relationship benefits can tilt
the entrepreneur’s choice towards less innovative project. Furthermore, banks
use debt contracts, which do not allow them to be locked inside the firm. On
the other hand, VCs use equity, and equity has the desirable property to lock
the VC inside the firm, which in case of success allows the venture capitalists
to share the gains with the entrepreneur.
The use of a theoretical model, allows me to undercover the indirect link
between banks and VC. In particular, Da Rin et al. (2013) claim that there is
a substantial scarcity of theoretical models in the finance literature that could
help explaining the choice of different forms of financing by small firms (debt,
angel and venture capital), and how this choice in turn affect the financiers.
Linking venture capital and bank financing is the main contribution of my
paper.
In the literature, few papers try to explain what drives differences across
counntry in venture capital’s success.Jeng and Wells (2000) find that the im-
portance of initial public offerings is a main driver of later-stage VC activity,
but it has little relevance for early-stage one. They claim this helps explaining
why Europe has in general lower levels of venture capital activity compared to
the US, a fact also documented by Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002). Other factors
identified in the literature include the stigma of failure (Landier (2006)) and
lower levels of expertise and ability of European venture capitalists (Hege et al.
(2009) and Kaplan et al. (2007)). But more recently, Axelson and Martinovic
(2013) show that European VC do not suffer from an higher stigma of failure
CHAPTER 3. LIAISONS DANGEREUSES 69
nor from lower expertise when comprehensively compared with their American
counterparts.
My work contributes to the literature about relationship lending, started
form the seminal papers of Rajan (1992) and Sharpe (1990), by showing that
one of the hidden costs of this phenomenon is to crowd out investment oppor-
tunities for non-bank intermediaries. Importantly, as relationship lending has
been associated with lack of competitiveness in the banking sector (Boot and
Thakor (2000) and Petersen and Rajan (1995)) my model can also interpreted
in light of a link between competition in the banking sector and venture capital
activity.
My paper closely relates to Landier (2003), Ueda (2004) and Winton and
Yerramilli (2008) in analyzing the choice of the entrepreneur between bank
founding and venture capital. This strand of literature mainly focuses on
endogenizing the choice of founding, conditional on the project chosen by the
entrepreneur, and it rationalize the stylized fact that riskier ventures tend
to attract venture capital, whereas safer and less profitable firms raise bank
debt (P. Gompers (1995)). My contribution is showing that the choice of
the financier and the choice of the type of venture by the entrepreneur is
a joint problem, and depending on the characteristics of the financiers the
entrepreneur’s choice can change.
My paper also contributes to the literature studying the difference between
the use of equity and debt for the financing of innovative firms (Casamatta
(2003) and Trester (1998)). I contribute to the literature by studying the
competition between banks and venture capitalists under different contracts
design, rather than the contract design itself for a given type of financier.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 3.1 states the assumption
of the model, finds the best responses of financiers and of the entrepreneur,
and solves the model in equilibrium; Section 3.2 extends the model by allowing
the entrepreneur to choose among a continuum of projects, that differ for an
innovation parameter γ; lastly, Section 3.3 concludes.
3.1 Main Model
The economy consists of three periods, from time 0 to time 2. An entrepreneur
can start a project at time 0 and refinance it at time 1, conditionally on
being successful. Every period, a project succeeds with probability θ, and
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with probability 1− θ it yields nothing and the entrepreneur is liquidated. A
generic project requires funding F at time 0 and yields X with probability θ at
time 1. At time 1, if the project is successful, the entrepreneur can invest an
additional F and get X with probability θ at time 2. There is no discounting
and all agents are assumed to be risk neutral.
The entrepreneur can choose between two projects: one innovative, that is
more profitable, and one traditional. the entrepreneur has to choose whether to
enter transformational or subsistance entrepreneurship (Schoar (2010)). She
can only start one project and she cannot switch projects at time 1. Total
proceedings from the project are:
Πj = −Fj + θjXj + θj(θjXj − Fj) = (1 + θj)(θjXj − Fj) j = (T, I)
The two projects differ for profitability, NPVs and funds required. Regarding
the characteristics of the two projects, I make the following assumption:
• Assumption 1 : 0 < θXT − FT < θXI − FI
Both projects have the same probability of success (θT = θI = θ) and both
projects have positive NPVs. Assumption 1 implies that the innovative project
has a NPV higher than the traditional one, and therefore an entrepreneur
investing her own funds would always choose an innovative project over a
traditional one, as ΠT = (1 + θ)(θXT − FT ) < (1 + θ)(θXI − FI) = ΠI . To
more closely resemble innovation’s pay-off one could assume θT > θI , which
combined with the assumption θXT−FT < θXI−FI implies that the innovative
project has an higher variance of pay-offs. Since in my model all agents are
risk neutral, assuming different probabilities of success for the two projects
does not change any of the results.
3.1.1 Financing of the Entrepreneur
The entrepreneur is penniless and needs to seek funding by a financier at time
0 to start a project. At time 0, the financier can pay a monitoring cost, m, to
make the cashflow at time 1 verifiable. This is consistent with a large part of
the literature in banking (De la Fuente and Marin (1996) and Carletti et al.
(2007), among others). If the entrepreneur is not monitored at time 0, she
never goes trough with her project and she extract a non-monetary private
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benefit that dominates the continuation value of the project. Unless m is paid
at time 0, the financier cannot size anything from the entrepreneur.
At time 2, the cashflow is always verifiable. Regarding monitoring cost, I
make the following assumption:
• Assumption 2 : (1 + θ)(θXT − FT ) > m > θXI − FI
Assumption 2 implies that a financier cannot break-even when financing the
entrepreneur unless some other incentive is provided. No monitoring cost
has to be paid at time 1 if the entrepreneur is successful, namely the sec-
ond project’s cashflow is always verifiable. On the other hand, Assumption 2
implies that if the first cashflow is verifiable, then the entrepreneur always has
an incentive to default strategically and pocket the first cashflow in full.
There are two types of agents that can finance the entrepreneur, banks and
venture capitalist. The difference between the two agents is the contract used:
banks can finance the entrepreneur using one-period debt claims, while venture
capitalists use equity claims, buying a portion α of the cashflows generated by
the project in exchange for all the funds needed by the entrepreneur. The
difference in contracts entails that while an entrepreneur can seek re-financing
from another bank at time 1, she is locked with the same VC in the second
period. Long-term debt, equivalent to a multi-period debt claim, is ruled out
by assumption. This si consistent with the empirical evidence showing that
small firms in their early stages rarely has access to long-term bank financing
(Whited (1992)).
Both types of financier has to pay the monitoring cost to make the first
cashflow verifiable. Venture capitalists and banks compete with each other and
finance the entrepreneur competitively, setting their overall profits to zero.
Relationship Banking and Venture Capital
When a bank finances an entrepreneur for the second time the second cashflow
of the project is increased by an amount B. This relationship benefit reflects
the fact that banks can add value when establishing long-term relationship with
their clients, as empirically documented by DeYoung et al. (2008) and Dass
and Massa (2011). Furthermore, B can only be earned if the project financed
is of traditional type, and no benefit can be earned if the entrepreneur switches
financier at time 1. I assume that when indifferent between switching or not,
the entrepreneur sticks with the same bank.
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On the other hand, venture capitalists can add value to the entrepreneur’s
project, but only if it is of innovative type. The value added by a VC is denoted
by V and it is earned as an additional cashflow at time 2. The recent work of
Bernstein et al. (2016) and Colombo et al. (2017) shows empirically that VCs
add value to the firm they finance.
An additional difference between bank-finance and venture capital, is that
the entrepreneur has to look for VC. This translates into having to pay a search
costK at time 0. Importantly, this cost is non-monetary and non-contractable,
namely it is not taken into account by the VC when setting the portion α of the
firm that she requires in order to finance the entrepreneur. Figure C3 shows
the cashflows associated with financing a project with bank funding, whereas
Figure C4 shows the cashflows under VC funding.
3.1.2 Financiers’ Strategies
Bank - Traditional Project
Assume that the entrepreneur proposes a traditional project to a bank, which
can establish lasting relations with her. To find the equilibrium repayments
that the bank offers to the entrepreneur, I work by backward induction, finding
the time 2 repayment R′T and the first period one, RT .
Competitor banks, outsiders from now on, can try to get the entrepreneur
from the original bank, the incumbent. Because of competition outsiders can
offer to the entrepreneur a repayment R′′T =
FT
θ
. At time 1, an outsider does
not have to pay the monitoring cost and can free ride on the monitoring that
the incumbent did at time 0. The incumbent has the advantage of being able
to generate an extra benefit B at time 2, conditionally on the entrepreneur
succeeding with probability θ. This benefit is assumed to be cash, verifiable
and perfectly shareable between the entrepreneur and the bank.
In order to convince the entrepreneur to stick with her, the incumbent must
offer a repayment that satisfies:
XT −R′T +B ≥ XT −
FT
θ
⇒ R′T ≤
FT
θ
+B
The incumbent bank therefore rationally set:
R′T =
FT
θ
+B (3.1)
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Even if the banking sector is competitive, the incumbent is able to generate
a monopolistic rent on the second financing relationship due to the additional
value it is able to generate for the entrepreneurial project, similarly ot Rajan
(1992).
After solving the second period, I can solve the first period’s problem of the
bank by finding RT . At time 0 there is perfect competition among financiers
and the expected profit for the bank must be equal to zero:
θRT −m− FT + θ2R′T − θFT = 0
Plugging 3.1 in the expression above and rearranging yields:
RT =
m+ FT
θ
− θB (3.2)
The bank, by establishing relationships that allow it to extract a monopolistic
surplus, is able to transfer income across periods. This allows the bank to bear
the cost of monitoring at time 0, generating a loss at time 1, but breaking even
thanks to a profit at time 2. If there were no relationship benefits (B = 0), a
bank would never finance a traditional project at time 0.
Bank - Innovative Project
If the entrepreneur proposes an innovative project to a bank, there is no rela-
tionship benefit that can be generated by the incumbent at time 2. Like before,
at time 1 outsiders compete with the incumbent bank, offering a repayment
R′′I =
FI
θ
. But now the entrepreneur is indifferent between switching and stay-
ing, since the incumbent can only offer the same repayment as outsiders and
R′I = R
′′
I =
FI
θ
. As per the previous section, I assume that the entrepreneur
does not switch when indifferent.
Since at time 0 there is perfect competition among financiers, expected
profit for the bank must be equal to zero:
θRI −m− FI + θ2R′I − θFI = 0
Plugging R′I in the expression above and rearranging yields:
RT =
m+ FI
θ
> XI (3.3)
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Now the bank is no longer able to subsidize losses in the first credit relationship
with rents in the second. Therefore, the repayment that it has to ask to the
entrepreneur is too high, following form Assumption 2. In my model, the
entrepreneur cannot start an innovative project with bank funding.
Venture Capital - Traditional Project
Another possibility for the entrepreneur is to look for venture capital, proposing
a traditional project. When the entrepreneur decides to look for VC financing,
she has to pay the search cost K. Importantly this cost is not internalized by
the venture capitalist. The VC still has to pay the monitoring cost m, and
since the project is of traditional type there is no value added V in the last
period.
At time 0, VC makes the entrepreneur an offer to buy a certain percentage
αT of her firm. In exchange of αT , VC provides the entrepreneur with FT at
time 0 and, conditionally on her surviving, FT again at time 1. VC’s break
even condition is as follows:
θαTXT − FT −m+ θ2αTXT − θFT = 0 ⇒ α∗T =
(1 + θ)FT +m
θ(1 + θ)XT
(3.4)
For VC financing to be feasible α∗T must be smaller then 1. Rearranging and
expressing everything in terms of project’s NPV this condition becomes:
(1 + θ)(θXT − FT ) > m
This condition is always satisfied under Assumption 2. Even without gener-
ating any additional benefit, the VC is able to finance a traditional project,
something a bank would not do if it were not able to generate B. This frame-
work outlines as equity allows the financing of firms in the presence of monitor-
ing costs. In the absence of long-term term, short-term bank financing could
be used only if banks can generate relationship surpluses.
Venture Capital - Innovative Project
Lastly, an entrepreneur could look for a VC to propose an innovative project.
As in the previous case, the entrepreneur has to invest a search cost K, that
is not considered by the VC in the terms of financing. Differently from before,
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now the VC can add value to the project at time 2, increasing the last cashflow
by V .
Denote αI the fraction of the firm that the VC buys from the entrepreneur
in exchange of the stream of investments FI . The VC sets αI as to break-even
in expectation:
θαIXI −FI −m+ θ2αI(XI +V )− θFT = 0 ⇒ α∗I =
(1 + θ)FI +m
θ(1 + θ)XI + θ2V
(3.5)
Feasibility of VC financing, requires α∗I to be smaller than one. This condition
can be re-arranged as:
(1 + θ)(θXI − FI) + θ2V > m
The inequality is always satisfied under Assumption 2. Venture capital financ-
ing is always available to the entrepreneur who wants to pursue an innovative
project.
3.1.3 The Entrepreneur’s Choice
The entrepreneur at time 0 must choose which project to pursue and which
financier to approach. Therefore the strategy of the entrepreneur can be ex-
pressed as a menu of actions (Project; Financier), where Project is either
Traditional or Innovative and Financier is Bank or V C.
Whenever the entrepreneur proposes to a financier a project she is not
willing to fund, the entrepreneur gets a pay-off of 0. Furthermore, if the
entrepreneur chose Bank at time 0 and she is successful at time 1, she has
to decide whether to switch bank or not. Importantly, the financier, both
bank and VC, always pay the monitoring cost, m, at time 0 otherwise the
entrepreneur never pays them back. Figure C5 describes the tree of the game.
The game is solved for sub-game perfect equilibria, using backward induc-
tion. I solve separately the two sub-games obtained from the first choice of
the entrepreneur, whether look for VC funding or resolve to a bank. I start by
analysing the decision of the entrepreneur whether to switch bank at time 1,
conditionally on her having being successful.
Firstly, I Assume that the entrepreneur chooses (Traditional; Bank). Con-
ditionally on being successful at time 1, the entrepreneur has to decide whether
to switch bank or not. Since the entrepreneur started a traditional project,
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keeping the same bank generate an extra benefit B and entails a repayment
R′T =
FT
θ
+B. The pay-off of the successful entrepreneur at time 2 is:
ΠNST = XT +B −
FT
θ
−B
If the entrepreneur switches, she loses the benefit B and pays R′′T =
FT
θ
:
ΠST = XT −
FT
θ
= ΠNST
Since the entrepreneur is indifferent between switching or not, I assume she
does not switch. This can be easily rationalized if the incumbent bank were
to share a small part δ of B with the entrepreneur. Not to over-complicate
the model, I simply assume that when indifferent the entrepreneur does not
switch.
The second case is the one where the entrepreneur chooses an innova-
tive project. As per the previous section, a bank would never finance an
entrepreneur with an innovative project at time 0, since she would have to re-
pay more than what she generates at time 1. Therefore there is no possibility
for the entrepreneur to switch bank at time 1, as she is never founded.
As a result, conditionally on choosing bank founding, the entrepreneur
never switches. Importantly, this result does not depend on the bank paying
the monitoring cost, as the pay-off of the entrepreneur at time 2 does not
depend on m.
Bank Funding - Project Choice
Conditionally on deciding to approach a bank for funding, the choice of the
entrepreneur regarding which project to start is trivial. In fact, a bank would
never agree to finance an innovative project, therefore the only project available
to the entrepreneur under bank financing is the traditional one.
When the entrepreneur proposes a traditional project to the bank, the
bank offers a menu of repayments that must be incentive compatible to avoid
switching at time 1, and that takes into account the fact that the bank has to
pay m upfront. The menu of repayments is as follow:RT = m+FTθ − θBR′T = FTθ +B (3.6)
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Under this repayment menu, the total pay-off of the entrepreneur at time 0
becomes:
ΠBT = θ(XT −RT ) + θ2(XT +B −R′T ) =
= θXT −m− FT − θ2B + θ2(XT +B)− θFT + θ2B =
= (1 + θ)(θXT − FT ) + θ2B −m (3.7)
Since banks compete to finance the entrepreneur at time 0 and they make zero
profits in expectation, the entrepreneur pay-off equals the NPV of the project
plus the relationship benefit, net of the monitoring cost. From Assumption
1, the expression in 3.7 is always greater than zero, that is the pay-off the
entrepreneur would get proposing an innovative project to a bank. This means
that if only bank finance were available, then the entrepreneur would always
pursue a traditional project, because an innovative project cannot be funded
in equilibrium with bank funding.
Venture Capital Funding - Project Choice
When the entrepreneur approaches a VC for funds, the VC proposes the en-
trepreneur to buy a fraction α of the firm, depending on the type of the project
propose. The entrepreneur could get financed by a VC both for the traditional
and the innovative project, since under Assumption 3 both α∗T and α∗I are
smaller than 1 and therefore feasible. Nevertheless, when deciding to approach
a VC the entrepreneur has to pay the search cost K.
If the entrepreneur proposes a traditional project to the VC, she sells a
fraction α∗T =
(1+θ)FT+m
θ(1+θ)XT
of the firm, getting a pay-off equal to:
ΠV CT = (1− α∗T )(θXT + θ2XT )−K =
=
θ(1 + θ)XT − (1 + θ)FT −m
θ(1 + θ)XT
θ(1 + θ)XT −K =
= (1 + θ)(θXT − FT )−m−K (3.8)
From Assumption 3, the term in 3.8 is positive and equals the NPV of the
traditional project, net of the monitoring cost m and the search cost K, which
is born by the entrepreneur. This is because venture capitalists compete at
time 0 and make zero profit in expectation, without considering the search
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cost paid by the entrepreneur.
Alternatively, the entrepreneur could propose to the VC an innovative
project. If the entrepreneurs is successful, the VC can add value in the last
period and increase the cashflow by V . In exchange for funding, the VC buys
a portion of the firm equal to α∗I =
(1+θ)FI+m
θ(1+θ)XI+θ2V
. The resulting pay-off for the
entrepreneur is asa follows:
ΠV CI = (1− α∗I)(θXI + θ2(XI + V ))−K =
=
θ(1 + θ)XI + θ
2V − (1 + θ)FI −m
θ(1 + θ)XI + θ2V
(θ(1 + θ)XI + θ
2V )−K =
(1 + θ)(θXI − FI) + θ2V −m−K (3.9)
Now the profit of the entrepreneur equals the NPV of the innovative project
plus the VC value-added V , net of monitoring and search costs. Again, this is
the case because of competition of financiers at time 0.
3.1.4 Equilibrium
To solve the model, I need to find the menu of actions (Project; Financier)
chosen by the entrepreneur. From the previous sections there are three menus
of actions feasible for the entrepreneur at time 0:
1. (Traditional; Bank), which yields a pay-off ΠBT ;
2. (Traditional; V C), which yields a pay-off ΠV CT ;
3. (Innovative; V C), which yields a pay-off ΠV CI .
Comparing the first two cases is easy. In fact:
ΠBT − ΠV CT =
= (1 + θ)(θXT − FT ) + θ2B −m− [(1 + θ)(θXT − FT )−m−K] =
= θ2B +K > 0 ⇒ ΠBT > ΠV CT
The entrepreneur always prefer bank financing to venture capital when choos-
ing a traditional project. The result follows from the fact that banks can build
relationship with the entrepreneur and add value, by offering her incentive
compatible repayment to keep her around. On the other hand, finding venture
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capital is costly for the entrepreneur, and she does not benefit from any value
added in this case. Therefore the model shows that an entrepreneur who want
to pursue subsistence entrepreneurship (Schoar (2010)), relationship lending is
best form of financing.
It is also easy to show that conditionally on looking for venture capital, the
entrepreneur prefers the innovative project to the traditional one. In fact:
ΠV CI − ΠV CT =
= (1 + θ)(θXI − FI) + θ2V −m−K − [(1 + θ)(θXT − FT )−m−K] =
= (1 + θ)(θXI − FI − [θXT − FT ) + θ2V > 0 ⇒ ΠV CI > ΠV CT
The result follows from Assumption 1. Pursuing the innovative project under
venture capital funding yields to the entrepreneur both an higher NPV of the
project but also the value-added by the venture capital.
Therefore the choice of the entrepreneur restricts to choosing bank founding
and start the traditional project or looking for venture capital proposing an
innovative project. The entrepreneur is willing to look for venture capital if
and only if:
ΠV CI > Π
B
T
(1 + θ)(θXI − FI) + θ2V −m−K > (1 + θ)(θXT − FT ) + θ2B −m
∆NPV + θ2V︸ ︷︷ ︸
Benefit of Innovation
> θ2B +K︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost of Innovation
(3.10)
In equilibrium the entrepreneur will only pursue an innovative project with
a venture capitalist if the Benefit of Innovation is bigger than the Cost of
Innnovation. The former is made by the extra-NPV that the innovative project
delivers and the value added that the VC can generate. The latter comprises
the search cost of getting venture capital, as the innovative project cannot be
financed by a bank, and the opportunity cost of forgoing building relationship
with a bank, earned when carrying out the traditional project. Importantly, if
the entrepreneur could finance the project with own funds, she would always
choose the innovative project, as it has an higher NPV.
Equation 3.10 constitutes the main result of the model. In fact, it shows
that under certain values of the parameter the model predicts that relation-
ship lending impair the ability of the venture capitalists to finance innovative
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projects. Importantly, the result does not come from the fact the VC and
banks compete directly. Venture capitalists and banks are linked to each other
through the choices of the entrepreneur.
The inequality in 3.10 holds for higher values of V , lower values of K and B
and for bigger differences in the NPV of the two projects. On the other hand,
it means that when venture capital is scarce (higher K) and venture capitalists
more inexperienced (lower V ), an higher degree of relationship lending (higher
B) requires a bigger wedge in projects NPVs to push the entrepreneur to choose
the innovative projects.
Therefore, in economies in which the venture capital industries its in early
stages, a significant degree of relationship lending could result in more en-
trepreneurs choosing not to innovate. In turn, this prevent new venture capi-
talists from entering the market, in a self-sustaining equilibrium in which few
innovators get funded. As a result, relationship banking could be an important
factor in preventing the development of the venture capital industry . This
does not happen through a direct link between banks and venture capitalists,
but rather though a feedback effect in entrepreneurial choices: relationship
banking alters the type of projects that entrepreneurs are willing to start,
this crowds out VCs’ investment opportunities keeping new entrants out of
the market; the scarcity and inexperience of venture capitalists then tilts even
more entrepreneurial choices to favor non-innovative projects.
3.2 Extension - Continuum of Entrepreneurial
Project
In this section I generalize the previous model, allowing the entrepreneur to
choose among a continuum of projects, rather than a binary set. Every project
differs for a parameter γ, which commands the evolution of cashflows, funds,
monitoring cost and relationship banking benefit. The parameter γ can take
any value in the interval [0; γMax].
The structure of the project is the same as before: three periods with the
possibility for the entrepreneur to rollover the project at the intermediate stage.
The entrepreneur needs to obtain F (γ) at time 0 and 1, and gets X(γ) at time
1 and 2, always with probability θ. The financier financing the entrepreneur at
time 0 has to bear a monitoring cost m(γ). Relationship banking, defined as
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the entrepreneur sticking with the same bank for two period, yields a benefit
B(γ) at time 2. I define NPV (γ) as the NPV of the one-period project (i.e.
NPV (γ) = θX(γ) − F (γ)). I make the following assumptions regarding the
elements of the model:
1. ∂X(γ)
∂γ
> 0 ∀ γ
2. ∂F (γ)
∂γ
> 0 ∀ γ.
3. ∂NPV (γ)
∂γ
> 0 ∀ γ.
4. ∂m(γ)
∂γ
> 0 ∀ γ.
5. ∂B(γ)
∂γ
< 0 ∀ γ and B(γ) > 0 for γ < γ¯ ∧ B(γ) < 0 for γ > γ¯.
6. ∂[(1+θ)NPV (γ)−m(γ)]
∂γ
> 0 ∀ γ.
7. θX(γMax)− F (γMax)−m(γMax) < 0 < (1 + θ)X(0)− F (0)−m(0).
8. ∂V (γ)
∂γ
> 0 ∀ γ
Under the first assumption, the cashflow of the project is increasing in the
degree of innovation. The second assumption states that the funding needed
by the entrepreneur grows with the degree of innovation chosen, but, as for
the third assumption, the one-period NPV of the project is monotonically
increasing in γ. Also, the monitoring cost is increasing in innovation, by the
fourth assumption. Moreover, the fifth assumption gives the evolution of the
relationship lending benefit as function of innovation: the more innovative the
project the smaller the benefit from relationship banking. If the innovativeness
of the project is greater then the threshold γ¯, this benefit becomes a cost.
Notably, this is not necessary for the main result of the model. If B(γ) were 0,
rather than negative, for γ ≥ γ¯, the model would yield the same result. This
assumption makes the function B(γ) differentiable.
Assumption 6 states that a project grows more profitable the higher the de-
gree of innovation, even if that entails paying higher monitoring costs. Lastly,
assumption 7 yields that the one-period project is not profitable enough to
cover the monitoring cost no matter the degree of innovation chosen. This
assumption makes it impossible for a financier to break-even without being
able to finance the entrepreneur for more than one period.
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3.2.1 Bank Finance
Now the entrepreneur has to choose a level of innovation γ so to maximize her
pay-off. I start by solving the entrepreneur’s problem conditionally on looking
for bank finance. The repayments offered by banks will be functions of the
degree of innovation. At time 1, the incumbent bank can offer a repayment
that makes the entrepreneur indifferent between switching bank and keeping
the same one. Calling R′(γ) and R′′(γ) the repayments offered at time 1 by,
respectively, the incumbent and an outsider:
R′′(γ) =
F (γ)
θ
and R′(γ) =
F (γ)
θ
+B(γ) = R′′(γ) +B(γ) (3.11)
The entrepreneur would refinance the project with the incumbent only if
R′(γ) < R′′(γ). This is true only if γ < γ¯. An entrepreneur has no incen-
tive to stick with an incumbent that shrinks her cashflow, and she will always
switch if she has chosen a level of innovation to higher than γ¯. Given that en-
trepreneur always switches, there is no bank willing to finance a project with
a level of innovation γ > γ¯.
On the other hand, if the entrepreneur has chosen a level of innovation
smaller than γ¯ at time 0, the incumbent bank would set a repayment so as
to make the entrepreneur indifferent between sticking and switching: R′(γ) =
F (γ)
θ
+ B(γ). At time 0, a bank would set a time 1 repayment R(γ) so as to
break-even in expectation:
− F (γ)−m(γ) + θ(R(γ)− F (γ) + θR′(γ)) = 0
R(γ) =
F (γ) +m(γ)
θ
− θB(γ) | γ < γ¯ (3.12)
The last step is to find the optimal choice of the entrepreneur in terms of level
of innovation γ, given the best response of banks and conditionally on looking
for bank funding. An entrepreneur maximizes her total pay-off:
Max
γ
Π(γ)Π(γ) = (1 + θ)(θX(γ)− F (γ))−m(γ) + θB(γ), for γ < γ¯Π(γ) = 0, for γ ≥ γ¯ (3.13)
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Given assumptions 5 and 6, the entrepreneur will always choose a level γ∗ < γ¯,
as her pay-off would be strictly positive. If she chooses a γ ≥ γ¯, no bank would
finance her and she would get a pay-off of 0. Conditionally on choosing γ < γ¯,
the level of innovation chosen, γ∗B satisfies:
∃ γ∗B < γ¯ s.t. (1 + θ)(θX ′(γ∗B)− F ′(γ∗B))−m′(γ∗B) + θB′(γ∗B) = 0 (3.14)
I am agnostic about the solution γ∗B. Depending on the shape of the functions,
γ∗B could be inside the interval (0; γ¯) or a corner solution, either 0 or γ¯:
• If ∂[(1+θ)NPV (γ)−m(γ)]
∂γ
> −θB′(γ) ∀ γ ⇒ γ∗B = γ¯
• If ∂[(1+θ)NPV (γ)−m(γ)]
∂γ
< −θB′(γ) ∀ γ ⇒ γ∗B = 0
• If ∂[(1+θ)NPV (γ)−m(γ)]
∂γ
= −θB′(γ) for some γˆ ∈ (0; γ¯) ⇒ γ∗B = γˆ
Therefore, conditionally on getting bank financing, relationship banking im-
poses an upper limit to the optimal level of innovation that an entrepreneur is
willing to choose.
3.2.2 VC Finance
Alternatively, an entrepreneur an invest the search cost K and look for VC
funding. As in the main model, VC offer equity-based financing by buying
a break-even portion of cashflow-rights α, which now will be a function of
the degree of innovation of the project (i.e. α(γ)). The search cost for the
entrepreneur to find a VC, is fixed and does not depend the level of innovation
chosen by the entrepreneur. A VC asks the entrepreneur a fraction of equity
α(γ) such that:
−m(γ)− F (γ) + αθX(γ) + αθ2(X(γ) + V (γ))− θF (γ) = 0 ⇒
α∗(γ) =
(1 + θ)F (γ) +m(γ)
θ(1 + θ)X(γ) + θ2V (γ)
(3.15)
The condition for VC financing to be feasible is α∗(γ) < 1, as the VC cannot
buy more than 100% of the firm. Re-arranging and combining with assumption
6 yields:
(1 + θ)NPV (γ)−m(γ) + θ2V (γ) > 0 (3.16)
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Interpretation of 3.16 is the same as in the basic model: the project must
be sufficiently profitable and VC value added must be sufficiently relevant, to
offset the monitoring cost. Notably, the inequality in 3.16 is always satisfied
under assumption 7. The total pay-off of the entrepreneur under VC financing
is:
Π = (1 + θ)(θX(γ)− F (γ))−m(γ)−K + θ2V (γ) (3.17)
As it is the case in the baseline model, the pay-off of the entrepreneur equals
the sum of the two periods NPVs net of monitoring and search costs. As
in the previous subsection, I can find the optimal level of innovation the en-
trepreneur is willing to choose under VC financing. The entrepreneur chooses
γ to maximize her expected pay-off:
Max
γ
Π = (1 + θ)(θX(γ)− F (γ))−m(γ)−K + θ2V (γ)
(1 + θ)(θX ′(γ)− F ′(γ))−m′(γ) + θ2V ′(γ) > 0 ∀γ ⇒
γ∗V C = γMax (3.18)
Where the inequality comes directly from assumptions 6 and 8. Therefore, it
must be that γ∗V C > γ∗B, namely the optimal level of innovation is higher under
VC financing than under bank finance with relationship lending. Notably,
without any relationship benefit, under bank financing the entrepreneur would
not be able to get funded, no matter the project chosen.
3.2.3 The Entrepreneur’s Choice
At time 0, the entrepreneur has to choose whether to look for a VC or get
bank funding. Given financiers best responses, the entrepreneur would choose
a level of innovation γ∗V C when obtaining venture capital and γ∗B when securing
funding from a bank.
The entrepreneur chooses the strategy that yields the highest expected
pay-off. The condition under which she decides to obtain bank financing is as
follows:
(1 + θ)(θX(γ∗B)− F (γ∗B))−m(γ∗B) + θ2B(γ∗B) >
> (1 + θ)(θX(γ∗V C)− F (γ∗V C))−m(γ∗V C)−K + θ2V (γ∗V C) (3.19)
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3.19 can be rearranged as:
K + θ2[B(γ∗B]− V (γ∗V C)) + [m(γ∗V C)−m(γ∗B)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost of Innovation
>
> (1 + θ)[NPV (γ∗V C)−NPV (γ∗B)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Benefit of Innovation
(3.20)
The condition in 3.20 mirrors the one in 3.10 for the baseline model. If the
cost of innovation, defined as the sum of the cost of looking for VC financing,
the opportunity cost of forgoing relationship banking benefit and the spread
in monitoring cost due to starting a more innovative project, outweighs the
benefit of innovation, which is the spread in NPV due to starting a more
innovative project, the entrepreneur would resolve to less innovative projects
and will not use VC financing.
Importantly, the cost of innovation is increasing in monitoring costs and re-
lationship lending benefit. Furthermore, from assumption 4 and 5 the functions
m(γ) and B(γ) are, respectively, increasing and decreasing in γ. Therefore,
the bigger the distance between γ∗B and γ∗V C the higher the cost of innovation.
The difference between the two levels of innovation crucially depends on the
condition in 3.14: when the function B(γ) is very steep (i.e. its first derivative
very negative), γ∗B = 0 and the distance with γ∗V C is maximized. Choosing VC
funding and therefore a more innovative project, is particularly costly in this
situation, in which the relationship benefit is very high for very non-innovative
projects.
On the other hand, as in the baseline model, when VCs significantly in-
crease the profitability of the project they finance (i.e. high and steep V (γ))
and when the search cost to obtain venture capital is low, the cost of inno-
vation is lower. Notably, the benefit of innovation does only depend on the
entrepreneur, in the sense it depends only on how profitable the more innova-
tive projects is, compared to less innovative ones. At the same time, the cost
of innovation does not depend on the entrepreneur, but rather on the efficiency
and structure of the financing conditions. This is one of the main contributions
of this paper, to show that decision to innovate or not crucially depends on the
financing conditions faced by entrepreneurs. Depending on these conditions,
entrepreneurs may avoid innovating and using venture capital, in favor of less
innovative project pursued under bank financing.
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3.3 Conclusions
The main contribution of this paper is to study the link between the banking
sector and the scope and success of venture capital. In particular, my model
shows that relationship lending can compete with VC and crowd out its in-
vestment opportunities. Importantly, banks and VCs are not directly linked,
but they are intertwined through the choices of entrepreneurs who look for
financing.
On the one hand, relationship banking eases credit constraints for the en-
trepreneurs, in the presence of monitoring costs. On the other hand, due to
the limit in scope and expertise of banking intermediaries, this restricts en-
trepreneurs’ investment opportunity set to more traditional projects. When
benefits from relationship lending are sufficiently high, entrepreneurs who
would be better off carrying out innovative projects switches to more tra-
ditional and less profitable ventures.
If the entrepreneur changes the type of project she carries out, this in turn
affects venture capitalists, whose investment opportunities are now crowded
out. In particular, when venture capitalists are more inexperienced and harder
to obtain (i.e. entrepreneurs have to bear higher search costs to obtain venture
capital), the effects of crowding out by relationship lenders are stronger, even
if VC can still add significant value to an innovative project. Notably in
my model, if entrepreneurs where to finance themselves with own funds, they
would always choose a more innovative and profitable project.
Therefore, relationship lending is a factor that helps explaining why certain
countries, or areas within countries, are struggling to develop a successful
venture capital industry. Even if VCs and banks appeal to both very different
investors and firms, entrepreneurial choices link them. As a result, policies
aimed at fostering venture capital should take into consideration the structure
of the banking sector.
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A. Appendix to Maternity Risk and
the Gender Gap in Entrepreneurship
A.1 Figures
Figure A1: GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF ABORTION
The map on the left shows the average percentage of CO gynecologists in towns where
hospitals with gynecology residencies are located. The average (COj) is weighted by the
number of gynecologists in each hospital of the municipality. The map on the right shows
the geographical distribution of access to abortion (Wm) in every Italian municipality, after
taking into account travel times to municipalities that have one or more hospitals (Wm =
1∑
j wmj
∑
j wmjCOj , wmj =
1
tmj
).
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Figure A2: GENDER GAP BY AGE AND TYPE OF FIRM
Percentage of founders of new limited liability companies (dashed line) and unlimited liability
partnerships (dotted line) in the pre-liberalization period (2013 - first half of 2015) who are
women by years of age at founding. The first vertical line is at age 35 and the second at age
50.
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Figure A3: SALES OF ELLAONE
Evolution of quarterly sales of EllaOne in Italy between the first quarter of 2014 and the
first quarter of 2018. The first vertical dashed line represents the quarter prior to the
liberalization of EllaOne, while the second vertical dashed line represents the quarter prior
to the liberalization of Norlevo. Source: AIFA and Italian Ministry of Health.
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Figure A4: POPULARITY OF REGULAR CONTRACEPTIVES
Evolution of monthly Google interest for the names of the most popular contraceptive pills
in Italy (Yaz, Yasminelle and Yasmin) and the word “condom” . The first and second vertical
lines indicate the liberalization of EllaOne and Norlevo respectively. Source: Google Trends.
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Figure A5: PARALLEL TRENDS - BIRTHS
Visual representation of the parallel trends assumption of the difference-in-differences frame-
work for the number of births per 1000 women in fertile age. Each triangle repre-
sents the coefficient (βmt), plotted with 90% confidence intervals, of the interaction be-
tween a yearly dummy and access to abortion Wm from estimation of equation ymt =
α+
∑2017
k=2012 βmk(τk × Wm)+γm+ τt+POSTt×ρr+ mt. I drop the last pre-liberalization
interaction (2014).
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Figure A6: PARALLEL TRENDS - REGULAR ENTREPRENEURSHIP (1)
(a) Half-yearly effect on the number of
entrepreneurs per 1000 women aged 35 or
younger.
(b) Half-yearly effect on the percentage
of equity held a limited liability company
by the average woman founder aged 35 or
younger.
Visual representation of parallel trends of the difference-in-differences framework for regular
entrepreneurship outcomes. In the parallel trends graphs, interactions (βmt) of half-yearly
dummies and access to abortion Wm are plotted with 90% confidence intervals, according
to estimation of equation yijmt = α+
∑2017h2
k=2013h1 βmk(τk × Wm) + γm+ τt+ σs+POSTt×
ρr + POSTt × FEsj + ijmt .
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Figure A7: PARALLEL TRENDS - REGULAR ENTREPRENEURSHIP (2)
(a) Half-yearly effect on the total amount
of equity in the hands of women.
(b) Half-yearly effect on the probability
of a firm having more than 50% of equity
in the hands of women.
(c) Half-yearly effect on the probability
of a firm having more than 50% of equity
held by a woman.
(d) Half-yearly effect on the percentage of
founders who are women.
Visual representation of parallel trends of the difference-in-differences framework for regular
entrepreneurship outcomes at the firm level. In the parallel trends graphs, interactions (βmt)
of half-yearly dummies and access to abortionWm are plotted with 90% confidence intervals,
according to estimation of equation yjmt = α+
∑2017h2
k=2013h1 βmk(τk × Wm) + γm + τt + σs +
POSTt × ρr + POSTt × FEsj + jmt .
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Figure A8: PARALLEL TRENDS - INNOVATIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP
(a) Half-yearly effect on the number of
young innovators per 1000 young women.
(b) Half-yearly effect on percentage of eq-
uity held by the average woman founder
aged 35 or younger.
(c) Half-yearly effect on the probability
of being the main owner for the average
woman founder, aged 35 or younger.
(d) Parallel trend visualization for the
probability of a woman founder aged 35
or younger being also the executive of the
start-up.
Visual representation of the parallel trends of the difference-in-differences framework for
innovative entrepreneurship outcomes. In the parallel trends graphs, interactions (βmt) of
half-yearly dummies and access to abortion Wm are plotted with 90% confidence intervals,
according to estimation of equation yijmt = α+
∑2017h2
k=2013h1 βmk(τk × Wm)+ γm+ τt+ σs+
POSTt × ρr + POSTt × FEsj + ijmt .
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Figure A9: PARALLEL TRENDS - LABOR MARKET
(a) Half-yearly effect on the probability of
being an entrepreneur for women aged 35
or younger.
(b) Half-yearly effect on the number of
hours worked by women entrepreneurs
aged 35 or younger.
Visual representation of parallel trends of the difference-in-differences framework for en-
trepreneurial outcomes using the Quarterly Cross-sectional Labor Force Survey. In the
parallel trends graphs, interactions (βmt) of half-yearly dummies and access to abor-
tion Wm are plotted with 90% confidence intervals, according to estimation of equation
yimt = α+
∑2018h2
k=2013h1 βmk(τk × Wm) + γm + τt + POSTt × ρr + POSTt × FEsi + imt .
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Figure A10: ROBUSTNESS - AGE THRESHOLD
(a) Effects on the number of young en-
trepreneurs per 1000 young women.
(b) Effects on percentage of equity held
by the average woman founder aged 35 or
younger.
(c) Effects on the number of young inno-
vators per 1000 young women.
(d) Effects on percentage of equity held
by the average woman founder aged 35 or
younger, in innovative start-ups.
Visual representation of the robustness of the main coefficients, estimated restricting and
enlarging the sample of women considered. In the main analysis, the sample of women aged
35 or younger is the most affected (vertical dashed line). In the graphs, the cut-off age of 35
is moved to the left and to the right, to test the robustness of the effects to sample selection.
Each coefficient represents the coefficient of interest estimated on a different sample, for
different outcomes.
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A.2 Tables
Table A1: BARRIERS TO ABORTION AND MUNICIPALITIES’ CHARACTERISTICS
(1) (2)
Wm Wm
% high school graduates (25-64) 0.0923*** -0.0125**
(0.00683) (0.00516)
% graduates (30-34) 0.00147 0.00827**
(0.00609) (0.00421)
Employment rate -0.0604*** -0.0264***
(0.00808) (0.00599)
Income per-capita (Th. Euros) -0.511*** 0.0459*
(0.0292) (0.0277)
Population (Th.) 0.00341*** 0.00194***
(0.00102) (0.000686)
Births per 1000 women 0.0252*** 0.0109***
(0.00371) (0.00254)
% of childless couples 0.0709*** -0.0392***
(0.0136) (0.00975)
% women in town boards -0.00419 -0.00534**
(0.00313) (0.00217)
% vote share of Right parties 0.0867*** 0.00821**
(0.00390) (0.00345)
Firms per 100 residents -2.30e-05 7.89e-05
(0.00214) (0.00148)
High-tech workers per 100 workers 0.00496 0.00893
(0.0115) (0.00770)
Female Ent. per 1000 Women -0.00607 0.00562
(0.0206) (0.0138)
Female Ent. per 1000 Women ≤35 -0.00586 -0.000905
(0.00487) (0.00326)
Male Ent. per 1000 Men ≤35 -0.00143 0.00178
(0.00270) (0.00181)
Observations 7,560 7,560
R-squared 0.312 0.694
Region FE NO YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Regression of barriers to abortion services (Wm) on various measures of employment, in-
come and population at the municipality level. Column (2) includes region fixed effects.
Regressions are cross-sectional and municipality-level variables are measured in 2014, the
year before the liberalization of ECPs.
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Table A2: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF FIRMS AND FOUNDERS
Panel A Regular Entrepreneurship Innovative Start-Ups
Individual-level statistics Mean Median Mean Median
% of women founders 30.5% - 20.0% -
% of institutional investors 4.7% - 3.0% -
% of foreign born 15.6% - 4.5% -
% of equity (stake) 46.7% 49.0% 30.5% 24.0%
Age 40.94 40 42.09 41
Number of women 650,158 - 4,921 -
Number of founders 2,131,220 - 28,294 -
Panel B Regular Entrepreneurship Innovative Start-Ups
Firm-level statistics Mean Median Mean Median
% of women founders 32.1% 0.0% 21.3% 0.0%
% of institutional investors 2.9% 0.0% 2.5% 0.0%
% of foreign born 18.4% 0.0% 3.9% 0.0%
% of equity (stake) 50.0% 59.9% 45.8% 33.3%
% of women-executives 30.2% 0.0% 17.2% 0.0%
Age 40.40 40 41.95 42
Number of founders 2.0 2 3.2 2
Number of executives 1.05 1 1.12 1
Number of firms 1,531,660 - 8,838 -
Summary statistics of individual founders and firms. Panel A reports statistics of founders of
all firms (regular entrepreneurship) and of innovative start-ups only. Institutional investors
are defined as financial corporations holding equity in newly founded firms. Panel B collects
summary statistics of the founders of the average new firm and new innovative start-up.
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Table A3: FIRMS’ SECTORS AND GEOGRAPHY
Panel A - Sector Description (NACE) General E. Innovative E.
A - Agriculture, forestry and fishing 8.64% 0.59%
C - Manufacturing 7.64% 17.43%
D - Electricity, gas and steam supply 0.27% 1.22%
E - Water, sewerage and waste management 0.16% 0.44%
F - Construction 13.15% 1.17%
G - Wholesale and retail trade; 30.45% 4.70%
H - Transportation and storage 2.15% 0.34%
I - Accommodation and food service activities 11.39% 0.62%
J - Information and communication 3.02% 42.47%
K - Financial and insurance activities 2.98% 0.16%
L - Real estate activities 2.54% 0.09%
M - Professional, scientific and technical activities 4.75% 23.50%
N - Administrative and support service activities 5.47% 3.04%
P - Education 0.46% 0.72%
Q - Human health and social work activities 0.62% 0.69%
R - Arts, entertainment and recreation 1.60% 0.43%
S - Other service activities 4.68% 0.38%
Panel B - Macroregion (NUTS1) General E. Innovative E.
ITC - Northwest 25.36% 31.56%
ITH - Northeast 17.88% 25.50%
ITI - Centre 22.30% 20.00%
ITF - South 24.11% 16.46%
ITG - Insular Italy 10.35% 6.48%
Sector and geographic distribution of the population of new firms (regular entrepreneur-
ship) and innovative start-ups (innovative entrepreneurship). Sectors are defined using the
level 1 NACE codes (equivalent to NAICS sectors), while macro-regions are defined using
the NUTS1 level of administrative nomenclature (equivalent to Census Bureau designated
regions in the US).
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Table A4: CONTRACEPTION SUBSTITUTION
(1) (2)
DDD (1000 inhab.) Oral Contraceptives Oral Contraceptives
Wr × POST 17.40 17.40
(78.93) (21.34)
POST -20.44
(55.56)
Wr -304.9***
(70.60)
Constant 267.8***
(49.69)
Observations 105 105
R-squared 0.468 0.970
Region FE NO YES
Year FE NO YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Economic Magnitudes 1.75% 1.75%
Effect of liberalizing emergency contraception on the defined daily dose (DDD) per 1000
inhabitants of oral contraceptives. Data on oral contraceptives is available at the region-
level for the years 2014-2018. Access to abortion at the region level (Wr) is calculated
as the weighted average access to abortion of the region’s municipalities (Wm), weighted
by the share of fertile women of the region living in each municipality. The estimation is
repeated both including and excluding region and year fixed effects. Economic magnitudes
are calculated as the interaction coefficient on Wr× POST times one cross-sectional standard
deviation of Wm, divided by the mean of the dependent variable before the liberalization of
ECPs. The difference-in-differences regression equation is: yrt = α + βrt(POSTt × Wr) +
ρr + τt + rt
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Table A5: ECPs AND FERTILITY
(1) (2)
Births (/1000 women) ≤49 ≤35
Wm × POST -7.481** -18.21**
(3.009) (7.179)
Observations 48,211 48,204
R-squared 0.327 0.317
Municipality FE YES YES
Year FE YES YES
Region#POST FE YES YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Economic Magnitudes -0.87% -0.92%
Effect of liberalizing emergency contraception on birth rates of women younger than 49
years old and women aged 35 or younger. Economic magnitudes are calculated as the
regression coefficient on the interaction Wm × POST, times one cross-sectional standard
deviation of Wm, divided by the mean of the dependent variable before the liberalization of
ECPs. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The difference-in-differences
regression equation is: ymt = α+ βmt(POSTt × Wm) + γm + τt + POSTt × ρr + mt
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Table A6: GENDER EQUITY GAP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Equity Stake 36-49 36-49 ≤35 ≤35 36-49 ≤35
LLCs ULPs LLCs ULPs SUPs SUPs
Female Dummy -1.899*** -0.422*** -1.619*** -0.409*** -2.432*** -2.118*
(0.127) (0.0418) (0.142) (0.0373) (0.895) (1.166)
Observations 119,946 222,368 81,491 211,251 2,746 1,833
R-squared 0.635 0.868 0.672 0.894 0.670 0.671
Fixed Effects: Age, # of founders, municipality, industry, legal form,
quarter of incorporation
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Economic Magnitudes -4.04% -0.46% -3.47% -0.44% -8.34% -7.54%
Regression of individual founders’ shares of equity on a dummy which equals one if the
founder is a woman, including fixed effects for founder’s and firm’s characteristics to match
female founders to similar male founders. The regression coefficient of the dummy measures
the gap in equity holding associated with being a woman. The estimation is repeated for
founders aged between 36 and 49, and aged 35 or less of limited liability companies, unlimited
liability partnerships and innovative start-ups. Economic magnitudes are calculated by
dividing the coefficient on the dummy Female, by the mean of the dependent variable when
the dummy equals 0. The regression equation is: Equityijmt = Femalei+γm+τt+FEsj+
FEsi + ijmt
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Table A7: REGULAR ENTREPRENEURSHIP - EXTENSIVE MARGIN
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ent. (/1000 women) Entrepreneurs Entrepreneurs Executives Entrepreneurs Entrepreneurs
All ≤35 ≤35 36-49 ≥50
Wm × POST 0.0448 1.122* 1.024* -0.439 -0.0720
(0.176) (0.612) (0.598) (0.553) (0.125)
Observations 160,740 160,720 160,480 160,720 160,740
R-squared 0.096 0.069 0.070 0.071 0.062
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES
Region#POST FE YES YES YES YES YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Economic Magnitudes 0.26% 3.10% 4.01%
Difference in differences estimation at the municipality level of the effect of ECP availability
on the number of women who start a new business, standardized per 1000 women living in
the municipality. The analysis is repeated for different age groups of women: women 35 years
old or younger, women aged between 36 and 49, and women aged 50 or older. Economic
magnitudes are calculated as the interaction coefficient on Wm × POST times one cross-
sectional standard deviation of Wm, divided by the mean of the dependent variable before
the liberalization of ECPs. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The
difference-in-differences regression equation is: ymt = α+ βmt(POSTt × Wm) + γm + τt +
POSTt × ρr + mt
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Table A8: REGULAR ENTREPRENEURSHIP - EQUITY
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Equity Stake All ≤35 36-49 ≥50 ≤35 ≤35
All All All All LLCs ULPs
Wm × POST 0.00803 0.0234** -0.0106 0.0147 0.0633** 0.00451
(0.00698) (0.0107) (0.0130) (0.0196) (0.0295) (0.00859)
Observations 620,811 234,750 239,964 143,881 71,250 161,703
R-squared 0.828 0.859 0.824 0.805 0.655 0.897
FEs: Quarter, municipality, NACE core code
Interacted FEs: # of founders, region, legal form
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Economic Magnitudes 0.05% 0.14% 0.61% 0.02%
Difference in differences estimation at the founder level of the effect of ECP availability on
the percentage of equity held by women founders. The analysis is repeated for different
age groups of women: women aged between 36 and 49, women 35 years old or younger and
women aged 50 or older, and different legal forms of the firm (limited liability companies
and unlimited liability partnerships). Economic magnitudes are calculated as the interaction
coefficient on Wm × POST times one cross-sectional standard deviation of Wm, divided by
the mean of the dependent variable before the liberalization of ECPs. Standard errors
are clustered at the municipality level. The difference-in-differences regression equation is:
yijmt = α+ βmt(POSTt × Wm) + γm + τt + σs + POSTt × ρr + POSTt × FEsj + ijmt
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Table A9: REGULAR ENTREPRENEURSHIP - DDD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Equity Equity Equity Main Owner Main Owner
36-49 (LLCs) ≤35 (LLCs) ≤35 (ULPs) ≤35 (LLCs) 36-49 (LLCs)
F × Wm × POST -0.0336 0.0544* 0.00194 0.135** -0.0521
(0.0275) (0.0301) (0.00644) (0.0595) (0.0616)
Wm × POST 0.0159 -0.00726 0.00668 0.00320 0.00478
(0.0174) (0.0164) (0.00430) (0.0477) (0.0420)
F × POST 0.0260 -0.0382* -0.000479 -0.101** 0.0390
(0.0201) (0.0220) (0.00476) (0.0437) (0.0447)
F × Wm 0.0295 -0.0435** 0.00411 -0.0611 0.0716
(0.0234) (0.0217) (0.00526) (0.0454) (0.0532)
Observations 289,002 222,485 502,303 222,485 289,002
R-squared 0.660 0.675 0.904 0.290 0.284
FEs: Quarter, municipality, NACE core code, female dummy
Interacted FEs: # of founders, region, legal form
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Difference in difference in differences (DDD) estimation at the founder level of the effect
of ECP availability on the percentage of equity in the hands of women founders and their
likelihood to be main owners relatively to men founders for limited liability companies. Main
owners are defined as those founders who hold the biggest stake of equity in the founding
team. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The difference-in-differences
regression equation is: yijmt = α + βimt(POSTt × Wm × Fi) + βmt(POSTt × Wm) +
βit(POSTt × Fi)+βim(Wm × Fi)+Fi+γm+τt+σs+POSTt×ρr+POSTt×FEsj+ijmt
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Table A10: REGULAR ENTREPRENEURSHIP - FIRM LEVEL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LLCs Total Women Equity Woman Control Max Woman Stakee Women Control % of Women
Wm × POST 0.0726** 0.0689* 0.0252 0.0713* 0.0575*
(0.0331) (0.0383) (0.0271) (0.0374) (0.0296)
Observations 387,626 387,626 170,607 387,626 360,346
R-squared 0.065 0.107 0.576 0.074 0.061
FEs: Quarter, municipality, NACE core code
Interacted FEs: # of founders, region, legal form
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Economic Magnitudes 1.19% 1.19% 0.21% 1.09% 1.03%
Difference in differences estimation at the firm level of the effect of ECP availability on dif-
ferent measures of women involvement in limited-liability companies only. The dependent
variables considered are: total percentage of equity owned by women, probability of one
woman having 50% or more of equity, the maximum stake of equity owned by a female
founder in the firm, probability of having 50% or more of equity owned by women and the
percentage of founders who are women. Economic magnitudes are calculated as the interac-
tion coefficient on Wm× POST times one cross-sectional standard deviation ofWm, divided
by the mean of the dependent variable before the liberalization of ECPs. Standard errors
are clustered at the municipality level. The difference-in-differences regression equation is:
yjmt = α+ βmt(POSTt × Wm) + γm + τt + σs + POSTt × ρr + POSTt × FEsj + jmt
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Table A11: INNOVATIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP - EXTENSIVE MARGIN
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Found. (/1000 women) Founders Founders Founders Founders
All ≤35 36-49 ≥50
Wm × POST 0.0312** 0.103* 0.0179 0.0188
(0.0133) (0.061) (0.0221) (0.0121)
Observations 130,582 130,578 130,580 130,582
R-squared 0.118 0.142 0.09 0.117
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES
Region#POST FE YES YES YES YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Economic Magnitudes 31.96% 39.60%
Difference in differences estimation at the municipality level of the effect of ECP availability
on the fraction of women living in a given municipality who start a new innovative start-up.
The analysis is repeated for different age groups of women: women 35 years old or younger,
women aged between 36 and 49, and women aged 50 or older. Economic magnitudes are
calculated as the interaction coefficient on Wm × POST times one cross-sectional standard
deviation of Wm, divided by the mean of the dependent variable before the liberalization of
ECPs. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The difference-in-differences
regression equation is: ymt = α+ βmt(POSTt × Wm) + γm + τt + POSTt × ρr + mt
APPENDIX A. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 1 117
Table A12: INNOVATIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP - EQUITY
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Equity Stake All ≤35 ≤35 36-49 ≥50
Wm × POST 0.582** 0.795* 0.746* 0.102 0.656
(0.234) (0.410) (0.408) (0.453) (0.588)
Observations 3,658 978 942 1,293 632
R-squared 0.283 0.386 0.380 0.327 0.410
Town FE YES YES YES YES YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES
Region#POST FE YES YES YES YES YES
Sector FE YES YES YES YES YES
One-founder Firms YES YES NO YES YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Economic Magnitudes 10.11% 17.35% 14.04%
Difference in differences estimation at the founder level of the effect of ECP availability on the
stake of equity (in percentage) held at founding by women founders of innovative start-ups.
The analysis is repeated for different age groups of women: women 35 years old or younger,
women aged between 36 and 49, and women aged 50 or older. In Column 3 one-founder
firms are excluded from the analysis. Economic magnitudes are calculated as the interaction
coefficient on Wm × POST times one cross-sectional standard deviation of Wm, divided by
the mean of the dependent variable before the liberalization of ECPs. Standard errors
are clustered at the municipality level. The difference-in-differences regression equation is:
yijmt = α+ βmt(POSTt × Wm) + γm + τt + σs + POSTt × ρr + ijmt
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Table A13: INNOVATIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP - MAIN OWNERSHIP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Main Owner All ≤35 ≤35 36-49 ≥50
Wm × POST 0.495 1.584** 1.620** 0.512 -0.989
(0.389) (0.783) (0.807) (0.719) (1.223)
Observations 3,662 978 942 1,293 634
R-squared 0.285 0.414 0.413 0.335 0.394
Town FE YES YES YES YES YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES
Region#POST FE YES YES YES YES YES
Sector FE YES YES YES YES YES
One-founder Firms YES YES NO YES YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Economic Magnitudes 5.92% 16.46% 17.87%
Difference in differences estimation at the founder level of the effect of ECP availability on the
probability of a woman founder of an innovative start-up to be the main owner of the firm.
A founder is considered a main owner if her equity stake is the biggest among all founders.
The analysis is repeated for different age groups of women: women 35 years old or younger,
women aged between 36 and 49, and women aged 50 or older. In Column 3 one-founder
firms are excluded from the analysis. Economic magnitudes are calculated as the interaction
coefficient on Wm × POST times one cross-sectional standard deviation of Wm, divided by
the mean of the dependent variable before the liberalization of ECPs. Standard errors
are clustered at the municipality level. The difference-in-differences regression equation is:
yijmt = α+ βmt(POSTt × Wm) + γm + τt + σs + POSTt × ρr + ijmt
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Table A14: INNOVATIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP - EXECUTIVES
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Executive All ≤35 36-49 ≥50
Wm × POST 0.304 1.234* 0.294 -0.658
(0.355) (0.677) (0.559) (1.072)
Observations 3,662 978 1,293 634
R-squared 0.231 0.298 0.282 0.408
Town FE YES YES YES YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES
Region#POST FE YES YES YES YES
Sector FE YES YES YES YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Economic Magnitudes 9.63% 43.42%
Difference in differences estimation at the founder level of the effect of ECP availability on
the probability of a woman founder of an innovative start-up to also be the executive of
the company. The analysis is repeated for different age groups of women: women 35 years
old or younger, women aged between 36 and 49, and women aged 50 or older. Economic
magnitudes are calculated as the interaction coefficient on Wm × POST times one cross-
sectional standard deviation of Wm, divided by the mean of the dependent variable before
the liberalization of ECPs. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The
difference-in-differences regression equation is: yijmt = α+ βmt(POSTt × Wm)+ γm+ τt+
σs + POSTt × ρr + ijmt
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Table A15: INNOVATIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP - EQUITY VALUE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Equity (Th. Euros) All ≤35 ≤35 36-49 ≥50
Wm × POST -23.83 24.86 18.03* -53.16 18.67
(35.77) (20.53) (10.29) (72.02) (33.08)
Observations 3,343 885 859 1,168 564
R-squared 0.333 0.512 0.408 0.240 0.619
Town FE YES YES YES YES YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES
Region#POST FE YES YES YES YES YES
Sector FE YES YES YES YES YES
One-founder Firms YES YES NO YES YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Economic Magnitudes -23.47% 33.33% 24.22%
Difference in differences estimation at the founder level of the effect of ECP availability on
the Euro-value (in thousands of Euros) of the stake of equity held at founding by women
founders of innovative start-ups. The analysis is repeated for different age groups of women:
women 35 years old or younger, women aged between 36 and 49, and women aged 50 or older.
In Column 3 one-founder firms are excluded from the analysis. Economic magnitudes are
calculated as the interaction coefficient on Wm × POST times one cross-sectional standard
deviation of Wm, divided by the mean of the dependent variable before the liberalization of
ECPs. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The difference-in-differences
regression equation is: yijmt = α+βmt(POSTt × Wm)+ γm+ τt+σs+POSTt× ρr+ ijmt
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Table A16: INNOVATIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP - AGE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age All ≤35 36-49 ≥50
Wm × POST 0.510 10.66* -1.661 -23.50
(9.203) (6.149) (5.314) (14.79)
Observations 3,658 978 1,293 632
R-squared 0.270 0.397 0.320 0.347
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Economic Magnitudes 0.06% 1.61%
Difference in differences estimation at the founder level of the effect of ECP availability on
the age at founding of women founders of innovative start-ups. The analysis is repeated for
different age groups of women: women 35 years old or younger, women aged between 36 and
49, and women aged 50 or older. Economic magnitudes are calculated as the interaction
coefficient on Wm × POST times one cross-sectional standard deviation of Wm, divided
by the mean of the dependent variable before the liberalization of ECPs. Standard errors
are clustered at the municipality level. The difference-in-differences regression equation is:
yijmt = α+ βmt(POSTt × Wm) + γm + τt + σs + POSTt × ρr + ijmt
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Table A17: INNOVATIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP - FIRM LEVEL (A)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Women Equity Woman Control Max Woman Stake Women Control % of Women
Wm × POST 0.187 -0.0446 -0.212 0.0710 0.246*
(0.150) (0.159) (0.145) (0.171) (0.145)
Observations 7,362 7,362 2,396 7,362 7,362
R-squared 0.173 0.209 0.609 0.179 0.181
FEs: Quarter, municipality, NACE core code
Interacted FEs: # of founders, region
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Economic Magnitudes 5.19% -1.80% -2.79% 2.09% 6.32%
Difference in differences estimation at the start-up level of the effect of ECP availability on
different measures of women involvement. The dependent variables considered are: total
percentage of equity owned by women, probability of one woman having 50% or more of
equity, the maximum stake of equity owned by a female founder in the firm, probability
of having 50% or more of equity owned by women and the percentage of founders who are
women. Economic magnitudes are calculated as the interaction coefficient on Wm × POST
times one cross-sectional standard deviation of Wm, divided by the mean of the dependent
variable before the liberalization of ECPs. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality
level. The difference-in-differences regression equation is: yjmt = α+βmt(POSTt × Wm)+
γm + τt + σs + POSTt × ρr + POSTt × FEsj + jmt
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Table A18: INNOVATIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP - FIRM LEVEL (B)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Women Equity Woman Control Max Woman Stake Women Control % of Women
Wm × POST 0.220 -0.0466 -0.202 0.129 0.300**
(0.142) (0.148) (0.147) (0.173) (0.143)
Observations 5,772 5,772 2,227 5,772 5,772
R-squared 0.178 0.234 0.416 0.192 0.181
FEs: Quarter, municipality, NACE core code
Interacted FEs: # of founders, region
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Economic Magnitudes 5.63% -1.86% -2.98% 3.52% 7.08%
Difference in differences estimation at the start-up level of the effect of ECP availability on
different measures of women involvement, excluding one-founder start-ups. The dependent
variables considered are: total percentage of equity owned by women, probability of one
woman having 50% or more of equity, the maximum stake of equity owned by a female
founder in the firm, probability of having 50% or more of equity owned by women and the
percentage of founders who are women. Economic magnitudes are calculated as the interac-
tion coefficient on Wm× POST times one cross-sectional standard deviation ofWm, divided
by the mean of the dependent variable before the liberalization of ECPs. Standard errors
are clustered at the municipality level. The difference-in-differences regression equation is:
yjmt = α+ βmt(POSTt × Wm) + γm + τt + σs + POSTt × ρr + POSTt × FEsj + jmt
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Table A19: LABOR MARKET - GENDER GAP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Labor Outcomes Employment Employment Entrepreneurs Entrepreneurs
≤35 ≤35 (Rel.) ≤35 ≤35 (Rel.)
Female Dummy -0.106*** -0.225*** -0.00546*** -0.00691***
(0.00436) (0.00862) (0.00106) (0.00242)
Observations 114,646 31,963 114,646 31,963
R-squared 0.209 0.257 0.061 0.099
Economic Magnitudes -17.61% -31.75% -26.58% -29.18%
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Labor Outcomes Hours Hours Salary Salary
≤35 ≤35 (Rel.) ≤35 ≤35 (Rel.)
Female Dummy -6.059*** -8.422*** -0.951*** -1.600***
(0.0829) (0.143) (0.195) (0.258)
Observations 188,682 61,274 154,401 50,705
R-squared 0.115 0.196 0.117 0.140
Economic Magnitudes -16.81% -23.42% -3.06% -4.77%
Fixed-Effects: municipality, quarter, age class, education level, family type,
marital status, foreign born, region, citizenship, profession
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Regression of several labor market outcomes on a dummy which equals one if the individual
is a woman, including fixed effects for location, time and individual characteristics (e.g.
education and marital status). The regression coefficient of the dummy measures the gap
in the outcomes of interest associated with being a woman. Economic magnitudes are
calculated by dividing the coefficient on the dummy Female, by the mean of the dependent
variable when the dummy equals 0. The regression equation is: yimt = Femalei+γm+ τt+
FEsi + imt
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Table A20: LABOR MARKET - ENTREPRENEURSHIP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Entrepreneur Entrepreneur Self-Employed Ent. Hours Ent. Hours S.E. Hours
≤35 ≤35 - (Rel.) ≤35 - (Rel.) ≤35 ≤35 - (Rel.) ≤35 - (Rel.)
Wm × POST 0.0227 0.0917** 0.00693 16.73 40.41* 3.044
(0.0193) (0.0404) (0.0544) (14.56) (21.03) (13.12)
Observations 141,521 49,227 49,227 2,830 1,092 5,843
R-squared 0.068 0.098 0.067 0.406 0.586 0.337
FEs: Quarter, municipality
Interacted FEs: Age class, education level, family and marital status, foreign born, region, citizenship
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Economic Magnitudes 4.86% 17.78% 0.63% 2.18% 5.42% 0.34%
Estimation of the effect of ECPs’ liberalization on the probability of a woman being an
entrepreneur and on the number of hours worked (weekly) by women entrepreneurs. The
analysis is repeated using all women aged 35 or younger and women below age 35 who
are in a relationship (Rel.). In columns (3) and (6) the effect of interest is estimated on
younger women who are self-employed rather than entrepreneurs. Economic magnitudes are
calculated as the interaction coefficient on Wm × POST times one cross-sectional standard
deviation of Wm, divided by the mean of the dependent variable before the liberalization of
ECPs. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The difference-in-differences
regression equation is: yimt = α+βmt(POSTt ×Wm)+γm+τt+POSTt×ρr+FEsi+ imt
.
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Table A21: LABOR MARKET - PAID EMPLOYMENT
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Employment Employment Hours Hours
≤35 ≤35 - (Rel.) ≤35 ≤35 - (Rel.)
Wm × POST -0.00617 0.156 -1.072 0.414
(0.0786) (0.114) (2.241) (3.598)
Observations 141,521 49,227 80,457 30,864
R-squared 0.207 0.238 0.069 0.128
FEs: Quarter, municipality
Interacted FEs: Age class, education level, family status,
marital status, foreign born, region, citizenship
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Economic Magnitudes -0.05% 1.12% -0.15% 0.06%
Estimation of the effect of ECPs’ liberalization on the probability of a woman being em-
ployed and on on the number of hours worked (weekly) by employed women. The anal-
ysis is repeated using all women aged 35 or younger and women below age 35 who are
in a relationship (Rel.). Economic magnitudes are calculated as the interaction coeffi-
cient on Wm × POST times one cross-sectional standard deviation of Wm, divided by
the mean of the dependent variable before the liberalization of ECPs. Standard errors
are clustered at the municipality level. The difference-in-differences regression equation is:
yimt = α+ βmt(POSTt × Wm) + γm + τt + POSTt × ρr + FEsi + imt .
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A.2.1 Supplementary Tables
Table A22: START-UP ITALY ACT SUMMARY
Panel A. Start-Up Italy Requirements
All of the following: - Incorporation in Italy as an independent private limited
company by less than 5 years;
- “Technological innovation” as main business objective;
- Value of production < e 5M;
- No dividend distribution.
At least one of the following: - R&D expenses for more than 15% of the biggest between
value or cost of production;
- A patent granted or a software trademark registered;
- At least a third of all collaborators holding a PhD or
two thirds holding a master degree.
Panel B. Start-Up Italy Incentives
Financial Constraints: - Preferential access to the Government Guarantee Fund
for bank credit and loans;
- Tax breaks for private and professional equity investors.
Bureaucracy: - Favorable employment law, incentives for equity-based
compensation;
- Easier and faster bankruptcy procedures;
- Exemption from several administrative expenditures
and red tape (e.g. stamp duties).
Summary of the requirements (Panel A) that firms have to satisfy in order to be incorporated
under the Start-Up Italy Act (SIA) and incentives (Panel B) start-ups receive under the
program.
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Table A23: LABOR MARKET - FIXED EFFECTS
Variables Values
Age class: 5 year intervals, from 18 to 108.
Citizenship: Italian, EU country, other.
Education level: ISCED 1-6 (primary educa-
tion, lower secondary educa-
tion, upper secondary edu-
cation, post-secondary educa-
tion, tertiary education, sec-
ond stage of tertiary educa-
tion).
Family type: Single without children, single
with children, in a relationship
without children, in a relation-
ship with children.
Foreign born: yes, no.
Marital status: Bachelor, married in a house-
hold, married not in a house-
hold, legally separated, di-
vorced, widow.
Region: 20 Italian regions (administra-
tive division analogous to US
states).
List of variables used as fixed effects when estimating regressions on the sample of women
from Quarterly Cross-sectional Labour Force Survey and their range of values.
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Table A24: LABOR MARKET - SUMMARY STATISTICS
Full Sample Men Women
No. of obs. 3,042,088 1,440,205 1,601,883
Gender - 47.3% 52.7%
Age 46.9 45.2 48.4
Monthly wage (e) 1308.0 1463.4 1168.2
Employment rate 76.7% 80.9% 73.0%
% of entrepreneurs 4.4% 5.5% 3.4%
% of parents 32.8% - -
% of singles 49.5% - -
Summary statistics of the sample of individuals in the Quarterly Cross-sectional Labor Force
Survey and the sub-samples of men and women.
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Table A25: ROBUSTNESS - EXTENSIVE MARGIN
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Found. (/1000 women) ≤ 35 ≤ 35 ≤ 35 ≤ 35 ≤ 35
Wm × POST 0.103*
(0.0610)
WL × POST 0.0895
(0.115)
WMin × POST 0.0191**
(0.00914)
Wm, 4h × POST 0.0901
(0.0577)
WL, 4h × POST 0.178
(0.153)
Observations 130,578 130,578 130,578 130,578 130,578
R-squared 0.142 0.142 0.142 0.142 0.142
Town FE YES YES YES YES YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES
Region#POST FE YES YES YES YES YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Estimation of the effect of ECPs’ liberalization on the number of innovative founders, aged 35
or younger, standardized by the number of women living in the municipality. In the first row,
access to abortion is measured as in the main analysis. In the second row, access to abortion
is calculated using linear weighting as: WL = 1∑
j wmj
∑
j wmjCOj , where wmj =
tmax−tmj
tmax
and tmax is the maximum travel time between any municipality and municipality m. In
the third row, access to abortion is measured as the share of conscientious objectors among
gynecologists in the nearest hospital. Lastly, in the last two rows access to abortion is
calculated as in the main analysis and as in the second row, respectively, but excluding any
hospital farther than 4 hours travel time.
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Table A26: ROBUSTNESS - EQUITY
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Equity Stake ≤ 35 ≤ 35 ≤ 35 ≤ 35 ≤ 35
Wm × POST 0.795*
(0.410)
WL × POST 16.73**
(7.052)
WMin × POST 0.150
(0.134)
Wm, 4h × POST 0.764**
(0.333)
WL, 4h × POST 4.362*
(2.453)
Observations 978 978 978 978 978
R-squared 0.386 0.388 0.384 0.387 0.386
Town FE YES YES YES YES YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES
Region#POST FE YES YES YES YES YES
Sector FE YES YES YES YES YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Estimation of the effect of ECPs’ liberalization on the stake of equity in innovative start-
ups of the average female founder, aged 35 or younger. In the first row, access to abortion
is calculated as in the main analysis. In the second row, access to abortion is calculated
using linear weighting as: WL = 1∑
j wmj
∑
j wmjCOj , where wmj =
tmax−tmj
tmax
and tmax is
the maximum travel time between any municipality and municipality m. In the third row,
access to abortion is measured as the share of conscientious objectors among gynecologists
in the nearest hospital. Lastly, in the last two rows access to abortion is calculated as in
the main analysis and as in the second row, respectively, but excluding any hospital farther
than 4 hours travel time.
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Table A27: ROBUSTNESS - MAIN OWNERSHIP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Main Owner ≤ 35 ≤ 35 ≤ 35 ≤ 35 ≤ 35
Wm × POST 1.584**
(0.783)
WL × POST 26.29**
(10.66)
WMin × POST 0.392
(0.303)
Wm, 4h × POST 1.383**
(0.640)
WL, 4h × POST 6.279
(4.209)
Observations 978 978 978 978 978
R-squared 0.414 0.414 0.413 0.414 0.413
Town FE YES YES YES YES YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES
Region#POST FE YES YES YES YES YES
Sector FE YES YES YES YES YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Estimation of the effect of ECPs’ liberalization on the probability of the average female
founder, aged 35 or younger, to be main owner of her innovative start-up. In the first row,
access to abortion is calculated as in the main analysis. In the second row, access to abortion
is calculated using linear weighting as: WL = 1∑
j wmj
∑
j wmjCOj , where wmj =
tmax−tmj
tmax
and tmax is the maximum travel time between any municipality and municipality m. In
the third row, access to abortion is measured as the share of conscientious objectors among
gynecologists in the nearest hospital. Lastly, in the last two rows access to abortion is
calculated as in the main analysis and as in the second row, respectively, but excluding any
hospital farther than 4 hours travel time.
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Table A28: ROBUSTNESS - EXECUTIVES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Executive ≤ 35 ≤ 35 ≤ 35 ≤ 35 ≤ 35
Wm × POST 1.234*
(0.677)
WL × POST 23.03***
(8.083)
WMin × POST 0.271*
(0.151)
Wm, 4h × POST 1.028*
(0.582)
WL, 4h × POST 4.900*
(2.576)
Observations 978 978 978 978 978
R-squared 0.298 0.299 0.296 0.298 0.297
Town FE YES YES YES YES YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES
Region#POST FE YES YES YES YES YES
Sector FE YES YES YES YES YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Estimation of the effect of ECPs’ liberalization on the probability of the average female
founder, aged 35 or younger, to be the executive of her innovative start-up. In the first row,
access to abortion is calculated as in the main analysis. In the second row, access to abortion
is calculated using linear weighting as: WL = 1∑
j wmj
∑
j wmjCOj , where wmj =
tmax−tmj
tmax
and tmax is the maximum travel time between any municipality and municipality m. In
the third row, access to abortion is measured as the share of conscientious objectors among
gynecologists in the nearest hospital. Lastly, in the last two rows access to abortion is
calculated as in the main analysis and as in the second row, respectively, but excluding any
hospital farther than 4 hours travel time.
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A.2.2 Tables of the Analysis on Men
Table A29: REGULAR ENTREPRENEURSHIP - EXTENSIVE MARGIN
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ent. (/1000 men) Entrepreneurs Entrepreneurs Executives Entrepreneurs Entrepreneurs
All ≤35 ≤35 36-49 ≥50
Wm × POST 0.114 1.261 0.836 -0.638 -0.0242
(0.335) (1.179) (0.958) (0.889) (0.260)
Observations 160,740 160,728 160,488 160,740 160,740
R-squared 0.146 0.098 0.085 0.114 0.074
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES
Region#POST FE YES YES YES YES YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Economic Magnitudes 0.19% 1.07% 3.28%
Difference in differences estimation at the municipality level of the effect of ECP availability
on the fraction of men living in a given municipality who start a new business (analogous
to Table A7). The analysis is repeated for different age groups of men: men 35 years old or
younger, men aged between 36 and 49, and men aged 50 or older. Economic magnitudes are
calculated as the interaction coefficient on Wm × POST times one cross-sectional standard
deviation of Wm, divided by the mean of the dependent variable before the liberalization of
ECPs. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The difference-in-differences
regression equation is: ymt = α+ βmt(POSTt × Wm) + γm + τt + POSTt × ρr + mt
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Table A30: REGULAR ENTREPRENEURSHIP - EQUITY
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Equity Stake All ≤35 36-49 ≥50 ≤35 ≤35
All All All All LLCs ULPs
Wm × POST -0.00200 -0.00116 0.00310 0.00791 -0.0213 -0.00860
(0.00420) (0.00669) (0.00780) (0.00530) (0.0189) (0.0131)
Observations 1,316,671 454,063 538,433 314,884 137,189 323,064
R-squared 0.856 0.885 0.856 0.912 0.700 0.825
FEs: Quarter, municipality, NACE core code
Interacted FEs: # of founders, region, legal form
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Economic Magnitudes -0.01% -0.01% -0.21% -0.06%
Difference in differences estimation at the founder level of the effect of ECP availability
on the percentage of equity in the hands of men founders (analogous to Table A8). The
analysis is repeated for different age groups of men: men 35 years old or younger, men
aged between 36 and 49, and men aged 50 or older and different legal forms of the firm
(limited liability companies and unlimited liability partnerships). Economic magnitudes are
calculated as the interaction coefficient on Wm × POST times one cross-sectional standard
deviation of Wm, divided by the mean of the dependent variable before the liberalization of
ECPs. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The difference-in-differences
regression equation is: yijmt = α + βmt(POSTt × Wm) + γm + τt + σs + POSTt × ρr +
POSTt × FEsj + ijmt
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Table A31: INNOVATIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP - EXTENSIVE MARGIN
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Found. (/1000 men) Founders Founders Founders Founders
All ≤35 36-49 ≥50
Wm × POST -0.000340 -0.105 -0.0424 0.0338
(0.0376) (0.161) (0.0592) (0.0301)
Observations 130,582 130,582 130,582 130,582
R-squared 0.152 0.194 0.111 0.097
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES
Region#POST FE YES YES YES YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Economic Magnitudes -1.81% -8.98% -
Difference in differences estimation at the municipality level of the effect of ECP availability
on the fraction of men living in a given municipality who start a new innovative start-up
(analogous to Table A11). The analysis is repeated for different age groups of men: men 35
years old or younger, men aged between 36 and 49, and men aged 50 or older. Economic
magnitudes are calculated as the interaction coefficient on Wm × POST times one cross-
sectional standard deviation of Wm, divided by the mean of the dependent variable before
the liberalization of ECPs. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The
difference-in-differences regression equation is: ymt = α+ βmt(POSTt × Wm) + γm + τt +
POSTt × ρr + mt
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Table A32: INNOVATIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP - EQUITY
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Equity Stake All ≤35 ≤35 36-49 ≥50
Wm × POST 0.0803 0.0502 0.0916 0.158 0.0400
(0.144) (0.192) (0.169) (0.234) (0.267)
Observations 16,419 4,334 4,131 6,501 3,720
R-squared 0.185 0.264 0.251 0.240 0.262
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES
Region#POST FE YES YES YES YES YES
Sector FE YES YES YES YES YES
One-founder Firms YES YES NO YES YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Economic Magnitudes 1.29% 0.80% 1.60%
Difference in differences estimation at the founder level of the effect of ECP availability on the
fraction of equity held at founding by men founders of innovative start-ups, both including
and excluding one-founder firms (analogous to Table A12). The analysis is repeated for
different age groups of men: men 35 years old or younger, men aged between 36 and 49,
and men aged 50 or older. Economic magnitudes are calculated as the interaction coefficient
on Wm × POST times one cross-sectional standard deviation of Wm, divided by the mean
of the dependent variable before the liberalization of ECPs. Standard errors are clustered
at the municipality level. The difference-in-differences regression equation is: yijmt = α +
βmt(POSTt × Wm) + γm + τt + σs + POSTt × ρr + ijmt
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Table A33: INNOVATIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP - MAIN OWNERSHIP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Main Owner All ≤35 ≤35 36-49 ≥50
Wm × POST 0.160 0.502 0.496 0.215 -0.281
(0.193) (0.422) (0.419) (0.327) (0.441)
Observations 16,449 4,334 4,585 6,501 3,751
R-squared 0.166 0.245 0.235 0.222 0.248
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES
Region#POST FE YES YES YES YES YES
Sector FE YES YES YES YES YES
One-founder Firms YES YES NO YES YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Economic Magnitudes 1.64% 4.87% 5.04%
Difference in differences estimation at the municipality level of the effect of ECP availability
on the probability of a man founder of an innovative start-up to be the main owner of the
firm, both including and excluding one-founder firms (analogous of Table A13). A founder is
considered a main owner if her stake of equity is the biggest among all founders. The analysis
is repeated for different age groups of men: men 35 years old or younger, men aged between
36 and 49, and men aged 50 or older. Economic magnitudes are calculated as the interaction
coefficient on Wm × POST times one cross-sectional standard deviation of Wm, divided by
the mean of the dependent variable before the liberalization of ECPs. Standard errors
are clustered at the municipality level. The difference-in-differences regression equation is:
yijmt = α+ βmt(POSTt × Wm) + γm + τt + σs + POSTt × ρr + ijmt
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Table A34: INNOVATIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP - EXECUTIVES
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Executive All ≤35 36-49 ≥50
Wm × POST 0.0924 0.176 0.0657 0.517
(0.157) (0.323) (0.260) (0.333)
Observations 16,438 4,334 6,501 3,739
R-squared 0.156 0.231 0.210 0.231
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES
Region#POST FE YES YES YES YES
Sector FE YES YES YES YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Economic Magnitudes 2.37% 4.30%
Difference in differences estimation at the founder level of the effect of ECP availability on
the probability of a man founder of an innovative start-up to also be the executive of the
company (analogous to Table A14). The analysis is repeated for different age groups of
men: men 35 years old or younger, men aged between 36 and 49, and men aged 50 or older.
Economic magnitudes are calculated as the interaction coefficient on Wm× POST times one
cross-sectional standard deviation of Wm, divided by the mean of the dependent variable
before the liberalization of ECPs. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.
The difference-in-differences regression equation is: yijmt = α+βmt(POSTt × Wm)+ γm+
τt + σs + POSTt × ρr + ijmt
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Table A35: LABOR MARKET - ENTREPRENEURSHIP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Entrepreneur ≤35 ≤ 35 - (Rel.) 36-49 ≥50
Wm × POST 0.00368 -0.0388 0.0236 -0.00895
(0.0193) (0.0573) (0.0157) (0.0263)
Observations 167,141 36,051 448,633 253,551
R-squared 0.066 0.116 0.093 0.177
FEs: Quarter, municipality
Interacted FEs: Age class, education, family and marital
status, foreign, region, citizenship
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Economic Magnitudes 0.82% -7.17%
Estimation of the effect of ECPs’ liberalization on the probability of a man being an en-
trepreneur (analogous to Table A20). The analysis is repeated for different age groups of
men: men 35 years old or younger, men aged between 36 and 49, and men aged 50 or older,
and men who are in a relationship (Rel.) Economic magnitudes are calculated as the interac-
tion coefficient on Wm× POST times one cross-sectional standard deviation ofWm, divided
by the mean of the dependent variable before the liberalization of ECPs. Standard errors
are clustered at the municipality level. The difference-in-differences regression equation is:
yimt = α+ βmt(POSTt × Wm) + γm + τt + POSTt × ρr + FEsi + imt
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A.3 Abortion Procedure in Italy
In this appendix, I outline the procedure that a woman in Italy has to fulfill
to get a voluntary abortion. The procedure is outlined in Law 194, enacted in
1978 and subsequently minorly amended. The Law has the goal to guarantee
women’s reproductive freedom under the constraint of minimizing abortions.
In Italy, abortion is legal within 90 days since the start of the pregnancy
(voluntary abortion). In case of grave dangers to the woman’s life or severe
congenital anomalies and conditions of the fetus, abortion is legal up to when
the fetus would be able to live autonomously outside the woman’s uterus (ther-
apeutic abortion). Here I focus exclusively on voluntary abortion.
The count of the 90 days begins not with the conceiving act but rather
with the first date of the last menstruation, namely the first day of the last
menstrual flow (not to be confused with the day last menses ended). Within
this term, a woman who wants to have an abortion must approach a Family
Contraceptive Clinic (equivalent to Planned Parenthood in the US). Here, a
doctor certifies her pregnancy status and she could also run a blood test for the
hormone Beta-hCG, to date the pregnancy more accurately. Conventionally,
the start of the pregnancy can also be dated to days of life of the fetus plus
two weeks.
Once the doctor establishes that a woman is pregnant and within the term
to obtain a voluntary abortion, she has to ask the woman the causes that
originate her choice. The doctor may ask to involve the man in the process,
even if the woman can refuse. The Law also requires that the doctor informs
the woman of all the possible help the woman can get from the state, certifying
the use of abortion as extrema ratio. If the woman decides to go ahead, the
doctor must giver her a certificate that attests the woman’s status and decision
to get an abortion. Before the woman can effectively book surgery at a public
hospital, she has to wait at least seven days, during which she is usually invited
by the clinic for counseling sessions. After the seven days, she can effectively
book an appointment at a hospital of her choosing, even if some clinics may
manage the booking themselves in accordance with neighboring hospitals.
Law 194 also accounts for the possibility of a gynecologist to object against
performing abortion procedures. Doctors’ conscientious objection impacts on
the ability of a woman getting an abortion at two stages: the clinic and the
hospital. At the hospital level, a high number of conscientious objectors causes
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longer waiting times for surgery. Also, in Italy abortions are still largely ob-
tained trough surgical procedure (pharmaceutical abortions in 2015 accounted
for 15% of the total, and by law they can be performed only within 49 days
from the start of the pregnancy), which means women have to find a hospital
with both a free operating room and a bed for the night. It is important to
note that the deadline of 90 days is a hard constraint, and the law requires
the woman to get the surgery, not the certificate, within 90 days. Therefore if
waiting times are particularly long, they can spike up to 30 days or longer, a
woman may not be able to get the surgery in time. This can force the woman
to visit neighboring hospitals, sometimes even outside her own region, in the
hope to find a suitable day for the surgery, all the while wasting precious days.
Therefore, casting aside the psychological consequences of such an excruciating
journey, getting an abortion in certain areas of the country can be physically
hard or impossible, depending on the time available to the woman.
It is important to notice that in Italy, a woman cannot get an abortion
independently in the private sector. While the national health-care system
allows some private clinic to provide the service, it is nonetheless regulated by
the Law 194, which means the woman has to go through the same procedure
no matter where she ends up having the abortion. Therefore the difficulties
in accessing abortion services impact women from all social and economic
statuses.
The other dimension how conscientious objection affects women’s ability
to get an abortion is at the family contraceptive clinic level. Before the end of
2016, doctors and personnel of the clinic could refuse to certify the pregnancy
status of the woman or to giver her the necessary certificate. This possibility
has been struck down by the Supreme Court in 2016 as a misinterpretation of
Law 194. I do not take into account this second dimension in the analysis for
three reasons: first, the problem seems to have been less severe with respect
to hospitals, since around 15% of personnel in 2015 declared conscientious
objection; the second reason is that in certain situations the contraceptive clinic
can be sidelined, as a woman can also ask her GP (General Practitioner) to
certify her status and decision; lastly, data coverage on contraceptive clinics is
scarce, as the Ministry of Health reports data about conscientious objection for
only 80% of them with serious data quality issue in certain regions. Therefore,
the measure of access to abortion I use represents a conservative measure of
women’s barriers to effectively get an abortion.
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A.4 Theoretical Intuition à la Goldin (2014)
In this appendix, I augment and reinterpret the theoretical framework of
Goldin (2014) to account for maternity risk.
Following Goldin (2014), I construct a model where occupations have convex
payoffs in time spent at work (t). Entrepreneurship pays a fixed dividend d
times the amount of time committed by the entrepreneur, conditional on her
having enough time to invest (t ≥ tˆ). Similarly, employment pays a wage
w times the amount of time spent at work, if it exceeds a certain threshold
(t ≥ t¯). If the agent does not have enough time to commit to the workplace,
both entrepreneurship and employment pay less per unit of time, respectively
(1 − β)d and (1 − α)w. Payoffs (Y ) from the two different careers can be
summarized as follows:
Employment Y (t) =
tw if t ≥ tˆt(1− α)w if t < tˆ
Entrepreneurship Y (t) =
td if t ≥ t¯t(1− β)d if t < t¯
The convexity of payoff fuctions is given by the discontinuities around the two
thresholds. The intuition is that an employee has to spend enough time at work
to progress in her career and achieve higher payoffs. Conversely, I can also
interpret the convexity of payoffs as employers punishing disproportionately
workers in need of flexibility. I apply such intuition, outlined in Goldin (2014),
to entrepreneurship.
Regarding the parameters of the model, I make the following assumptions:
1. d > w
2. (1− α)w > (1− β)d, where 1 > β > α > 0
3. tˆ < t¯ < T
I assume that entrepreneurship is a more rewarding career than paid employ-
ment (Assumption 1). But entrepreneurship is also a career choice that pun-
ishes more those who cannot commit enough time to it (Assumption 2). At
the same time, the amount of time to commit to entrepreneurship for it to be
successful is higher than for paid employment (Assumption 3).
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I also augment Goldin (2014) framework by adding maternity risk. Mother-
hood reduces the time available to the woman from T to δT , where δ < 1.
Furthermore, motherhood is random and happens with probability p < 1. I
make the following assumption about δ:
4. δT < tˆ < t¯ < T
Assumption 4 makes maternity risk relevant for women’s career choices. Figure
A11 offers a visual representation of the payoffs of entrepreneurship and paid
employment as a function of the time available to spend at work.
Since there is no outside option for the use of time, an agent will always spend
all the time available to her on the workplace. If a woman has her full time
T to spend at work, she would always go for entrepreneurship, it being the
most profitable career per unit of time. Once I add the possibility of maternity
risk hitting the woman with probability p, her choice could change. Assuming
women to be risk-neutral, her payoffs under maternity risk becomes:
• Employment: YEmp = (1− p)Tw + p(1− α)δTw
• Entrepreneurship: YEnt = (1− p)Td+ p(1− β)δTd
Being a rational agent, a woman will choose entrepreneurship only if YEnt >
YEmp, a condition which depends on the magnitude of p. Therefore, p repre-
sents what I call maternity risk throughout the paper. Easily, it can be proven
that:
Result 1. If p > p¯ = d−w
d−w+δ(w(1−α)−d(1−β)) then YEnt > YEmp. Therefore, paid
employment is preferred to entrepreneurship.
In other words, when maternity risk is sufficiently high, women select out
of entrepreneurial careers. Interpreting the result in light of the main empirical
analysis, I can say that when maternity risk is reduced women are more likely
to join entrepreneurship and committing more time and resources to it. What
makes maternity risk problematic for selection into entrepreneurship is the
convexity of entrepreneurial careers’ payoffs, and in particular the fact that
entrepreneurship has a more convex payoff than paid employment. This stems
from the lower payoff earned when the time committed to the project is lower,
and from the fact that an entrepreneur has to commit more time to her career.
Such assumption is consistent with the view of entrepreneurial roles as 24/7
jobs and with the absence of paid maternity leave for entrepreneurs.
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Figure A11: PAID EMPLOYMENT VERSUS ENTREPRENEURSHIP
t
Y
tˆ t¯
Employment
Entrepreneurship
Visual representation of the convexity of the payoffs entrepreneurship and employment as
functions of time spent at work. Entrepreneurial careers have a more convex payoff compared
to paid employment.
B. Appendix to Lend Me a Hand -
Banks Rent Extraction and Policies for
Start-Ups
B.1 Figures
Figure B1: CASHFLOWS IN THE MODEL
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Time-line of the cashflows of the entrepreneur’s project. The project needs to be financed
at time 0 and refinenced at time 1. It produces a risky cashflow at time 1 and a safe one at
time 2. The parameter γ measures the level of innovativeness of the firm, making it more
risky in the first period (i.e. the first cashflow is more risky) and more profitable in the
second (i.e. the cashflow at time 2 is bigger).
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Figure B2: PARALLEL TRENDS - POLICY
Local polynomial smooth (to smooth seasonality) of numbers and percentages (of total
firms registered) of newly incorporated LLCs around the policy, in R&D-oriented and other
industries. The difference in incorporations between the two groups of industries widens
after the passing of the policy, showing its effectiveness.
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Figure B3: PARALLEL TRENDS - DDD
Difference between high and low rent provinces for R&D oriented industries (blue) and not
R&D oriented (red) in newly incorporated limited (left) and non-limited liability companies
(right). The graph shows a graphical representation of the triple-diff setting: the difference
between the two groups remains flat in the control (dashed) and shows an upward trend in
the treated industries (solid) after the passing of the policy (red vertical line), but only for
LLCs. For NLLCs there is no difference before and after the passing of the policy. Since
NLLCs are not affected by the policy, this constitutes a placebo test.
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Figure B4: PARALLEL TRENDS - DDD (REGION)
Difference between high and low rent provinces provinces for R&D oriented industries (blue)
and not R&D oriented (red) in newly incorporated limited (left) and non-limited liability
companies (right). The graph has the same interpretation of Figure B3 but here the rent
extraction dummy is defined at the regional level.
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Figure B5: GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF START-UPS
Map of Italian provinces ranked by the number of start-ups incorporated under the Start-Up
Italy policy. Provinces are divided in quartiles.
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Figure B6: GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF RENTS
Map of Italian provinces ranked by the average return distance between 2010 and 2012, as
a proxy for rent-extraction by banks. Grey provinces are scoring above the national median
and are classified “high-rent” provinces.
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Figure B7: GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF RENTS (REGION)
Map of Italian provinces, as per Figure B6, but where the ranking of provinces is done using
regional median. Regional boundaries are outlined in black.
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Figure B8: RETURN DISTANCE AND BANKS’ CONDUCT
Scatter plot of the return distance against banks’ conduct in Italian provinces in the period
2010-2012, as estimated by Coccorese (2008).
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Figure B9: RETURN DISTANCE AND INNOVATIVE FIRMS
Correlation between return distance and percentage of total firms registered that operate
in R&D-oriented industries. Provinces in which banks are more competitive tend to have
higher share of firms in innovative industries. The negative correlation between innovation
and banks’ rent-extraction is stronger for limited liability companies than for non-limited
liability ones.
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B.2 Tables
Table B1: R&D-ORIENTED INDUSTRIES
Innovative and R&D-oriented Industries Two-Digits NACE Codes
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations 21
Manufacture of computer, electronic, optical products 26
Manufacture of electrical equipment 27
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 28
Publishing activities (includes software publishing) 58
Computer programming, consultancy, related activities 62
Information service activities 63
Management consultancy activities 70
Scientific research and development 72
List of industries which are considered innovative or R&D-oriented, in order to match those
most represented in the sample of start-ups taking up the program.
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Table B2: SECTOR DISTRBUTION OF FIRMS
Sectors % of Startup Sample Avg. % in Italy
Agriculture 0.57% 13.26%
Arts & Sports 0.47% 1.12%
Construction 1.33% 14.50%
Education 0.78% 0.44%
Energy 1.98% 0.14%
Finance 0.15% 1.95%
Healthcare 0.75% 0.58%
Hospitality 0.57% 6.64%
ICT 42.17% 2.09%
Manufacturing 17.63% 9.94%
Mining 0.00% 0.08%
Other Services 0.44% 3.81%
Professional S. & R&D 25.23% 3.20%
Real Estate 0.06% 4.65%
Services & Consulting 3.30% 2.73%
Trade 4.22% 25.50%
Transport 0.35% 2.90%
House Services 0.00% 0.00%
International Org. 0.00% 0.00%
Public & Defense 0.00% 0.00%
Unclassified 0.00% 6.27%
Utilities 0.00% 0.18%
Percentages of start-ups incorporated under the SIA policy in different sectors, compared
to the sectors’ distribution of all Italian firms.
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Table B3: SOURCES OF FUNDING
Source of Funding N. of Operations N. of Recipients Total (mil.)
Gurantee on Bank Loans 3,872 2,410 688.54
External Equity Financing 197 137 64.7
Numbers of deals, recipients and Euro values of founding for start-ups participating in the
SIA program, by source.
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Table B4: T-TESTS - ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
(1) (2) (3)
L-H National North-South L-H Regional
Value Added (Mil.) 7,626.73** 7,263.92* 6,441.85*
Income per Capita (Eur) 4,343.50*** 4,664.15*** 197.87
Surface (km2) -327.40 -342.62 451.06
Population (100k) 0.70 0.80 2.17*
Blackouts per User -1.63*** -1.89*** 0.24
% Export of Dynamic Sectors -5.57 -0.59 0.22
Hospital Emigration Rate -2.97*** -3.84*** 0.94
Patents per Inabit. (Mil.) 64.15*** 73.29*** 11.88
Unemployment Rate - Youth -10.18*** -13.61*** 2.24
Unemployment Rate -5.45*** -6.42*** 0.73
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
T-tests for differences between low-rent and high-rent provinces in several economic indica-
tors at the passing of the policy (end of 2012). T-tests are repeated for provinces located in
North and in the South, as well as defining low-rent and high-rent categories using regional
medians.
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Table B5: T-TESTS - BANKING SECTOR
(1) (2) (3)
L-H National North-South L-H Regional
Deposits per Branch (Th.) 3905.05** 4706.31** 1044.92
Loans per Branch (Th.) 9738.07*** 4179.14 6666.44*
Growth Rate of Fin. Comp. -0.01 0.14 -0.66*
Birth Rate of Fin. Comp. -0.74*** -0.44* 0.10
Branches - Foreign Pct. 0.28* 0.52*** 0.07
Banks - Foreign Pct. 2.09 3.46** -0.77
Banks - Relationship Pct. -11.99* -16.84*** 2.01
Branches - Relationship Pct. 4.41* 9.42*** -1.67
HHI - Branches -0.04*** -0.01 -0.02
Loan/Deposit Ratio 0.09 -0.12* 0.16**
Branches - per 100k Inhab. 25.74*** 25.76*** 1.16
Banks - per 100k Inhab. 0.74*** 0.51* -0.01
Employees 2346.63** 2148.13** 1479.37
Deposit Costs - Mil 0.06** 0.04 0.04
HR Costs - Mil 180.22** 164.98** 113.62
HR Costs per Branch - Mil. 0.14*** 0.06 0.06
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
T-tests for differences between low-rent and high-rent provinces in several banking-sector
outcomes at the passing of the policy (end of 2012). T-tests are repeated for provinces
located in North and in the South, as well as defining low-rent and high-rent categories
using regional medians.
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Table B6: INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES - EXCLUSION RESTRICTION
(1) (2)
Branch per capita 1936 Saving Branch per capita 1936
Cars per capita 1933-38 5.637 2.843
(5.190) (1.993)
Share Active Population 0.101 0.140
(0.335) (0.129)
Entr. share of workf. 1936 -0.167 0.0336
(0.467) (0.179)
Agr. share of workf. 1936 0.113 0.0733
(0.182) (0.0698)
Factory share of workf. 1936 0.0771 0.0737
(0.221) (0.0850)
Region V.A. per capita 1938 3.65e-05 1.07e-05
(3.93e-05) (1.51e-05)
Region V.A. per worker 1938 -9.76e-06 -5.51e-06
(1.76e-05) (6.76e-06)
Constant -0.0324 -0.0947
(0.201) (0.0772)
Observations 104 104
R-squared 0.236 0.276
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Regression of the banking structure of provinces in 1936 on several economic indicators
measured in 1936. The two outcome variables are the instruments used in the IV analysis.
Number of cars per capita, as proxy of income, is only available in 1933 and 1938 and the
average of the two values is used. Value added is only available at the region level and
measured in 1938. Data on active population and composition of the workforce has been
obtained digitalizing the Census of 1936.
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Table B7: DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES
(1) (2) (3)
LLC - New LLC - Pct. NLLC - Pct.
Policy × Industry 0.108*** 0.00140*** -0.000177
(0.0295) (0.000463) (0.000543)
Observations 134,784 120,332 112,722
R-squared 0.322 0.020 0.010
Quart. FE YES YES YES
Ind. FE YES YES YES
Prov. FE YES YES YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Estimates of the effect of the policy on incorporations of new firms in innovative industries,
using a DID approach. Incorporations are expressed both in numbers and percentages of
firms registered four quarters before. In column 3 the estimation is performed on NLLCs as
a placebo test, since NLLCs are not included in the SIA policy.
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Table B8: DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES - NATIONAL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LLC - New NLLC - New LLC - New NLLC - New LLC - Pct.
Rent× Policy × Industry -0.132** -0.0103 -0.262** -0.0384 -0.00286*
(0.0548) (0.0176) (0.118) (0.0368) (0.00149)
Observations 129,792 129,792 129,792 129,792 112,839
R-squared 0.897 0.869 0.913 0.893 0.443
Quart.*Prov. FE YES YES YES YES YES
Quart.*Ind. FE YES YES YES YES YES
Prov.*Ind. FE YES YES YES YES YES
Quart*Prov.*Sect. FE YES YES YES YES YES
Quart*Reg.*Ind. FE NO NO YES YES YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01
Main DDD regression to estimate the causal effect of banks’ rent-extraction on the effect of
the policy, measured in terms of new incorporations in R&D-oriented sector. Incorporations
are measured both in numbers (columns 1-4) and percentage of registered firms four quarters
before (column 5). The dummy Rent is calculated using the median return distance at
the national level. In addition to the baseline fixed-effects structure, columns 3-5 includes
Quarter × Region × Industry fixed-effects. Columns 2 and 4 use as outcome variable
incorporations of non-limited liability companies (NLLCs), that being excluded from the
policy constitute a placebo test.
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Table B9: DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES - REGIONAL
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LLC - New NLLC - New LLC - Pct. NLLC - Pct.
Rentr × Policy × Industry -0.153*** -0.0274 -0.00208** -0.00176
(0.0500) (0.0183) (0.000953) (0.00119)
Observations 129,792 129,792 112,839 104,994
R-squared 0.913 0.893 0.443 0.447
Quart.*Prov. FE YES YES YES YES
Quart.*Ind. FE YES YES YES YES
Prov.*Ind. FE YES YES YES YES
Quart*Prov.*Sect. FE YES YES YES YES
Quart*Reg.*Ind. FE YES YES YES YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01
DDD regression to estimate the causal effect of banks’ rent-extraction on the effect of the
policy, measured in terms of new incorporations in R&D-oriented sector. Incorporations
are measured both in numbers (columns 1 and 2) and percentage of registered firms four
quarters before (columns 3 and 4). The dummy Rent is calculated using the median return
distance at the regional level. Columns 2 and 4 use as outcome variable incorporations of
non-limited liability companies (NLLCs), that being excluded from the policy constitute a
placebo test.
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Table B10: INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES - NUMBERS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
First Stage IV First Stage IV First Stage IV OLS
Saving Branches (1936) -4.104*** -2.789**
(1.150) (1.345)
Return Distance -1.198*** -1.763*** -1.458*** -0.350***
(0.461) (0.591) (0.452) (0.131)
Bank Branches (1936) -1.485*** -0.925*
(0.434) (0.506)
Constant 3.482*** 3.820** 3.567*** 5.704*** 3.580*** 4.685*** 0.991**
(0.0556) (1.539) (0.0777) (1.971) (0.0767) (1.509) (0.438)
Observations 104 104 104 104 104 104 104
R-squared 0.066
F Statistics 12.75 11.71 8.19 -
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Estimation of the effect of banks’ rent-extraction on the effect of the policy using the IV
approach, via 2SLS. The first stage (columns 1, 3 and 5) uses the number of savings banks’
branches and total banks’ branches per capita in 1936 as instruments for the return distance
at the province level. The outcome variable is the effect of SIA at the province level,
estimated on the number of new incorporations in innovative sectors using the difference-
in-differences framework in Equation 2.26. For reference, column 7 collects estimate of the
basic OLS regression of the policy’s effects on the return distance.
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Table B11: INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES - PERCENTAGES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
First Stage IV First Stage IV First Stage IV OLS
Saving Branches (1936) -4.104*** -2.789**
(1.150) (1.345)
Return Distance -0.00931** -0.00771* -0.00858** -0.00211*
(0.00431) (0.00425) (0.00375) (0.00126)
Bank Branches (1936) -1.485*** -0.925*
(0.434) (0.506)
Constant 3.482*** 0.0317** 3.567*** 0.0264* 3.580*** 0.0293** 0.00774*
(0.0556) (0.0144) (0.0777) (0.0142) (0.0767) (0.0125) (0.00424)
Observations 104 104 104 104 104 104 104
R-squared 0.027
F Statistics 12.75 11.71 8.19 -
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Estimation of the effect of banks’ rent-extraction on the effect of the policy using the IV
approach, via 2SLS. The first stage (columns 1, 3 and 5) uses the number of savings banks’
branches and total banks’ branches per capita in 1936 as instruments for the return dis-
tance at the province level. The outcome variable is the effect of SIA at the province level,
estimated on new incorporations in innovative sectors expressed as percentages of firms reg-
istered four quarters before. To estimate the effect of SIA, I use the difference-in-differences
framework in Equation 2.26. For reference, column 7 collects estimate of the basic OLS
regression of the policy’s effects on the return distance.
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Table B12: DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES - SOUTH
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LLC - New LLC - Pct. LLC - New LLC - Pct.
Rent× Policy × Industry -0.157** -0.00296**
(0.0748) (0.00144)
South× Policy × Industry -0.0291 0.00224** 0.0504 0.00373**
(0.0570) (0.00108) (0.0755) (0.00147)
Observations 129,792 114,349 129,792 114,349
R-squared 0.897 0.296 0.897 0.297
Quart.*Prov. FE YES YES YES YES
Quart.*Ind. FE YES YES YES YES
Prov.*Ind. FE YES YES YES YES
Quart*Prov.*Sect. FE YES YES YES YES
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01
DDD regressions where the dummy Rent, defined using the median return distance at the
national level, is substituted with a dummy South, equal one if the province is located in
the South of Italy and 0 otherwise. The placebo triple interaction of South with Industry
and policy is used both as main regressor (columns 1 and 2) and as a control (columns 3
and 4). Outcome variables are new incorporations, expressed both in numbers (columns 1
and 3) and as percentage of registered firms four quarters before (columns 2 and 4).
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Table B13: DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES - WITHOUT FEs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LLC - New LLC - New Pct. LLC - New LLC - New Pct.
Rent× Policy × Industry -0.125** -0.00125
(0.0576) (0.000916)
Rentr × Policy × Industry -0.126** -0.00180**
(0.0550) (0.000895)
Rent× Policy -0.0492 0.000111
(0.0486) (0.000434)
Rentr × Policy -0.0932* -0.000625
(0.0479) (0.000447)
Rent× Industry -0.326** -0.000853
(0.147) (0.000554)
Rentr × Industry -0.155 -0.000372
(0.141) (0.000583)
Industry × Policy 0.170*** 0.00203*** 0.166*** 0.00224***
(0.0516) (0.000695) (0.0492) (0.000682)
Industry 0.279* 0.00161*** 0.188 0.00135***
(0.142) (0.000314) (0.134) (0.000277)
Policy 0.144*** 0.000901*** 0.162*** 0.00124***
(0.0346) (0.000222) (0.0333) (0.000212)
Rent -0.299* -0.000861*
(0.151) (0.000440)
Rentr -0.169 0.000757
(0.146) (0.000458)
Constant 0.674*** 0.00470*** 0.603*** 0.00392***
(0.138) (0.000193) (0.129) (0.000220)
Observations 134,784 120,332 134,784 120,332
R-squared 0.007 0.002 0.004 0.001
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
DDD regressions estimated without the use of any fixed-effect, to asses the robustness of
estimation to the fixed-effect structure considered.
C. Appendix to Liaisons Dangereuses -
Relationship Banking and Venture
Capital
C.1 Figures
Figure C1: VC INVESTMENT AND GDP
Scatter plot of VC investments as % of GDP and natural logarithm of GDP (in millions
USD) among OECD countries. Data on VC investments and countries’ GDP comes from
the OECD data bank.
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Figure C2: VC INVESTMENT AND RELATIONSHIP LENDING
Scatter plot of VC investments as % of GDP and importance of relationship lenders in the
banking market among OECD countries. The latter is calculated as the ratio of the sum of
loans and deposits made by relationship lenders to the sum of loans and deposits made by
non-relationship lenders. Data on VC investments comes from the OECD data bank, data
on relationship lenders comes the IMF Finance Access Survey.
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Figure C3: CASHFLOWS - BANK FINANCING
Cashflow profile and probabilities of success of the entrepreneur for a generic project under
bank financing.
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Figure C4: CASHFLOWS - VC FINANCING
Cashflow profile and probabilities of success of the entrepreneur for a generic project under
VC financing.
APPENDIX C. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3 172
Figure C5: DECISION TREE OF THE ENTREPRENEUR
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Full tree of the model as a game. The tree represents the choices and pay-offs available to
the entrepreneur, conditional on financiers best responses.
